Ancient Commentators on Aristotle

GENERAL EDITOR: RICHARD SORABJI

SIMPLICIUS: On Aristotle Categories 5–6

Translated by

Frans A.J. de Haas & Barrie Fleet

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Contents

Acknowledgments vi

Simplicius *On Aristotle Categories 5*
translated by Frans A.J. de Haas 1
Introduction 3
Textual Emendations 16

Translation 17

Notes 67
Bibliography 81
English-Greek Glossary 83
Greek-English Index 87
Subject Index 92

Simplicius *On Aristotle Categories 6*
translated by Barrie Fleet 93
Introduction 95
Textual Emendations 98

Translation 99

Notes 137
Bibliography 153
English-Greek Glossary 155
Greek-English Index 161
Subject Index 168
Index of Passages 170

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Simplicius
On Aristotle Categories 5

Frans A.J. de Haas

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Introduction

Simplicius wrote his extensive commentaries on works of Aristotle after the year AD 532. He studied in Alexandria under Ammonius and in Athens under Damascius. In AD 529 the Neoplatonic School at Athens closed under the threat of Justinian's laws which prohibited the teaching of pagan philosophy. Damascius, Simplicius, Priscian and a number of other philosophers were forced to continue their work elsewhere. Recently Rainer Thiel[1] has argued anew that we may have some confidence in the story that after a disappointing visit to Chosroes, the Persian king, Simplicius settled in Carrhae (Harran) in present-day Turkey. Whatever his precise place of residence, we can be fairly certain that it was only after his return to the Roman Empire that Simplicius wrote his surviving commentaries, i.e. on Epictetus' *Enchiridion*,[2] and on Aristotle's *De Caelo*, *Physics* (after 538), and *Categories* (after the *Physics* commentary).[3]

In later centuries the commentary on the *Categories* was perhaps the most widely available one among Simplicius' works. In the Middle Ages William of Moerbeke provided a Latin translation of the *Categories* commentary (1271) which was later revised and printed by Paul of Geneçano (Venice 1516). Zacharias Kallierges edited the Greek text (Venice 1499) which served as the basis of a second Latin translation by Guillelmus Dorotheus (Venice 1540).[4] However, the question what impact (if any) Simplicius' commentary had on philosophy in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance is an issue that remains largely to be investigated.

To the eyes of a modern beholder Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories* has rather surprising aims, which are defined at the beginning of his commentary (2,30-3,17). Iamblichus' commentary on the *Categories* (lost but for fragments in Dexippus and Simplicius) is literally Simplicius' source of inspiration. Simplicius regards the writing of his own commentary as a spiritual exercise, itself a means of obtaining the high level of understanding displayed in Iamblichus' work.[5] At the same time Simplicius aims at clarifying Iamblichus' work so as to make it more accessible to the less-gifted, as well as reducing the bulk of all available commentaries to a reasonable size. A small number of additions of his own, he claims, should be regarded as mere introductory material to Iamblichus' interpretation and to Porphyry's large commentary on the *Categories Ad Gedalium*[6] whose work Iamblichus 'followed right to the letter' (2,11). In this large commentary Porphyry is reported to have answered all tradi-

tional *aporiai* raised up to his date, notably those of Lucius and Nicostratus. Many of these *aporiai* had also been taken up and developed in Plotinus' *Enneads* 6.1-3, *On the Genera of Being*. In its turn, Plotinus' treatment is reflected in Dexippus' question-and-answer commentary on the *Categories*.[7] The more concise *Categories* commentaries of the Alexandrian school,[8] tailored to the level and needs of freshmen in philosophy, can be shown to have drawn mainly on Porphyry's work.

In addition to Porphyry's achievement, Iamblichus provided an integration of Aristotle's doctrine into the larger perspective of Neoplatonic metaphysics, the so-called 'intellective theory' (*noera theôria*).[9] Iamblichus also added numerous references to (Pseudo)-Archytas the Pythagorean's *On the Universal Logos* (or *Logoi*) which we now know to be a forgery.[10] However, Iamblichus and Simplicius regarded the work of Archytas as Aristotle's Pythagorean source and compared Aristotle's text and doctrine to those of Archytas in this spirit.[11] These dimensions of Simplicius' commentary have no counterpart in the Alexandrian commentaries, if only because they would surpass the level of freshmen (not of course because their authors did not share any of Iamblichus' Neoplatonic metaphysics or were less sophisticated philosophers).[12]

This background is important for understanding the structure of Simplicius' commentary since each individual lemma may betray the course of the history of ancient scholarship as outlined in the previous section. The broad structure of Simplicius' commentary sometimes clearly reveals an underlying organization into *theôria* and *lexis*, i.e. doctrinal sections explaining the philosophical content, followed by close scrutiny of Aristotle's text, respectively.[13] The commentaries from the Alexandrian school exhibit this structure more clearly. It derives from a teaching practice in which Aristotle's text was cut into manageable blocks which are often still mirrored in our division of Aristotle's text. First the philosophical significance of such a unit was laid out to introduce the pupils to the 'correct' interpretation; then this interpretation was confirmed by means of an (almost) word by word commentary on the text. Simplicius specifies that particularly the harmonization between Aristotle and Plato is based on a balanced exegesis of both wording and philosophical content (7,29-32).

As a result of Simplicius' aim to bring together the entire tradition up to his day, his commentary is also a blend of two commentary formats. The surviving commentaries by Porphyry and Dexippus are lists of questions and answers that follow the sequence of Aristotle's text. In a direct way this format reflects the older tradition of raising and answering *aporiai* about both text and philosophical doctrine, which itself imitates Aristotle's aporetic mode of doing philosophy.[14] Substantial parts of Simplicius' commentary exhibit this structure, with hardly any transition between questions. However, this question-and-answer format is embedded in a format in which the commentary is organized by lemmata and reads as a continuous text. This format is already found in e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias'

commentaries on Aristotle and in Athenian and Alexandrian commentaries on both Plato and Aristotle. Simplicius' magisterial command of his topic can be gleaned from the way in which he was capable of combining the two formats: his presentation of the *aporiai* (or his straightforward rejection of a view which can be shown to derive from the aporetic tradition) is often at the same time a clever device to explain a topic in more detail, or to proceed from one issue to another.[15]

In each of these two stages of *theôria* and *lexis* traditional *aporiai* could be raised, and solved either by drawing on the same tradition (Plotinus, Porphyry) and/or by having recourse to Iamblichus' intellective theory. However, Simplicius tends to refrain from Iamblichus' more lofty speculations, probably in order to remain faithful to the aims he set himself for his commentary.[16] However, the Neoplatonic commentary tradition on the *Categories* is less of a unity than Simplicius suggests. Plotinus and Porphyry restricted the scope of the *Categories* to the sensible world, whereas commentators from Iamblichus onwards strove to extend Aristotle's categories to the intelligible world by analogy.

Even more troublesome is the relation between Plotinus and Porphyry with respect to the *Categories*. Modern interpretations differ: the scholarly consensus claims that Plotinus, after a thorough critique of Aristotle's work, rejects it in order to replace it with a Platonic ontology which has Plato's five highest genera (Being, Motion, Rest, Sameness, Otherness) as the genera of intelligible being. For sensible being he more or less settles for categories of Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Relation (which have hardly more than their name in common with Aristotle's categories), together with Motion. Porphyry, the consensus view continues, opposed Plotinus in order to rescue the *Categories* for Neoplatonism. He restricted the scope of Aristotle's work to the sensible realm, and claimed that it was intended for beginners in philosophy so that the work (as well as his own commentaries) need not contain a sophisticated Platonic metaphysics.[17] He accepted all ten Aristotelian categories as genera that are truly predicable of the sensible realm. Moreover, he is said to have taken the trouble of refuting every *aporia* ever raised against the *Categories*.[18] This fundamental disagreement between Plotinus and Porphyry concerning the compatibility of the *Categories* and Platonic thought is even believed by some to have been the real motive for Porphyry's departure for Sicily from where he never returned to Plotinus, and where he probably wrote most of his work on the *Categories*.[19] On this theory the question remains why Plotinus would have trusted Porphyry to edit his work if they had parted long ago because of such a fundamental disagreement.

Recently, a number of scholars have emphasized that many of the *aporiai* which Plotinus raised were part of the commentary tradition of his day – which he discussed in his classes[20] – and therefore need not necessarily reflect his own opinion; that he often provides hints of answers to these *aporiai*; and that Porphyry and later commentators can be shown to

have taken up these hints in developing their own interpretation.[21] In this respect at least, the gap between Plotinus' and Porphyry's handling of the *Categories* is indeed less wide than was commonly believed.

However, on this interpretation the disagreement between Plotinus and Porphyry concerning the significance of the *Categories* for Platonism may well remain. For since later commentators (including Simplicius) also employ the earlier aporetic tradition while defending different views of the *Categories* as a whole, it seems that continuity in this respect does not exclude important disagreements elsewhere.

These and other considerations have led me to attempt a different approach to the problem which is based on a different reading of Plotinus *Enneads* 6.1-3. While relegating a careful analysis of Plotinus' work to a separate paper I am currently preparing, I shall here confine myself to a rough outline of my interpretation. First, any assessment of the reception of the *Categories* should take account of the fact that Plotinus wrote an ontological treatise on the genera of (real) being, not a commentary on the *Categories*, whereas Porphyry wrote an introduction (the famous *Isagoge*) and commentaries on the *Categories*. Moreover, in doing so Porphyry explicitly chose to start from Peripatetic doctrine, to write for beginning students, and to avoid strictly metaphysical issues as much as possible. In my view, the different aims of the writings of Plotinus and Porphyry already throw a different light on many of their so-called disagreements. Furthermore, it is striking that Plotinus' negative assessment of the *Categories* as an ontological work in *Enn.* 6.1.1 did not deter him from using it as a kind of sparring partner throughout the aporetic metaphysical explorations of *Enn.* 6.1-3. With respect to the four categories that he retains (albeit with extensive modifications), he ends his discussion with the statement that the characteristics by which Aristotle differentiates between his categories allow one to use the names (*katêgoriai*) 'substance', 'quantity', 'quality', and 'relation' to designate a collection of different kinds of sensible 'entities' – as long as one is clear that these terms do not signify proper genera of being, nor disclose anything of the true nature of such genera.[22] For instance matter, form, and the composite are all called 'substance' by Aristotle,[23] even though they differ essentially, even in the way in which characterics like 'not being in a subject' and 'not being said of a subject' apply to them.[24]

Perhaps, I venture to suggest, Porphyry simply started where Plotinus left the discussion of the *Categories*, i.e. with *katêgoriai* as predicates of sensible 'entities' without direct relevance (or threat) to Platonic metaphysics. It is common knowledge that Porphyry developed a semantics of his own on the basis of the *Categories* and Aristotle's theory of predication, and thus laid the foundations of Western logic.[25] If my reconstruction is in any way plausible, Plotinus' Platonic concerns forced a wedge between, on the one hand, the *Categories* as Aristotle's discussion of the language by which we refer to the sensible world, and Platonic ontology on the other.

Thus Plotinus set Porphyry on the track of exploring Aristotelian logic (almost) without metaphysical strings attached. If so, it was Plotinus, not Porphyry, who redefined the meaning and significance of Aristotle's categories so as to fit within the larger project of a Platonic ontology. Even if Porphyry's approach led him to ontological claims which Plotinus would not have endorsed, I believe their interpretation of the *Categories* as such had too much in common to speak of a fundamental disagreement.[26]

Substance: Neoplatonic influences

Despite the ingenious treatment of Aristotle's *Categories* by Plotinus and later Neoplatonists there is every reason to suspect that especially the chapter on Substance raises considerable difficulties for a Platonist.[27] First and foremost the priority given to primary substances, i.e. sensible composites, is (and was meant to be) entirely at variance with any Platonic treatment of being. Indeed, Simplicius pays considerable attention to questions of ontological priority, often in rebutting Alexander's Peripatetic interpretation of the *Categories*.[28] It is not surprising to find that here Plotinus' guidelines turn out to be most powerful. From the angle of our common practice of predication sensible composite substances are indeed primary, and the predication of species and genera secondary. And if this semantical approach is inadequate Simplicius may rely on an achievement of Porphyry's who declared the *Categories* a work for beginners, to be prefaced by his own *Isagoge*.[29] After all, freshmen cannot be expected to absorb distinctions only more advanced students will be introduced to in other works of Aristotle and/or Plato.[30]

Distinctive Neoplatonic concerns surface in Simplicius' treatment of (a) the epistemological status of Aristotle's treatment of each category from *Cat.* 5 onwards; (b) the order of the categories; (c) universals; and (d) the status of the differentia.

(a) Since the categories are supposed to be the *highest* genera it is impossible by definition to define them by stating their genus and differentia. Since this seems to rule out that Aristotle's treatment of them constitutes a definition *pur sang*, what is the purpose of the chapters starting with *Cat.* 5? Simplicius claims that highest genera can only be captured by a *description* (*hupographê*) that consists in a list of, first, the properties each category has in common with others (the pseudo-genus), followed by the property (or properties) that mark it off from the other categories (the pseudo-differentia(e)).[31] Such a description is sufficient because it is able to trigger our innate knowledge of being, i.e. to set in motion, under the instruction of a gifted teacher, the process of recollection that will lead students of philosophy to knowledge of the intelligible truth (see esp. 12,16-13,11; 159,9-12). Simplicius is convinced that Aristotle's *Categories* is perfectly capable of serving that goal.

(b) Another recurrent theme is the order in which Aristotle listed the

categories. All agree that substance should be listed first (75,31-76,12), but Archytas put quality second after substance, instead of quantity (120,27-122,30). Although Aristotle himself does not seem to have had a specific order (or number) of the categories in mind,[32] Simplicius explicitly opposes the notion of a random listing since this would destroy the mutual co-ordination of beings as well as the self-consistency of Aristotle's account (155,33-156,4). Consequently, it becomes important to identify the presuppositions of different orderings so as not to get confused about the true order of nature. In this context the Aristotelian distinction between 'prior to us' and 'prior by nature' may be helpful to distinguish the order of Aristotle's teaching in the *Categories* from the order of the true hierarchy of being (e.g. 156,5-8). In the case of the position of Quantity Simplicius remarks that an appeal to the perspective of the sensible substance does not help because the form of the composite, which is substance *par excellence* according to the *Metaphysics*, is akin to unextended quality rather than extended quantity. Therefore he has recourse to common parlance and general accessibility in order to explain the position of Quantity in the *Categories* (122,5-30).

(c) On more than one occasion Simplicius discusses a threefold division of universals, or rather 'common items' (*koina*) which enables him to locate in a consistent hierarchy all of Plato's Forms, their images, both innate in our minds and reflected in the Receptacle, and Aristotle's forms and acquired concepts (68,32-71,2; 82,35-83,16).[33] One should distinguish between (1) a common cause which transcends the individuals; (2) a common nature which resides in individuals as the effect of this cause, constituting them as members of a particular species; and (3) the concept corresponding to this common nature as established in our thought by means of abstraction and thus freed from the differentiation accrued to it in each individual. Platonic Forms, or rather their Neoplatonic descendants in Intellect, come under (1), all kinds of immanent forms under (2), and acquired concepts under (3).

This threefold division is called upon to sort out a number of difficulties concerning the *Categories*. Although many problems of priority have specific bearing on Neoplatonic concerns with the hierarchy of being, they often arise as problems of interpreting all of Aristotle's works as a coherent whole. For instance the ranking of primary vs. secondary substances in *Categories* 5 can be seen as contradicting *Metaphysics* 12.7, 1072a31-2, *Physics* 1.1, 184a23-4 (so 82,1-22), and *Posterior Analytics* 1.2, 72a1. However, *Categories* 5 deals with genera and species as common causes from the perspective of sensible substances; hence they are ranked secondary 'in relation to us'. *Metaphysics* 12.7, *Physics* 1.1, and *Posterior Analytics* 1.2 deal with common causes in their own right; hence they are ranked primary 'by nature'. As opposed to this interpretation, Alexander of Aphrodisias is reported to have claimed that individuals are prior to universals *by nature*. Of course Simplicius can only condone this interpre-

tation if here 'universals' refers to (3) concepts which are neither (1) common causes nor (2) common natures. But in that case Alexander cannot hold – as Simplicius claims he did – that the individuals are *constituted* out of the common item plus differences. Nor is it acceptable to claim with Alexander that the Intellect is an individual substance on a par with the sensible ones. Moreover, Simplicius objects to Alexander's division of Substance into corporeal and incorporeal as two equivalent branches. Only if Alexander would be ready to agree to the priority of incorporeal over corporeal substance as part of a series of ever-declining effects (*en têi huphesei*)[34] of Substance as a common cause, can his division be accepted. Simplicius characteristically adds a reference to Plato's *Parmenides* 144b1-c8 in support of his position.[35] In short, Simplicius uses the threefold division of 'common item' to sort out apparent contradictions between Aristotle's works, to harmonize different interpretations of the *Categories*, as well as to align recalcitrant interpretations with Neoplatonic emanatist metaphysics.

A.C. Lloyd[36] has drawn attention to the fact that the Neoplatonists stretched the notion of 'genus' to include the intelligible cause. Simplicius is clearly aware of the difference between the logical genus and the causal genus (cf. 77,1-4.12-14), which instantiate the third and first universal of his division respectively. This 'enriched' genus breaks away from the Academic restriction embraced by Aristotle[37] that if members of a class exhibit a hierarchical order the class will not be a genus. E.g. 'soul' cannot be predicated of each different kind of soul without equivocation – and therefore not as a genus – because 'soul' is different in each.[38] For such cases Aristotle developed his theory of focal meaning in terms of which the Neoplatonists shaped their causal genera.[39] Simplicius discusses the restriction as a traditional problem for the genus of Quantity which is supposed to range over the discrete and the continuous, the former of which is prior to the latter.[40] The equally traditional answer is that immediate participation of both in the causal genus is sufficient to warrant Aristotle's wording, even if Quantity is not a logical genus (126,6-127,11).

(d) Finally, the presence of Neoplatonism is obvious in the state-of-the-art discussion of the categorial status of the differentia (97,24-102,10) which perhaps deserves to be regarded as a *Corollarium* on a par with the famous corollaries on Place and Time in Simplicius' *Physics* commentary.[41] The 'Essay on the differentia' as I have called it, addresses the status of differentiae in general, not just differentiae of substances.[42] Although in Aristotle the term 'differentia' denotes a predicate and a part of the definition, not a kind of being, the ancient commentators were troubled as to its categorial status. Does the differentia belong to Substance because it helps constitute a composite substance, or does it belong to Quality because it somehow 'qualifies' a species? With Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Dexippus, Simplicius settles for the hybrid notion of a 'substantial quality' which, so he believes, satisfies nature's need for intermediates. Judging

from his arguments Simplicius seems to have a slight preference for the option that a 'substantial quality' is an entity that participates in both categories,[43] not a *tertium quid* next to Substance and Quality – which was vehemently denied by Ammonius and his school as introducing an eleventh category.[44]

Simplicius' contribution

As Simplicius led us to expect in his introduction (3,10-17), some passages in his commentary have flown from his own ingenuity, e.g. 'an *aporia* of some value or a noteworthy articulation of the argument' (3,12-13). A combination of both seems to be present in the division of positions concerning the categorial status of the differentia discussed above. We have seen that Simplicius opts for the position that the differentia is a 'substantial quality'. But then Simplicius can no longer agree with Iamblichus' reply to the question how the differentia, itself a quality, can nevertheless be predicated synonymously of a substance (*Cat.* 3a17-28). For Iamblichus criticizes the question as resting on the confusion of regarding the differentia *both* as part of the substance *and* as a quality in its own right. In order to escape this criticism, Simplicius must reject Iamblichus' solution. He rephrases the problem and provides the solution that since the differentia is not merely a quality but a *substantial* quality, and therefore *essentially* part of a substance, the definition of the differentia *qua* quality is simply irrelevant to the discussion. Fortunately Simplicius suggests that this solution can be confirmed from later remarks in Iamblichus so that this departure from his master is not too obvious.[45]

Concerning a problem involved in essential predication Simplicius' dissatisfaction with existing solutions gives rise to an interesting compromise (79,22-80,8). The problem was put that if 'human being' is *said of* Socrates this would mean that 'human being' is *in* Socrates and thereby an accident – which is obviously absurd. Porphyry and Iamblichus claimed that in such cases the non-coordinated (*akatatakton*) human being (either the concept or the cause) is *said of* the coordinated (*katatakton*) nature of human being which is present *in* Socrates. This solution nicely preserves the distinction in Aristotle's vocabulary between 'said of' and 'in'. At the same time it shows why essential predication is not a tautology, and how Neoplatonic metaphysics ties in with each act of predication. However, Simplicius suggests that this solution should be further refined in order to meet more clearly the problem of identity and difference involved in essential predication, thus developing a hint of Iamblichus in a related context (cf. 53,9-18). In contrast to his predecessors Simplicius prefers to regard the *coordinated* nature of human being as the predicate[46] but only *in virtue of* the likeness to its transcendent cause which it is able to display by participation. In other words, Simplicius creates a distinction *within* the individual substance (between the likeness displayed by the image and

the image as a whole) in order to solve the initial problem. This focus is more in line with the framework of common parlance about sensible objects to which the problematic in Aristotle's *Categories* is supposed to be confined, and still emphasizes (though in a different way) the causal relation between transcendent causes and immanent natures.

Finally, Simplicius seems to raise a new problem in response to Iamblichus' claim that if one considers speech only by its length and vocal utterance one does not appear to reveal any order (138,25-139,10). Is it not clear to everyone that there is order in the word, that nobody would speak the name 'Socrates' by pronouncing the syllable 'cra' first? If, then, order is accepted in the case of speech too, *all* quantities lacking position (time, number, and speech) will have order in terms of prior and posterior instead. In this way Simplicius deftly removes an incongruity from Iamblichus' interpretation of Aristotle and at the same time provides Aristotle with an even more coherent account. Thus Simplicius' own additions may serve to confirm once again the ingenuity of his strategy in demonstrating the coherence of Aristotle's *Categories* and its harmony with the whole tradition of ancient philosophy as a unique mode of knowledge which was believed to derive ultimately from Pythagorean wisdom.

Notes

1. Rainer Thiel, 'Simplikios und das Ende der neuplatonischen Schule in Athen', *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz. Abhandlungen der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse*, no. 8, 1999 provides an extensive reappraisal of the issue, with a full bibliography. I am grateful to him for putting his publications (see also n. 18) at my disposal.

2. cf. I. Hadot, *Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète*, Leiden, 1996.

3. Simplicius, *In Aristotelis De Caelo Commentaria*, ed. I.L. Heiberg, *CAG* 7, Berlin, 1894; id., *In Aristotelis Physicorum libros quattuor priores commentaria*, ed. H. Diels, *CAG* 9, Berlin, 1882; id., *In Aristotelis Physicorum libros quattuor posteriores commentaria*, ed. H. Diels, *CAG* 10, Berlin, 1895; id., *In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium*, ed. C. Kalbfleisch, *CAG* 8, Berlin, 1907. Two volumes of a French translation of Simpl. *in Cat.* with elaborate commentary have been published under the direction of Mme Ilsetraut Hadot (1990); for a review see De Haas, *Mnemosyne* 47.5, 1994, 698-702. A volume containing a translation of *Cat.* 5 by Mme Hadot with commentary by Concetta Luna is currently in preparation. In the present series Simplicius' commentary is translated with introduction and notes in four volumes by Michael Chase (Simpl. *in Cat.* chs 1-4), Frans de Haas & Barrie Fleet (chs 5-6), Barrie Fleet (chs 7-8) and Richard Gaskin (chs 9-15) respectively.

4. Recently reprinted by Charles Lohr (1999).

5. cf. the prayer at the end of the commentary, 438,33-6.

6. Michael Chase is preparing a full edition and commentary of the fragments that remain of this illustrious commentary, many of them deriving from Simpl. *in Cat.* Porphyry's short question-and-answer commentary was translated for this series by Steven Strange (1992).

7. Translated by John Dillon (1990).

8. See in the present series Cohen & Matthews (1991). Philoponus' *in Cat.*, ed. Busse 1898, *CAG* 13.1, reflects the same lectures by Ammonius, albeit in a more elaborate and sometimes more critical mode.

9. See John Dillon, 'Iamblichus' *Noera Theôria* of Aristotle's *Categories*', in H.J. Blumenthal and J.F. Finamore (eds), *Iamblichus: the philosopher*, Iowa City, 1997, 65-77. Iamblichus discussed the status of this mode of knowledge at *Myst.* 1.2, 16-22; 2.9, 5-7.

10. Szlezák (1972) 14 dates this text between the second half of the first century BC and Hippolytus of Rome, with preference for a date early in this period.

11. This gives rise to bogus questions as to why Aristotle omitted pieces of Archytas (e.g. 78,31-79,5) or deviated from the order of categories Archytas had laid down (91,14-33), but also why Aristotle discusses topics Archytas omitted (40,5-13).

12. See e.g. E. Tempelis, *The School of Ammonius, Son of Hermias, on Knowledge of the Divine,* Athens, 1998 for a sufficient antidote to such assumptions.

13. See e.g. 22,15; 68,32-3; 80,13-14; 159,9; 165,31; 208,22-3; 211,5; 228,1-3; 286,4; 381,31-3; 387,17.

14. Simplicius also finds this feature in the *Categories*, see e.g. 118,3: 'Let us see which problems Aristotle adds to what has been said.'

15. See e.g. Simpl. *in Cat.* 87,1-88,23; 103,8-104,18; 123,29-126,5; 141,16-143,8.

16. This is especially clear at the start of his own evaluation of Iamblichus' doctrine of Place at 364,7-8 which echoes 3,7.

17. There are indications that the *Ad Gedalium* contained some digressions on metaphysics, notably an attempt to harmonize Plotinus' metaphysics with *Metaphysica* Lambda; cf. Hadot (1990) 132ff. Prophyry's question-and-answer commentary is concerned with ontology only indirectly, in so far as the significant terms which are the proper subject of the *Categories* signify genera of being, Porph. *in Cat.* 57,19-59,33.

18. cf. Simpl. *in Cat.* 2,5-8.

19. See Chr. Evangeliou, *Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry*, Leiden, 1988, 3-5; his suggestion was taken up by H.D. Saffrey, 'Pourquoi Porphyre a-t-il édité Plotin?' in Porphyre *La Vie de Plotin*, edited by Luc Brisson et al., vol. 2, Paris, 1992, 43-4 and Porphyre *Isagoge*: *texte grec et latin*, translated by Alain de Libera and Alain-Philippe Segonds, introduction and notes by A. de Libera, Paris, 1998, pp. viii-x. Contrast Porph. *Vita Plotini* §11, 11-19, saying he acted on Plotinus' advice in order to cure the suicidal inclinations from which he suffered. From §5, 51-64 we may infer that Plotinus finished *Enneads* 6.1-3 shortly before Porphyry left for Sicily.

20. See Porph. *Vita Plotini* §14, with Goulet-Cazé (1992).

21. See S. Strange (1987); and R. Thiel, *Introduction to Simplicius. Commentarium in decem Categorias Aristotelis*, translated by Guillelmus Dorotheus (1540). Reprint edition by Charles Lohr. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1999, pp. viii-xiv. This introduction contains the gist of Thiel's unpublished 1997 Marburg Habilitationsschrift *Aristoteles' Kategorienschrift in ihrer antiken Kommentierung*, which he kindly put at my disposal.

22. cf. Plot. *Enn.* 6.1.3.19-23; 6.1.5.22-6; 6.1.9.27-30; 6.1.10.40-2.

23. Arist. *Metaph.* 8.2, 1043a26-8; *DA* 412a6-11, 414a14-16.

24. cf. Plot. *Enn.* 6.3.5.36-9; 6.3.8.9-12.

25. For a survey of Porphyry's contribution to logic which emphasizes the a-metaphysical nature of Porphyry's enterprise see Sten Ebbesen, 'Porphyry's Legacy to Logic: a reconstruction', in *Aristotle Transformed*: *The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, edited by R.R.K. Sorabji, London, 1990, 141-71.

26. Of course neither Plotinus nor Porphyry interpreted the *Categories* in a way that should be acceptable to us today. Here I have been concerned only with an assessment of the compatibility or incompatibility between their views of the *Categories* and the role they see for this work in the whole of their philosophy.

27. cf. Strange (1987) 957-8.

28. cf. 82,6-10; 82,22-35; 83,16-20; 85,5-9; 90,31-3.

29. In this Porphyry followed the Peripatetic Herminus, Porph. *in Cat*. 59,21-2.

30. cf. 67,9-12; 110,24-5; 133,35-134,4; 194,3-11; 264,1-4; 268,24-5; 278,5-7; 295,6-16; 317,27-9; 346,18-20; 387,23-4; 411,5-6; 418,24-8; 426,34-427,2; 427,25-8; 428,5-13.

31. cf. 92,3-13; 141,12-15.

32. Compare the *Categories* and *Top*. 1.9, 103b20-29 with e.g. *Metaph.* 5.7, 1017a24-30; 5.28, 1024b12-15; 6.2, 1026a33-b2; 7.1, 1028a10-13; *EN* 1.6, 1096a19-29. Contrast Simplicius' claim at *in Cat.* 12,3-16.

33. For a general appraisal of this division in relation to its medieval developments see Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge*, Paris 1996, 103-5.

34. P. Hadot (1990) 130 notes the first application of this principle of degradation under the name of *huphesis* throughout Porphyry's *Sententiae*, esp. 11.3.5 (Mommert).

35. For similar appeals to Plato cf. 76,25; 104,25; 108,15.

36. cf. A.C. Lloyd (1990), ch. 3. For the contrast see e.g. Plot. *Enn*. 6.2.2., 10-14.

37. cf. *Metaph.* 3.3, 999a6-14.

38. For the application to soul cf. the clear discussions by Simpl. *in DA* 81,12-26; 106,33-107,14.

39. For Aristotle's conception of *aph' henos kai pros hen* predication see *Metaph.* 4.2; for its fate in the hands of the Platonists, see P. Hadot (1990), and P. Aubenque, 'Plotin et Dexippe, exégètes des catégories d'Aristote', in *Aristotelica.* Mélanges offerts à M. De Corte, edited by Christiaan Rutten and A. Motte, Bruxelles-Liège, 1985, 7-40.

40. cf. Plot. *Enn.* 6.3.13,12-15, Dex. *in Cat.* 67,8-68,11.

41. Translated for this series by J.O. Urmson, *Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time*, London and Ithaca NY, 1992.

42. For a detailed discussion of this problem in the ancient commentators see De Haas (1997) 180-250.

43. Compare the position of paronyms as participating in both homonyms and synonyms without sharing all features of both at 37,3-4.

44. cf. Amm. *in Cat.* 46,18-19; Philop. *in Cat.* 66,6-12. The possibility of an eleventh category was already discussed and rejected by Alexander in his *De differentiis specificis* preserved in Arabic; see further De Haas (1997) 214-19.

45. Other deviations from Iamblichus occur at 41,21-4 (Iamblichus misquoted Alexander); 99,6-10; 100,3-12; 101,34-102,6; 138,16-24; 139,5-10; 147,1-22.

46. Here Simplicius remains close to at least the wording of Plotinus, cf. *Enn.* 6.1.3, 17-18.

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Simplicius
On Aristotle Categories 5

Translation

Textual Emendations

78,14	reading *on ti* instead of *onti*
88,5	reading *estai* for *ginetai*; cf. the apparatus
88,19	reading *phasin* for *phêsin*, following Kalbfleisch's suggestion
89,25	reading *autôn* for *autên* as Kalbfleisch conjectures in his apparatus
92,11	reading *estô* as Kalbfleisch suggests
96,13-14	the comma before *kai* is superfluous
96,30	inserting the lemma 3a21-32 for clarity's sake after b (editio Basileensis)
97,19-20	Kalbfleisch's conjecture *hôste* for *hôs to* seems unnecessary, see note
99,32	reading *haplôs* as Kalbfleisch suggests
100,12	inserting the lemma 3a33-b9 for clarity's sake with b (editio Basileensis)
101,33	reading *tôi tês ousias sunonumôi* with Kalbfleisch p. 573, cf. 308,9
103,4	reading *hupostaseôs aristas* as Kalbfleisch suggests
105,5	I propose *ata sunthêkên*
112,23	reading *phantazetai* after Dex. *in Cat.* 54,24; cf. Kalbfleisch p. 573
113,3-4	reading *parekhetai* after Dex. *in Cat.* 54,34
117,5	reading *phainomenê* or *ephorômenê* instead of *phromenê* (as suggested by Barrie Fleet)
117,13	reading *klimati* instead of *apoklimati* (with A before correction)

Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*

CHAPTER 5

On Substance 75,23

2a11-14 A substance which is called a substance most strictly, primarily and most of all is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual human being or the individual horse. 25

Earlier <Aristotle> enumerated all genera[1] in order, and he provided an outline elucidation of them by means of examples; now he takes in hand each of the genera and gives a more detailed account as best he can, by pointing out their conceptual content (*ennoia*) by means of a description (*hupographê*), and by clarifying their attributes (*parakolouthounta*) and distinguishing characteristics (*idia*). Archytas proceeded in this way as well. <Aristotle> ranks substance before the 76,1
others, and further on he himself will give the reason for this: all beings[2] are either substances or have their being in substances (2a34-b6). So if substance, existing in virtue of itself, has no need for any of the other <genera>, but they need substance; and if substance even bestows on them being generally speaking, it is reasonable that substance is held in higher esteem than they are. For indeed the other 5
genera, which are called accidents of substance, belong to substance itself, but substance belongs to none of them, but to itself. And that is why among them substance alone can exist in itself, and it removes the others along with it, whereas it is not itself removed along with them.

Also Archytas wrote about the order <of the categories> thus: 10
'Their order is as follows: substance ranks first because it alone underlies the others and can be conceived of in itself, whereas the others cannot <be conceived of> without it, since they are either predicated of substance or in substance as in a subject.'[3]

Plotinus and those around Nicostratos[4] raise problems about the description of substance too, namely how substance is one genus. Because if it is something common to intelligible and sensible <sub- 15
stance>, it will be prior to and predicated of both of them and it is clear that it will not be body nor incorporeal, lest body become also incorporeal and the incorporeal also body.

In response to this can be said what has been said before,[5] that the

discussion is about sensible and natural substance and about the <substance> in it which is apprehensible by discursive reasoning (*dianoêtê*),[6] as also Archytas, who started this <line of> teaching, clearly marks out when he says: 'So every natural and sensible substance is by nature fit to become an object of human reason (*dianoia*) either in <the categories> or through them or not without them.'[7] Therefore to raise problems about the substance common to intelligible and sensible substances has no place in the present discussion.

Nevertheless, since it is indeed in itself worth knowing, which is the substance common to both intelligible and sensible substance, and since Plato also assumed an intelligible genus of substance,[8] one should know that the primary intelligible substance establishes all substances both intelligible and sensible, the former close to itself, the latter further away. Moreover, it is clear that it is not merely a genus but also a principle of the substances that are posterior to it, and that not everything participates in that principle to the same degree, so that such a substance is not a genus in the proper sense,[9] which he who raises the problem takes for granted. Also Aristotle, in the *Metaphysics*,[10] mentioned two substances, one intelligible and one sensible, and thirdly mathematical or psychic <substance>, and demonstrated a general theory of their definition (*logos*), which applies to all <substances>. Archytas too enumerates substance as a whole as natural, sensible and moving, calling natural substance the one that consists in matter and form, sensible substance the composite, moving substance the noetic and incorporeal substance, because it is the cause of motion characterized by life. Furthermore it is clear that he too comprised the plurality of substances into one system.[11]

If, then, the primary substance is not regarded as a genus in the strict sense, but as the principle of all substances, they do not rightly contend that it must necessarily be neither incorporeal nor corporeal. For nearby the incorporeal principle of the substances produces the substances that are like itself, i.e. the incorporeal <substances>, and further away it produces the corporeal substances as well.

And moreover, even if the primary substance is the genus of incorporeal and corporeal substance, they do not rightly contend, I think, that, if the principle is incorporeal, body is necessarily incorporeal too because it partakes of the primary substance; and that if the principle is body, the incorporeal is necessarily body for the same reason. For according to this argument, given that animal is the genus of the rational and irrational and of the mortal and immortal, the irrational will be rational or the rational irrational and the mortal immortal or vice versa. On the contrary, the genus transcends the opposite differentiae because it comprises both and because in virtue of its transcendent superiority it contributes to each in the way proper

to each. For if corporeal and incorporeal are dividing <differentiae> of substance, and if rational and irrational are dividing <differentiae> of animal, but not constitutive <differentiae> (since nothing is constituted by opposites), it is clear that the genus exists prior to the contrast.[12]

What is the answer, then? Is it not necessary that every substance be either body or incorporeal, and every animal either mortal or immortal? No, the incorporeal is twofold, on the one hand a determinate nature and the opposite of the corporeal, on the other a negation causative of both the corporeal and its opposite, the incorporeal. In this way the immortal and the irrational are twofold as well. Therefore even if it is necessary to call an animal either rational or irrational, it should rather be called irrational by way of negation, and not as the opposite of rational.

However, Boethus considers these questions redundant here, since <he believes that> the discussion is not concerned with intelligible substance. Rather, he says, one should have raised the additional problem that in other works[13] <Aristotle> divides substance into three: he said that substance is spoken of in one way as matter, in another as form, and in yet another as the composite, but that here he posits substance as one category. What is this substance, and how will <Aristotle> arrange the three <substances> under it, given that they are not called substances in virtue of one account (*logos*)?[14] In answer to these problems Boethus claims that the account of primary substance fits both matter and the composite. For to each of them belongs that they are not said of a subject nor in a subject, for neither of them exists in something else. But although the composite is not in something else, it possesses the form which is in it as being something[15] which is in something else, i.e. matter, while it, i.e. matter, does not even possess anything that is in something else. Thus they have something in common as well as a difference insofar as matter, *qua* matter, is matter of something (in the same way as <it is> a subject <of something>), but the composite substance is not <substance> of something <*qua* substance>. This way, Boethus says, matter and the composite will be subsumed under the category of substance, but the form will be outside the <category of> substance, and will fall under a different category, either quality or quantity or another one.

Porphyry says[16] that Boethus is mistaken in saying this, because <Boethus> claims that the form which is contradistinguished from matter and is called substance by Aristotle, is a quality or one of the other accidents. For that which qualifies substance (*to poiôtikon ousias*) is substance-like (*ousiôdes*) and therefore substance.[17] For indeed the composite is substance most of all in virtue of the form. In general, if matter and the composite are substances, because they

have in common that they are not in a subject, the form is not in a subject either. For the form does not belong to matter in the way that whiteness belongs to the composite. When something combines with something else to form a unity, as the form combines with matter to form the composite, the one does not reside in the other as in a subject.[18] For 'in a subject' was <said to be> that which is in something not as a part (1a24-5). For this reason too Aristotle included the others <i.e. matter and form> in his definition of the composite substance as its parts. In the sequel (3a29-32) Aristotle will show that the parts of substances are substances, and therefore perhaps he did not mention the other two, though Archytas mentioned them as well.[19]

Another explanation for not mentioning form and matter might be that the work of the *Categories* employs readily accessible and common language. The phrase 'matter and form' and their meanings were not familiar to the multitude, but some called matter more of a substance, others form.[20]

How then, says Plotinus,[21] can these three be called substances to the same degree? In response to this it must be said, first, that the general characteristic of substance, i.e. not being in a subject, applies equally to all three.[22] Furthermore, it is not at all surprising if matter and the immanent <forms> partake of the more and the less because of the extremity of the existence peculiar to them. One should present each of them as they naturally are and one should not, when looking into the ultimate substances, investigate them in accordance with the notions of the first and intelligible substances.

All right, <Plotinus> says,[23] let form, matter, and what is composed out of them be included in the primary substance, because they have in common that they are not said of a subject nor in a subject. But what shall we say about the secondary substances? What do *they* have in common with the primary substance, if it is true that the secondary substances derive their being called substances from those prior <to them>?

Well, <we shall say> this – which is exactly what Aristotle said – that not being in a subject is what is truly a substance. That is why Archytas[24] too characterized substance by being in virtue of itself. If then the species and the genera contribute to the composition of the individual as parts, they cannot be in a subject, i.e. in the individual. With regard to them too one should not look for precise similarity because of the indeterminacy of the extremes.[25]

But, they say,[26] if the secondary substances are said of a subject, they will be in something else, i.e. that of which they are said.

Not at all, since that which is said of a subject is not said in the same way as that which is in a subject, but as that which is not co-ordinated is predicated of that which is.[27] For to call a particular human being a human being is no different from calling Socrates

Socrates. In a way then it is said about itself, and it will not be predicated of something else nor will it be in something else. In this way Porphyry too resolves the *aporia*, as well as Iamblichus, who follows Porphyry to the very words. But perhaps, if, when we call Socrates a human being and an animal, we say that as if about itself, then the individual and the form and the genus will be the same, and such a predication will be in vain.[28] If, on the other hand, we predicate <human being and animal of Socrates> as species or genus of an individual, we shall predicate either the constitutive element of the individual or the transcendent <human being or animal>. But the individual is neither of them, but one is in the individual as a part, the other is its cause.[29] So it is better to say that what is predicated is that which inheres, but <only> in virtue of its likeness to the transcendent <cause>. In virtue of this likeness it is called a genus and we say that the species is composed of genus and differentiae.[30] However, it is absurd that the genus should become part of the species given that it is more general and embraces more than the species. But the differentia too, they say,[31] is not in a subject, since it is constitutive of substance. So this <feature, i.e. not being in a subject> is not peculiar to substance. <This point is incorrect> Rather, it is in virtue of its substantiality (*to ousiôdes*) that the differentia too is constitutive of substance and becomes a part of substance, because when regarded as a quality, e.g. rationality, the differentia too shall be in a subject. Somewhat further below[32] we shall investigate the differentia as well, but now we must examine Aristotle's text (*lexis*).

> [2a11-14 A substance which is called a substance most strictly, primarily and most of all is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject.]

Since substance is said in three ways, as stated above, i.e. as matter, form and the composite, <Aristotle> says that the composite individual (*atomon*) substance is primary. He will also mention the other two, when he says that the parts of substances are themselves substances too (3a29-32).[33] It is clear that 'not being in a subject' belongs to every substance, for it underlies the other <beings> and the others do not exist either without it. 'Not being said of a subject' is most peculiar to the individual (*atomon*) substance, for because it is indivisible (*adiairetos*) it is not itself said of any subject, but the secondary substances are predicated of it as subject. Therefore the substance that also underlies the substances themselves is principally and strictly 'substance' (*ousia*), since when it does not exist no other <substance> can exist (*einai*).[34] Now after dividing the substances in so far as some <substances> are called primary and some

secondary, he posits individual substances as primary, and the common and simple <substances> as secondary, because we first encounter the composite and individual <substances> and subsequently the simple and universal <substances>, and because he says that the common substance, too, has its being in the individual.[35] Therefore he calls the individual substance 'primarily' substance, and 'most strictly' because this is substance in virtue of itself, whereas the other <substances> are said of it as of a subject. It is 'most of all' substance, because substance is characterized by being a subject, and <the individual substance> is subject both for the species and genera, because they are said of it as of a subject, and for the accidents, because they are in it as in a subject. In another way too one may apply 'most strictly, primarily and most of all' to the individual composite substance. Those things which partake of the same name <i.e. 'substance'> either partake of it homonymously or synonymously or by transference. If then the intelligible and sensible substances are called substances homonymously, the latter <i.e. sensible substance> is 'primarily' so called as being in relation to us. If intelligible <substance is called substance> by transference from sensible <substance>, as e.g. the foot of a mountain is called after the feet of an animal, sensible <substance> will be 'most strictly' substance, and the intelligible <substance> by transference. If species, genus, and individual are called substances synonymously, the individual <substance> will be substance 'most of all' because it displays 'being in itself ' and 'being a subject' most of all.

Since many *aporiai* have been raised against the discussion about the first substance too, let us see again what they are and which are the solutions that are properly supplied for them.[36]

By these <arguments>, they claim,[37] <Aristotle> does not explain what substance is, but what it is not, as if one were to give an account of a human being by saying that it is neither horse nor dog.

However, first one should know that something like that is not a definition, but a description.[38] Furthermore some definitions are given by means of negation. However, the argument stating the *aporia* does not provide a proper example, for if only these three species (horse, dog and human being) existed it would be true to say that that which is neither a dog nor a horse is a human being, and when these two are known, the third is also. Consequently, since there are the following three <i.e. exclusive and exhaustive items>, good, evil and the indifferent,[39] it is true to signify the indifferent by saying 'that which is neither good nor evil', and when these two are known the indifferent is known as well. So since here these three <items>, i.e. that which is in a subject, that which is said of a subject and that which has neither of these <features>, embrace all <there is>, that is why <Aristotle> first explained being in a subject and

being said of a subject,[40] in order to signify what is most strictly substance by means of the negation of them. Moreover, he was not content with just the negation, but also added an example, as if someone saying that a human being is neither horse nor cow should immediately add, 'e.g. Socrates'. But why, they say,[41] does <Aristotle> here call sensible substance primary, but elsewhere[42] secondary because it is ranked after incorporeal <substance>?

Well, because here he is not concerned with discussing the intelligible substances, but with accounting for the nature and order (*taxis*) of the sensible substances. This he also made clear by the <word> 'called' (2a12). For in ordinary language intelligible substance is not spoken of, nor is it known to the multitude, but sensible substance is.

However, Alexander[43] claims that the intelligible and separate form is called individual substance as well, and this is probably characteristic of the Peripatos, since <on their view> the universals are not in existence (*en hupostasei*) independently at all, but have their being in the individuals. If, then, the separate forms are in existence most of all, they would be individuals and not universals.

But Iamblichus denounces Alexander for his ignorance as to what individual substance means here. For it is clear, he says, that it means 'not divisible into further species'. But I suppose Alexander can say that the separate and intelligible substance, since it is not common (*koinê*), is not divisible into further species either.

Regarding the same problem the question is also raised why, in the *Physics*,[44] <Aristotle> classes the universals as prior, but here the individuals.

Well, because prior and secondary are said in two ways, either by nature or in relation to us: in relation to us the particulars (*ta kath' hekasta*) are prior, for we encounter them first. But by nature the universals (*ta koina*) are prior, for the individuals are classed below the universals (*ta katholou*). So if one starts from nature, one will class as prior the simple <entities>, the causes, the universals (*ta katholou*), the immaterial, the undivided and suchlike. But since the order is here derived from the semantic relation,[45] the first will be chosen in relation to us.

However, Alexander contentiously claims that here universals are posterior to particulars by nature as well, <a claim> for which he hardly provides any proof but, taking up his initial <statement> that universals (*ta koina*) derive their being and substance from individuals, he does not add any proof thereof. Further, his proofs are unsound: for, he says, when there is a universal (*koinon*), it is necessary that there is an individual, because the individuals are encompassed in the universals. But when there is an individual there is by no means a universal, since the universal obtains over many. <Alexander is wrong,> for it is clear that also every individual is

completed by the universal: 'a particular human being is also a human being', Aristotle says (2a25-6). So <Alexander> also wrongly regards it as a sign that individuals are first by nature, that when the universal is removed the individual is by no means removed. <He is wrong> because, if the universal has its substance in extending to the individuals as a whole and in completing them, and if the individual <has its substance> in being completed by the universal, how would the individual not be removed immediately as well, when the universal is removed?

Perhaps one should take 'common item' (*koinon*) in three ways,[46] the first transcending the individuals and being the cause of the common item in them in virtue of its single nature, as it is also the cause of the difference <between them> in virtue of its pre-encompassing many species.[47] For example, in virtue of the single nature of animal the first animal, i.e. the Animal-Itself, endows all animals *qua* animals with the common item they share, and in virtue of its pre-encompassing the different species it establishes the different species of animals. The second common item is the one that the different species are endowed with by their common cause and which resides in them, like the one in each animal. The third is the common feature established in our thoughts by means of abstraction, which is later-born and most of all admits of the notion of the non-differentiated and common feature.

For the common cause transcends its effects and is something different from them in all respects. It is common as a cause, but not as a common nature. The commonality which completes the individuals has difference together with the common item. For there is nothing merely common in mortal and immortal substance, but the common feature is differentiated and the difference is shared in common.[48] Thus only the result of abstraction which we leave behind when we strip away the differences provides us with the notion of the common feature *qua* common.

Perhaps Alexander has this in mind when he thinks that it is posterior to individuals. Nevertheless, he does not preserve consistency with his own account, when he says that the individuals are constituted out of the common item and the differences, unless perhaps he considers their constitution, too, in the *conceptual* mode which yields the definition and exposes the common item.[49]

Iamblichus also objects to Alexander that he divides the corporeal and incorporeal, which have nothing in common, as if he were dealing with a single <kind of> substance. For, <Iamblichus> says, this also contradicts Aristotle, since he <i.e. Aristotle> does not posit a common item in the case of sensibles either.[50]

However, if <Alexander> takes the common item too to be non-differentiated in all respects too because <the corporeal and the

incorporeal> are taken as being on the same level in one contradistinction, this is absurd. But if he does so because there is also a kind of commonality in the abasement (*en têi huphesei*),[51] in virtue of which everything is bound together and remains unified after the differentiation, what is absurd about that?[52] Indeed, Plato did not extend the genera of being only to incorporeals or only to bodies, but he declared that they pervade everything the substance of which is one.[53]

2a14-19 [The species in which the so-called primary substances belong, as well as the genera of those species,] are called secondary substances. [For instance, the individual human being belongs in human being as a species, and a genus of this species is animal. So these are called secondary substances, i.e.] both human being and animal.

After dividing the substances into primary and secondary substances and discussing the primary ones, <Aristotle> next leads on to a discussion of the secondary ones, which he distinguishes into species and genera. The species encompass the individuals (for these were 84,1
the primary substances), the genera <encompass> these species, as he carefully adds in order that we are not led astray to other senses because species and genera are said in many ways. Especially Porphyry, in his *Isagoge*, listed many senses of *eidos* and *genos*, of which 5
he said one *eidos* was the species that encompasses the individuals and one *genos* the genus that encompasses such species.[54] Since there are species and genera in the other categories as well, to be on the safe side <Aristotle> said 'in which the' individual 'substances are' (2a14-15), i.e. those species and genera of such species, to prevent us from regarding the species and genera in the other categories as secondary substances. He also made this clear by means of his 10
examples: an example of a species is human being in which a particular human being belongs; an example of a genus is animal, in which human being and a particular human being are included.[55]

But if the individual men are removed when human being is, and if human being is removed when animal is, but not vice versa; and if we said[56] that the <entities> that remove others along with themselves but are not removed along with others are primary by nature, how can we call the individuals primary substances, the species 15
secondary, and the genera tertiary (for further on (2b7-8) he will call the species more of a substance than genera)?[57]

Well, (i) these are secondary substances, inasmuch as they complete the individual substances as parts, and parts are secondary to the whole, and (ii) because in the individual they have become in actuality just what they were in potentiality before in virtue of

themselves. That which is actually is prior, that which is potentially is posterior.[58]

Moreover, (iii) the question about removing but not being removed along with others is not stated accurately. For the single individual, e.g. Socrates, is not the primary substance, but all individuals that range under human being, since each is <a primary substance> too. When all individuals are removed, the universal human being is removed as well.[59]

Further, (iv) universals (*koina*) are conceived (*epinoeitai*) from individuals, because we always set apart the universal in things that differ in certain respects. E.g. though Socrates and Dion are different from each other in many features, there is still one non-differentiated substance in them, in virtue of which the common feature in them is perceived and which has the capacity for being conceived with reference to individuals (*peri ta kath' hekasta*) and in particulars (*en tois kata meros*).[60]

Again, (v) particulars are the cause of the existence of universals, for they pre-exist in being these-particular-things (*tade tina*), and the universals – which are not things conceived of as these-particular-things but rather as certain kinds of things (*toiade*) – supervene. So if the particulars were removed, the universal cannot exist either: for it has a nature <which is such that it is> completive of the individual substances.[61]

Again, (vi) we say that the categories concern signifying words, and signifying words are first applied to individual things. For these we encounter first in sense perception, and we subsequently pass to the species and genera in progressing from sense perception towards knowledge.[62]

Generally speaking, if we take not the species and genera in themselves, but – according to Peripatetic custom – the species and genera in the individuals, how could they *not* be secondary in terms of substance? For they could not be fully substance because they do not exist in themselves, being parts of individuals and being substances in virtue of being parts of substances.

Alexander, however, cannot be constrained by such arguments, because he wants individual substances to be prior to universals in nature as well. For he claims that if the individuals did not exist no other thing could – in which he is mistaken. For even if the common substance exists together with the individuals, it nevertheless contributes to the essence (*ousia*) of its subjects by being in virtue of itself. It is better to say that the universal in itself has supreme substance (*kuriôtatê ousia*) and also communicates itself to the particulars, and this way it is superior to the individuals according to the principle of its nature.

But, <Alexander> claims, no universal can exist without the indi-

vidual, but the individual exists without the universal, e.g. the sun, the moon, and the universe.

In reply to him it must be said that the matter of each of these received the form once by an unrelated coincidence. However, the formative principle (*logos*) is constituted in such a way that if there were indeed many <things> naturally disposed to receive it, it can give itself to the multitude.

Secondary substances are substances anyway, even if they do not exist in themselves, because they alone among the predicates reveal the essence (*ousia*). For all predications taken from the accidents are foreign to substantial signification, because they do not reveal what each thing is, but the accident. But these <secondary substances>, which are said of the primary substances as subjects, signify the essence of their subjects. For if someone gives an account of what Socrates is, he will give a more proper and comprehensible account when he indicates the species and the genus, e.g. human being or animal, whereas if someone indicates one of the nine categories, e.g. white or three feet long, he gives an account that is more foreign, because he bases his account on an accident that does not reveal what <the thing> is.[63]

In another sense too the secondary substances are similar to primary <substances>. For the secondary substances are related to everything else in the same way as the primary substances underlie everything. For <everything else> is said of them <i.e. the secondary substances> either paronymously – e.g. not only a particular human being is grammatical, but also human being – or homonymously – e.g. white <thing>, for not only the <particular> white body, but also body *simpliciter* is called that way. So therefore it is not without reason that these too were named substances, albeit secondary substances.

2a19-31 It is clear from what has been said that if something is said of a subject [it is necessary that both its name and its definition[64] are predicated of the subject. For instance, 'human being' is said of a subject, the individual human being, and indeed the name is predicated – for you will predicate 'human being' of the individual human being – and also the definition of human being will be predicated of the individual human being – for the individual human being is also a human being. Thus both the name and the definition will be predicated of the subject. If something inheres in a subject, in most cases neither its name nor its definition is predicated of the subject. But nothing prevents the name from being predicated of the subject 86,1

in some cases, but] it is impossible for the definition [to be predicated].

It is puzzling what <Aristotle> means when he says that what he writes next is clear 'from what has been said' (2a19).[65] For if the species and genera are secondary substances, how is it clear from that that some things are predicated of their subject synonymously, and others are in their subjects homonymously? And what use does that have for what is now being said? Surely, he cannot be referring the argument to the earlier passage where he said 'when something is predicated of something else as of a subject' (1b10-11) etc.? For in such cases predication occurs synonymously.

No, from the division between primary and secondary substances too this can be shown. If both have in common not to be in a subject and if the distinguishing characteristic of one group is to be said of a subject, and of the other not to be said of a subject; and if genera and species were <sc. said to be> secondary substances; and if they are predicated of their subjects synonymously and if it is characteristic of synonyms that both their name and their definition are said of the subject – then they do not belong to what is in a subject. For neither the name nor the definition of what is in a subject are said of the subject. For if no substance is in a subject, neither can things in a subject be substances or completive parts of the substance, nor will the definition of what is in a subject be said of the subject. For instance, the soul is neither called knowledge (but only by derivation from it) nor is the definition of knowledge said of the soul, for the soul is not a contemplative state (*hexis*). Again, neither a colour nor its definition is said of the body. Hence, this is clear 'from what has been said'.

As he is going to give the reason why the individual substances are primary, i.e. because everything is either said of them as subjects or is in them as subjects, and as he is also going to contend that it is reasonable that the secondary substances are substances too, i.e. because they reveal the primary substance in being said of it as a subject, by these words <i.e. 'from what has been said' (2a19)> he reminds us how things said of a subject are predicated. For this reason, surely, he also needed synonymy because of what is predicated of a subject, as well as homonymy and paronymy because of the accidents in the subject. For the latter can never be combined with substances insofar as definition is concerned, for no one will say body is a colour penetrative of sight even though he calls the body white. Most things are said paronymously from their like, as grammatical derives from grammar. This, then, is the use of the recapitulation under discussion, and subsequently he adds the following:

2a34-6 Everything else is either said of the primary substances as subjects or is in them as subjects. This is clear from the examination of individual cases. 87,1

Having said which are the primary and which the secondary substances he seems to give a clear presentation of what belongs to the primary substances. For he says that the primary substances are indeed the foundation since they underlie both what is said of them, i.e. the secondary substances,[66] and what has its being in them, i.e. the accidents.

Then he solves a problem about the primary substances. For if they are neither in a subject nor said of some subject one may doubt whether they even exist in the first place, for where do they get their being from? Solving this problem Aristotle says that they do not only have their being by themselves but also provide existence for everything else. For both what is said of a subject and what inheres in a subject has its being from the subject. In mounting this thesis he passes over the fact that the species has its being in the individuals because he believes this to be more comprehensible (e.g. human being has its being in the particular human beings) but he proves that the genus, even though it seems to be predicated of the species most of all, nevertheless has its being in the individual substances, because he believes that this appears further away and because he proves the one simultaneously with the other.

The proof is as follows: 'for if it were not said of any of the particular human beings it would not be said of human being in general either' (2a38-b1). E.g. if winged were not said of any of the particular eagles, it would not be said of eagle *simpliciter* either. Consequently, the species also underlies the genus because of the individual substance. Similarly that which is in a subject is in the individual first and then through the individual it also inheres in the species. E.g. grammar inheres primarily in Aristarchus, and then through him also in human being.[67] Hence the individual substance is the cause of the existence of everything else, both of what is said of a subject and of what inheres in a subject.

When we say that everything else, such as quantity, quality, relation etc. inheres in the primary substances as subjects we have to conceive such inherents, e.g. whiteness and hotness,[68] to be of the same kind as the primary things,[69] but not as what is already affected and in a certain disposition. For what is affected and in a certain disposition and called after them is also in accordance with them in description (*logos*) and name.[70] For in speaking of a white swan it is true to indicate that it has whiteness, and this is a description (*logos*) of what is white in the sense of having been affected, i.e. having undergone a process of whitening.

88,1 For such a thing already becomes part of the form. So in the same way as the form is part of the subject, so will that which contributes to the form be part of the same <subject>. So the description (*logos*) of such a thing will also be true of the subject. For these reasons, then, the mode of predication (*tropos tês katêgorias*) of what has already been affected will be[71] different from the mode of predication of what is said *simpliciter*.[72]

But, they say,[73] if the division of substance as a genus into species yields the primary and secondary substances, and if these are <all substances> that are taught, the common generic substance is omitted. No: rather, it[74] <i.e. generic substance> too is spoken of in the phrase 'not in a subject' because that is a distinguishing characteristic of all substance, since it itself is the subject and is determined, so that all <substance> is determined in accordance with it. Moreover, 'said of a subject' is a distinguishing characteristic of the secondary substance in addition to the common feature <i.e. 'not in a subject'>, whereas 'not said of a subject' is a distinguishing characteristic of the primary substance in addition to the common feature, so that the descriptive account covers all substances.

But, they say,[75] every division of a genus yields species, but the primary substance is not a species, for it is numerically the same whereas a species is many in number. The solution of this problem is that to be numerically one is itself a common principle (*logos*), and 'not being said of a subject nor in a subject' is also a proper characteristic of this species <sc. of primary substance>. As a common principle (*logos*), then, it creates the common feature that the primary substance is numerically one. The <resulting> formative principle of the individual is not a species, for it is numerically one.[76]

But, they say,[77] the division yields unequal parts which is foreign to division into species. Well, this is not true either. Universals and individuals are complementary and contribute to each other's being. The individual substances are discovered in virtue of the indivisible (*atmêtos*) properties of beings, whereas the secondary substances are discovered in virtue of the essential common formative principles that are observed in sensible objects.

Besides, it should not be omitted that in this passage some dittography occurs (2b6$^{a\text{-}c}$). For Aristotle adds nothing superfluous to his words, but perhaps because the other reading was added in the margin (*exô paragegrammenês*) the scribes wrote down both at this position. The sequel is: 'so that everything else is said of the primary substances as subjects or is in them as subjects, so that when there are no primary substances it is impossible for any of the others to exist.' Let us move on to the next passage.

2b7-3a6 Of the secondary substances the species is more of a substance than the genus [for it is closer to the primary substance. If one provides an account of the primary substance one will do so more intelligibly and more properly when providing the species than when providing the genus. (…) Furthermore, the primary substances are called substances most of all because they underlie all other <things> and all other <things> are either predicated of them or inhere in them. Indeed, as the primary substances are related to other <things> so too the species is related to the genus. (…) For this reason too, then, the species is more of a substance than the genus. Of the species themselves which are not genera, one is not more of a substance than the other. (…) Similarly, of the primary substances, too, one is not more of a substance than the other. (…) It is reasonable that of everything else only the species and genera are called secondary substances after the primary substances. For they alone among predicates reveal the primary substance. (…) Moreover, the primary substances are most strictly called substances because they underlie everything else. Indeed, as the primary substances are related to everything else, so the species and genera of primary substances are related to everything that remains. For everything that remains is predicated of them. (…)] It is the same in other cases.

Since <Aristotle> calls the species and the genus together secondary substances, one may ask by all means whether they are both equally substances, and at an equal distance from the primary <substance>. In answer to this query <Aristotle> says that they do not have the 89,1
secondary status (*to deutereion*) equally, but that the species is more of a substance than the genus. He gives two proofs of this, one from the relation of both to the individual kind and one from proportion.[78] For the one from relation he provides the following syllogism. The 5
species is closer to what is more of a substance; that which is closer to what is more of a substance is more of a substance; hence the species is more of a substance than the genus. He proves that the species is closer to the individual substance from the fact that it happens to be more appropriate for an account. For when giving an account of Socrates we surely give a more appropriate and more comprehensible account if we say that he is a human being, and a more remote account, if we say he is an animal. And what is more appropriate is closer. 10

<Aristotle> carries out the proof from proportion as follows. If the species is related to the genus as the primary substances are related to everything else, the species is more of a substance than the genus. That this is the case, i.e. that the former are related to each other as

the latter are, he demonstrates from the fact that indeed the species underlies the genus as the <primary> substance underlies everything else. He proves the conclusion by means of the fact that for the <primary> substance too its being a substance consists most of all in underlying everything else and in everything else being in it. However, 'of all species which are not' subordinate one to the other nor 'genera, one is by no means more of a substance than another',[79] even if one is superior in dignity, the other inferior. For he who states with regard to an individual human being that it is a human being will not give a more appropriate account than when he states with regard to an individual horse that it is a horse. It is the same with the primary substances too: that Socrates is worthier in dignity than the horse Boucephalas does not entail that Socrates is called more of a substance than the horse Boucephalas.[80]

Some believe that the order of the argument here is not correct. For, he says,[81] <Aristotle> should first have stated the reason why they are secondary substances and then made a comparison between them.[82] It must be said that <Aristotle> has clearly presupposed this in the division of what is said of a subject and what is not said of a subject, and in the proof that what is not said of a subject nor inheres in a subject is substance most strictly. From this he infers that secondary substances are said of a subject though not in a subject.

He adds another *aporia* concerning the order, i.e. that it would have observed logical order to demonstrate that primary substance is not more or less substance and then to demonstrate the more and less of the species. It is possible to give the same defence in answer to this problem, i.e. that <Aristotle> has already presupposed the fact that the primary substance is not more or less <sc. substance> when he stated it was primarily and most of all and most strictly substance. For all such things are definite and do not have the indefiniteness of the more and less. For the more and less proceed onwards unceasingly, whereas 'most of all' stands still in its supremacy.

Why will not the nine categories of the accidents be secondary substances too, by virtue of their being predicated of the primary substances? Or, why are these secondary substances not accidents because of their inherence in individual substances and their being said of them? Well, not all predicates of primary substances will be secondary substances, but only those which are predicated in the essence (*en tôi ti ên*) as is the case with the species and genera.

But why did he say 'it is more proper (*idion*)' (2b12), e.g. human being <is more proper to Socrates> than animal? For human being is not a proprium (*idion*)[83] of Socrates, but the species. Rather, he did not here use proper (*idion*) in the strict sense but he called what is less general 'proper' in the same way as we say that what is less heavy is light.

But, they say,[84] no substance is more or less, as <Aristotle> will point later on (3b33-4a9). So how is the species said to be more of as substance than the genus? Well, because he considers their more and less not in so far as they are substances but in accordance with their distance from the sensible substance. However, I believe the problem still remains. For the sensible substance is substance most of all, but also in the case of the other categories in which the more and less occurs, e.g. quality, the more and less is considered in accordance with their distance from what is most of all. E.g. what borders on what is most of all <white> is more of a white thing, because there too they do not possess the more and less insofar as they are qualities: they are both qualities in the same way.

Perhaps substance is said not to receive the more and less since, even if one of its species is more of a substance, another less, and yet another most of all, each particular species does not receive the more and less. For no genus, species, or individual is more or less of a substance than another genus, species, or individual. However, in the case of quality the more and less is observed within the species of quality themselves: for one white thing is more or less <white> than another. In this way Porphyry and Iamblichus solve the problems.[85] But as Alexander interprets the individual substance, aspiring to posit the first mover in <this class>,[86] the problems get even worse. For how will what is closer to the sensible substance be more of a substance any longer? And how will the intelligible substances be ranked together with the sensible ones? It is also absurd for <Alexander> to have recourse to mere homonymy and to understand 'the individual' in one way <here, i.e. in the case of sensibles> when it is used in another in the case of intelligibles. Nor does he correctly apply 'not being in a subject', the characteristic by which material substances are recognisable, to immaterial substances. Surely it is clear that we characterize material substances in one way, i.e. in terms of their having something in a subject, whereas we characterize immaterial substances in another way, i.e. in terms of their having nothing as something in something else.[87] Moreover, lest the primary moving substance fall short of the primary composite substances, <Alexander> is eager to provide its relation to them. For the cause, he says, of the substances that have what is in a subject must be substance most of all. But this is not the case. For in no way does the intelligible and primary moving substance derive its being a substance most of all from its relation to what is composite and material, but, on the contrary, from its being separate from all <composite substances>.

Archytas the Pythagorean does not accept the division of substances we are discussing now, but in its place he admitted another division, saying: 'There are three differences of substance: for one is matter, the other form, yet another the composite of both.' This

division is made according to the very definition of substance, extends to everything and makes use of the differentiation of the substances in accordance with nature, but it is not connected to merely ordinary significations in the way the Aristotelian division is. For Aristotle too uses this division in his most accurate works, e.g. in the *Physics* course[88] and the *Metaphysics*. However, no Pythagorean can accept this division of primary and secondary substances, because they testify that to be primary belongs to the universal, and leave the last <position> to the divided. And because they locate the substance which is primary and most strictly <substance> in what is most simple, and not – as is said now – in what is composite and sensible. And because they consider the genera and species to be beings, and not things brought under one head by means of separate concepts.[89]

So how is it that Aristotle did not now use Archytas' division of substance even though he knew it too? Well, because this division is more congenial to this logical treatise. For since he is here giving instruction about simple words as subjects and predicates it is reasonable that, finding something, i.e. the species and the genus, predicated in substance, which, he said, underlies everything, he made a division into them.

92,1 **3a7-b10**[90] 'Not being in a subject' is common to every substance, [for a primary substance is neither said of a subject nor does it inhere in a subject. With respect to secondary substances it is clear at once that they do not inhere in a subject. For 'human being' is said of an individual human being as of a subject, but it does not inhere in a subject. (…) Moreover, in the case of things that inhere in a subject nothing prevents their name from sometimes being predicated of the subject, whereas it is impossible for the definition <to be predicated>. However, of secondary substances both the definition and the name are predicated of the subject (…)] so substance cannot belong to the things that are 'in a subject'.

After distinguishing how many and which substances there are, he proposes to set out next both the common and the particular features belonging to them. This is reasonable, for if it were possible to give a definition of each of the genera <i.e. categories>, one would have to consider an account of their properties as of less value. For from the definition both the properties and the nature as a whole would become clear. But since it was not possible to give a definition,[91] but only a description and examples, it is reasonable that he needed an examination of the properties, both common and, most of all, particular, in order to provide out of them as genus and differentiae something like a definition of each of the genera. So let this be the general defence

for the fact that[92] in the case of each of the genera Aristotle provides the properties of the genus, both common and particular, after the division, and first the properties it has in common with other genera.

Iamblichus believes <Aristotle> investigated the proprium in each genus first of all, because he believed that in some way or other it can establish the nature of the object of investigation instead of the definition.[93] And since, while looking for the proprium (*to idion*) in the strict sense, which belongs to <its subject> only and to all instances of it, <Aristotle> happened to attain it in a fragmentary way (*meristôs*) – sometimes he laid hold of properties that belonged to all instances but not to it alone, and sometimes he laid hold of properties that belonged to it alone but not to all instances – for this reason he rejected those that hit on the property (*idiotêtos*) in a divided way (*diêirêmenôs*), saying 'this is not a proprium of substance' – because he was looking for the proprium (*idion*) most of all[94] – and the others he accepted as belonging completely and as properties (*idiômata*). Because Aristotle was devoted to inquiry and he tried to find the truth by means of inquiry, he first confronts what is said in a general way (*holoskherôs*) and after investigating it he thus finds the truth in the end.[95]

This too can be said correctly, but perhaps it is more proper indeed to first set out the properties in common with other categories, because the description of the object of investigation that arises from the common *and* the particular properties is more exact.

Archytas shows this too, because he does not only investigate the properties but also sets out what <the genus under discussion> has in common with the other categories. Let us quote several Archytean statements, because even the divine Iamblichus recorded only a brief dictum of <Archytas> which itself gives rise to ambiguity as well. 'To these thoughts and categories some properties belong in common, some as characteristics. By the common properties of substance I mean: (1) "not accepting the more and the less", for a human being cannot be more and less, nor for that matter a god or a plant; (2) "having no contrary", for a human being is not contrary to a human being, nor a god contrary to a god or to another substance; (3) "to exist in virtue of itself (*kath' hauto*), but not to exist together with something else as greyness and brightness belong to eyes", is proper to substance. For every substance exists in virtue of itself, whereas what exists together with it and is accidental to it either exists in substance or not without it.' After mentioning the properties <substance has> in common with quality, he adds: 'Many properties of substance also accompany quantity, e.g. "not accepting the more and the less".' After mentioning the properties <substance has> in common with relation, he adds: 'To each of them also belongs a proprium (*idion*), for it belongs to substance "to receive contraries while remaining one and

the same in number".' So in this way he wants to set out both the properties <substance has> in common with the other categories and the propria.

However, Porphyry says[96] that only the propria of each of the genera were set out by Aristotle and not the properties <they have> in common with the other genera *simpliciter*. For the proprium (*idion*) is said in three ways: (1) what belongs to all but not to it alone, as two-footed belongs to human being; (2) what belongs to it alone but not to all, as grammatical belongs to the same <i.e. human being>; (3) what belongs to it alone and to all, which is indeed a proprium in the strict sense, as being capable of laughter belongs to human being. Those which do not belong to it alone are indeed in common with the other genera, when it belongs to all but not to it alone.[97]

One ought to pay attention to Archytas' statements, because nothing <is said> in an inquisitive or ambiguous way, but is produced categorically with the confidence of knowledge and proceeds by means of what is precisely the most necessary for the argument.

Perhaps one may raise the *aporia* how it is possible to define the proprium (*idion*) of substance as a whole. For in each substance it is different and the property (*idiôma*) is something else. Consequently, one should give one account of properties of composites and another of properties of simples; and one for things that move eternally, another for things that participate in movement partially (*en merei*); one for things that remain the same in their forms, another in the case of changing things, and similarly in the case of intelligibles and sensibles. However, it is possible to say that everywhere an analogous similarity can be determined.

Aristotle says that 'not being in a subject' is common to both primary and secondary substances (whether he is mentioning this as something common or presenting it as part of the proprium (*idion*) of substance). In the case of primary substance no proof is needed. For it is immediately agreed that it is 'not in a subject' because of the initial fourfold division (1a20-b9) and when he taught what the substance most strictly so called is (2a11-13). However, with regard to the secondary substance which is said of a subject but is not in a subject he provides proof.

94,1 The first proof (1) is derived from the division: secondary substances are the substances said of the individuals as subjects while not being in them as subjects. The second proof (2) is taken from the fact that no particular human being can exist without human being. If so, it follows that no human being nor any other secondary substance can be in the particular human being as subject. For nothing that is in a subject contributes to the essence of the subjects, whereas the particular human being is also a human being because it is completed by the human being. If the other substances do not exist

in the primary substance as in a subject, it follows they are not in anything else as in a subject. For everything other <than primary substance> is either in the primary substances as subjects or said of them as subjects. Moreover (3), what is in a subject can perish while the subject is preserved, e.g. white. But the species and genera <sc. of the category of substance> cannot perish while the individuals of which they are said are preserved. And when the subject perishes, what is in a subject vanishes but the universal is preserved, because at different times individuals with different qualities come to be.[98] Again (4), the species and genera will be either in their proper individuals as subjects or in others. But it is impossible for them to be in their proper individuals, for the precise reason that what is in a subject is not in its proper individuals as subjects, but is said of them as subjects.[99] Surely they do not exist in something else either, for there is no subject without the individual substances. Again (5), Aristotle also constructs the following syllogism: what is in a subject is predicated homonymously; no secondary substance is predicated homonymously, but synonymously; so no secondary substance is in a subject. Of course the primary substance is not <in a subject> either; so no substance is.

Also according to Archytas' division of substances into matter, form, and the composite[100] the argument proves the same point, that no substance is in a subject. For since matter underlies everything and is the primary subject it is evident that it does not belong to what is in a subject. But neither is the form in matter as in a subject, for that together with which it constitutes something unitary with an equal contribution (*sunteleia*) <i.e. matter> is not one thing in another, so that it cannot be itself in a subject either. It stands to reason that the composite substance cannot be in a subject since it comprises in itself form and matter.

But 'not being in a subject' is negative, and, they say, it is impossible to grasp anything by reason (*dianoiâi*) by way of negation. For the negation is indefinite, and it is impossible to fit definite knowledge together with something indefinite. Well, that which is made clear from that negative utterance is in a way definite and affirmative. For 'not in a subject' only means either that it is what it is of itself or that it is a completive part of such a thing, and that it is a subject. For exactly this belongs in common to every substance, but matter underlies the form differently from the way in which the composite underlies the activities that arise from it <i.e. the composite>. Moreover, if there is a substance in the strictest sense, on which the others depend and through which they exist and with respect to which passion occurs and from which action originates, and it belongs to such a thing not to be in a subject, it stands to reason that substance is said not to be in a subject. For because it exists in virtue of itself it does not have

its being in something else. The species and the genus are not in subject either, since they are parts of the substance.

To 'neither in a subject nor said of a subject' one should add 'as of something else'.[101] For when we predicate human being of Socrates it is not as if we call the piece of wood 'white' but rather as if <we call> the white thing (*to leukon*) <sc. 'white'>.[102] So much about these topics.

One might raise the *aporia* how substance is not in a subject, when the mind is in the soul, and the soul in the body, and (according to Plato) the Forms in the mind. Well, these are immanent neither as in a subject nor as if they resembled participation in accidents, but (1) as a substance is present in another substance, not as if they are immanent as a part in a whole, but rather as a complete reality (*entelekheia*) and a substance in actuality (*kat' energeian*) is present to a potential receptacle and an incomplete nature in a separate way – in the same way as a helmsman is in a ship and generally everything that employs something is in that which it employs and present to it. Or (2) as the cohesive cause is present to that which is kept together in a different way; or (3) as the unified substance encompasses the multiple substance in itself, as the centre includes the circle in itself.[103] For by means of all these <comparisons> and more of the same kind, one can explain the presence of substances in other substances, and nothing absurd follows from that.

But, they say,[104] time is not in a subject either. Well, one should divide time into what does the measuring and what is measured. And if someone takes time as something measured the measure will be in the movement as in a subject, as the movement itself is in the thing moved. If someone takes it as the measure, e.g. the soul, as Aristotle says, the measure is in what measures. However, if someone takes the time that exists in itself, it is clear that this is a substance, and such an account belongs to another <branch of> philosophy. And if someone says that place is not in a subject either, we shall say to him that since, according to Aristotle's philosophy of place, place is the limit of the container, it will be in <the container>, and in that way it will be one of the things that are in a subject. But these <problems> are easy to solve.

But this question is worth asking: 'Why did he not demonstrate as accidents "not being in a subject" and the other things that belong to substance in common?' For he did not show the common feature of substances in terms of their being. To this the better interpreters[105] reply that the sensible substance is a conglomerate of qualities and matter, and the fact that everything is compounded together renders the sensible substance unitary, but when each is taken separately one is quality, another quantity or something else. And whatever causes the sensible substance to be no longer completely put together when it is missing, will be a part of this substance; whatever super-

venes after the substance has come into being has its own status as being acquired and is not hidden in the mixture that yields the so-called substance. None of the ingredients is a substance, but the whole that consists of all of them is a substance. One must not be annoyed if we constitute the sensible substance out of non-substances, for neither is the whole a true substance, but it merely imitates the true <substance>, which has its being centred around itself without the others even when the others come to be from it because it truly is.[106] In the sensible and composite substance the substrate is infertile and insufficient to have being,[107] because the rest does not come of out it, but it is a shadow and a painting even on what is itself a shadow, a shadow-drawing. From this it follows by necessity that in the case of things generated not everything exists in <the realm of> being and that we are not always capable of grasping their essential properties when we have got hold of what belongs to them.

But why does he characterize substance by drawing on its non-propria? We shall say: in order to know the things that are not substances. For that to which 'not being in a subject' does not belong will not be a substance. So this is useful for knowing non-substances, but we shall not immediately know also what substance is, but we need a second lesson. But perhaps even this 'not being in a subject but being in virtue of itself ' is immediately a property of substance. For even if this belonged to substance in common with the differentia, still the differentia would have this property inasmuch as it is substantial. That is why Archytas too posits among the common properties 'to be in virtue of itself, and not to exist together with something else, as greyness and brightness <exist along> with eyes'. He calls it proper (*oikeion*) to substance, because it also belongs to the differentia inasmuch as it is substance.[108]

> [3a21-32 However, this is not a proprium of substance but also the differentia belongs to what does not inhere in a subject. (…) Also the definition of the differentia is predicated of that of which the differentia is said. (…) We need not be disturbed by any fear that the fact that parts of substances inhere in their wholes as subjects might force us to say they are not substances. For things are not said to be 'in a subject' in the sense of inhering in something as parts.[109]]

Further, since there is occasion to extend the common feature of substance (I mean not being in a subject) to the differentiae as well we must first determine the question about its position (*taxis*) <in the text>.[110] Some say that what is said about the parts of substances: 'we need not be disturbed by any fear that <we may be forced to say that> the parts of a substance, being in a subject, i.e. the whole substance,

<are not substances>' (3a29-31), should have been placed before the passage about the differentiae (3a21-8). For just as Socrates is a primary substance, the parts of Socrates are primary substances too, e.g. a particular hand, a particular head. So when we say that no substance is in a subject, one should not think that these are in a subject and therefore not substances: we did not say that things present in something as parts are in a subject, but that things <present in something> *not* as parts <are> (1a24-5). Hence the parts of substances are each in that whole they are part of, but they are not in any subject.

This <passage> then, as some people believe, should have been placed first, because it contains the solution of an *aporia* pertaining to substances; then <Aristotle> should accordingly have added that 'not being in a subject' does not belong only to substances, but also to other things, such as differentiae. However, such a transposition of the order does not please the more careful <interpreters>, but they rather accept Aristotle's <order>. For since both secondary substances and differentiae seem to complete the individual substances as parts, he needed to talk about the differentiae after the secondary substances. Then, in the same way as he had to secure that which applies commonly to both secondary substances and differentiae (i.e. being parts of the substance), in that way[111] he also had to secure that we should not consider it to be in the wholes as subjects because they are parts of substances. This order is more consistent than to disrupt the continuity by inserting the statement about the parts between the statements about the secondary substances and the differentiae. On this interpretation, then, the order is correct.

Essay on the differentia[112]

Since <Aristotle>, after stating that 'not being in a subject' belongs to substance, discovers that it has this <feature> in common with the differentiae and therefore claims that it is not a proprium of substance (3a21-2), we should first discuss what the differentia is.

Now, some believe the differentia to be something which by nature separates what are under the same genus,[113] and clearly in this way the differentiation from its genus is given.

Boethus however says that, properly speaking, the differentia should be classed with the species, not with the genus, because the differentiae are often substituted for the species.[114] Indeed,[115] all <differentiae> together may be said with respect to the genus,[116] but each differentia in itself can be said of everything ranked below it of which it is said, though by no means of the genus. For each <differentia, i.e. taken separately> is not constitutive (*morphôtikê*) of the genus.[117] And the differentia is different from the species, because it

exists together with the genus, and the differentia is a kind of form of the genus while the genus pre-exists like a subject. 35 98,1

The differentia, then, completes substance (*sumplêrôtikê ousias*) in a simpler way <than>[118] species and genera are said to complete substance. For both 'animal' and 'rational' complete 'human being', but 'animal' <completes 'human being'> together with subject and differentia, whereas 'rational' <does so> as a simple quality (*haplê poiotês*). And if in turn 'rational' has been added to 'animal', the <combination> of both will be like a composite, but the next thing added, e.g. 'mortal', will be like a simple quality. Therefore species and genera are called secondary substances because they are subjects, whereas differentiae are said of a subject, but they are not substances, for they do not contribute to being (*einai*) but to being such (*toionde einai*).[119] 5

However, they are not accidents either, since they contribute to the essence (*ousia*) of the things they characterize (*eidopoiousin*). For this reason, then, they are not in a subject either, for that which is in a subject is also separated without the corruption of its subject,[120] whereas the such-and-such of the differentia is not separated without corruption. 10

But, someone might say, the inseparable accident is not separated without corruption either.[121] Yes, but even if it is not separated, one sees remission and intension with respect to <the inseparable accident>, e.g. with repect to the black of the Ethiopian when he moves to another region, and the whiteness of milk is less <intense>, whereas the whiteness of snow is more <intense>, and similarly with all inseparable accidents. But there is no more and less with regard to the differentia, not in several species or individuals nor in the same.[122] 15

If the differentia is such, if it is neither substance nor accident, and, what amounts to the same thing, neither not in a subject nor in a subject, what can it be, given that all beings are either in a subject or not in a subject?[123] It is necessary[124] then that the differentia is (1) a substantial quality (*poiotês ousiôdês*) completing substance, or (2) intermediate between quality and substance, connecting in common substances with accidents, and accidents with substances. For nature does not like to proceed from one opposite to another immediately (*amesôs*), as it does not proceed from animals to plants <immediately> either but established an intermediate nature in between, the zoophytes, which brings both extremes together and completes or connects them to each other. In this case then it established the differentia as an intermediate, according to some (a) separately from either one, according to others (b) as participating in both. 20 25 30

There can be another opinion of people saying (3) that the differentia is not only constitutive of substance but also part of it, either,

that is, (a) considered with the inclusion of the subject, or (b) being a part of the formal substance (*hê kata to eidos ousia*), or (c) as changing along with its relations to the subject, so as to be itself in a way differently disposed about it as well.[125]

99,1 This is the number of opinions[126] about the differentiae that we may have. Inquiry about them is useful for the teaching of the categories as a whole,[127] for there are differentiae in all categories. But it is worth investigating which is the best opinion about the differentia among the ones mentioned. Well, <the best opinion is> that it occupies an intermediate position between quality and substance, on account of which it contributes to <something's> being of a certain quality (*suntelei eis to poion einai*) and is said to determine the quality (*to poion*) concerning substance and not as being in a subject.[128] Therefore, Iamblichus says, one should add to the definition of what is in a subject 'without contributing anything to the being (*ousia*) of the subject'.[129] For the differentia too completes the species. But perhaps the addition of 'not as a part' (1a24) to the definition suffices, for the differentia becomes a part just like the genus. The differentia must keep close to the species to which it contributes, and must be entirely free from the non-differentiated qualification (so to speak) which consists in the formlessness of the subject.[130]

In another way it must be said that the differentia properly speaking is the one that divides the genus into species, exists in the divided <genus> and concerns the very nature of the divided <genus>, e.g. of the animal *qua* animal, of the substance *qua* substance. For the differentia according to which the genera are divided into species concerns the species, whereas one particular human being does not at all differ from another, e.g. Dion and Plato, by the specific differentia (*eidikêi diaphorâi*) of human being.

Alexander raises the problem that if the differentia is a quality, it is in the substance as in a subject and is no longer said of it as a subject. To this we can reply by inverting the conditional, i.e. if the differentiae are said of a subject, they are in no subject whatsoever. So it is clear that they cannot be qualities such as those who raise the problem think they are.

But, they say, if the differentia is said of the primary and material substance as of a subject, it will itself be material too. Well, if they call material what exists together with matter in the sense that it also has a definite independent existence, it is not at all absurd that the differentiae too, if they exist in such a way, are predicated synonymously. After all, the form which is constitutive of the individual substance together with matter has both its own independent existence and a common existence together with matter. It does not entirely belong to matter, and because it contributes to the substance it is predicated synonymously of it, and the secondary substances

which are said of a subject will by no means be material in the sense of having their being in matter.[131]

We shall also reject the disquisitions[132] on the differentiae which proceed merely within a quality, e.g. rationality, and include matter 100,1
or the genus with themselves and separate the nature of the species altogether from them.[133] For all these opinions fall short of the true opinion concerning the differentiae.

Iamblichus also <rejects[134] the claim that> the species consists of many differentiae. For there is always one final <differentia> which characterizes the species, and the preceding <differentiae> pre-exist 5
as genera.[135] Perhaps there must be one proximate genus in the species, while the others are differentiae that distinguish it from the species in the same genus which are many. For 'rational' distinguishes human being from the irrational <species>, and 'mortal' <distinguishes human being> from the immortal <species>, but, one might say, 'animal' too <distinguishes human being> from non-living substances, and 'animate' from the inanimate <substances> and in 10
this way the many genera become differentiae, but the differentiae <do> not <become> genera, given that the genera signify what-it-is (*to ti estin*) but the differentiae what-kind-of-thing (*to hopoion ti*) it is.

> [3a33-b9 It belongs to substances and differentiae that everything is called after them synonymously. For all predications (*katêgoriai*) after them are predicated either of the individuals or of the species. (…)][136]

Some[137] raise the problem, in what way <Aristotle> (3a34) means the differentia to be predicated synonymously (e.g. both the name and the definition of 'footed' is predicated of its subject), for it is not 15
possible to predicate either the name or the definition of the subject. For 'footed' signifies two things: (1) the disposition (*hexis*) itself, e.g. footedness; (2) that which participates of that disposition and is disposed accordingly. But the latter is not the differentia, and therefore it has nothing to do with the present discussion. On the other hand, the name 'footedness', which is the differentia, is not predicated of the subject, for we do not call the subject, e.g. human being or some 20
other footed thing 'footedness'; neither is the definition <said of> the footed things, for we do not say that the subject is the disposition the participants in which we call footed things. So what does it mean that both the name and the definition of the differentia are predicated of the subject? As a consequence[138] the differentia would not be said synonymously of the subjects. And if it is not, then it is not said of a 25
subject either, since the things said of a subject are predicated synonymously of the corresponding individuals.

In response to this problem <Iamblichus said:>[139] 'People who posit that the differentia is constitutive according to its being, but say that it is not truly predicated in definition and name; or <those who posit that the differentia> is constitutive of the account of the subject, though not of its defining account, are not in agreement with Aristotle. For here he speaks about the defining account, and in that sense he means synonymous predication in the case of differentiae, species, and genera. They also miss the best opinion about the differentiae because they do not consider their substantiality (*to ousiôdes*). It is absurd that they even separate the account concerning the subject species and the defining account. For if the defining account indicates the essence (*to ti ên einai*), and that *is* the *eidos*,[140] the account concerning the subject and the account concerning the definition will not be different. The reason for the confusion is that sometimes they take the differentiae as completing the substance and as parts of the *eidos*, but when they construct the defining account, they no longer take the differentiae as completive, but regard them *qua* quality, and they do not apply the account of the states to all subjects. If they took the differentiae as completive in both these cases, as would be proper, both the name and the defining account would certainly be predicated of the subjects.' This, then, Iamblichus says by way of solution to the problem.

But perhaps the problem still remains: for the subject does not exist by the name of the constituent nor can it be said accordingly, nor can the account of the quality fit that which is qualified (*to poion*) in virtue of it <i.e. the quality>. But if the differentia were merely a quality, he would be right; but if it is a substantial quality and does not exist in a subject nor as a part of the composite or material substance, but is completive of the *eidos* according to its being, then it is clear that the *eidos* both exists and is said in virtue of it, and one should not take the definition of the quality or the state as <the definition of> a differentia. For the differentia would not be that which exists as an accident, but that which is substantial and completive of substance, in virtue of which the species both exists and is said. Moreover, Iamblichus accepts this himself further on, so that he plausibly concludes that not only is the secondary substance predicated synonymously of the subjects, but also the differentia.

Well then, does synonymous predication belong to secondary substances and differentiae only or to all the other categories too? For in them too the genera and species will be predicated synonymously of all individual accidents <existing> by virtue of them. E.g. knowledge is said synonymously of literacy as well as literacy <is said synonymously> of Aristarchus' literacy.

In response to this one should say that this belongs in common to the genera and species of the other categories too, but that it is a

distinguishing characteristic of the genera and species in the category of substance that they are genera and species of the individual substances and are synonymously predicated of them, and that the synonymity of substance[141] has nothing in common with that of accidents.

Perhaps[142] it is a proprium of substance to be predicated synonymously, and genus and species primarily belong to this <category>, 102,1
and it is communicated from it to the other categories too, in so far as they too have, in a way, an essence (*ousiôntai*). That is why we say that in <the other categories> the genera and species belong substantially (*ousiôdôs*) to the individuals and are predicated in the essence (*en tôi einai*), as e.g. colour and white <are predicated> of this particular white thing. For just as some things belong accidentally to 5
substances, in the same way too <some things> belong to accidents substantially.

But why, they ask, does <Aristotle> adduce things which are not proper to substance, e.g. not being in a subject, as if they were useful for the understanding of substance? Well, it is profitable to the understanding of substance to know that although not being in a subject belongs to substance, it does not belong to <substance> alone, even if it seems to pertain to <substance> most of all. 10

3b10-23 Every substance is believed to signify a this-something (*tode ti*). [In the case of primary substances it is undisputed and true that they signify a this-something, for what is designated is indivisible and one in number. In the case of secondary substances it is apparent from the form of the designation (*prosêgoria*) that they signify a this-something too, when one says 'human being' or 'animal'. However, this is not true, but <they> rather <signify> something qualified – for the subject is not one, as the primary substance is, but 'human being' and 'animal' are said of many things. But they do not signify something qualified without specification (*haplôs*), as 'white' does. For 'white' signifies nothing but quality (*poion*), whereas the species and genus determine the quality (*to poion*) with respect to substance: they signify a particular kind of substance (*poion tina ousian*). – The determination by means of the genus has a wider extension than that by means of the species.] For he who says 'animal' includes more than he who says 'human being'.

Having shown earlier that it is not the case that 'not being in a subject' is a proprium of substance (but that it has this in common with the differentia), nor that 'the other entities are called after substance 15
synonymously' (for this does not belong to the individual substance), he makes a transition to the differentiation by means of demonstra-

tives (*deixis*). Some demonstratives are proper to certain categories, as 'of this kind' (*toionde*) is proper to quality, and 'of this size' (*tosonde*) to quantity; and in the same way 'this' (*tode*) <is proper> to substance, although he shows that it does not belong to every substance.[143] For secondary substance is not designated as 'this', but as 'of this kind', because it 'determines the qualification concerning substance' (3b20), but 'this' does not belong to <secondary substance> determinately. So none of these is a proprium in the strict sense of substance.

<Aristotle> rightly said that 'every substance is believed to signify a this-something' (3b10) because he reports the opinion of others and the anomaly of everyday usage, which often tends to signify dissimilar things by similar forms of words. Moreover, in this case it generates a convincing impression, to wit that 'human being' is similar to 'Socrates', i.e. one in number, since it is one in species. Scrutinizing this opinion Aristotle finds it to be generally accepted in the case of primary substances. For the individual substance is a this-something, though not because it is one in number simply in virtue of being thus <i.e. being an individual substance>, since quality too may become one in number and so may everything else under the nine categories which is determined as to unity, but these do not at all accept the demonstrative 'this' in virtue of their own particular character, but only what is substantially one in number does. For if one calls each of these <substances> 'this' (*tode*), <one does so>[144] without using the proper demonstrative of quality (which requires 'of this kind' (*toionde*)) but stating[145] the common feature of *per se* existence, with which everything is endowed from substance. In the case of the secondary substances, however, the form of the word seems to signify a this-something in the same way as in the case of 'human being' and 'Socrates', but 'this is not true, because <it> rather <signifies> quality'[146] (3b15-16). For when there are many individuals the genus and the species represent their similarity.

After presenting two <claims>, i.e. (1) that it is not true that the genus and the species signify a this-something in the same way as the individual substance does, and furthermore (2) that they rather signify something qualified, he establishes the first by 'for the subject does not signify one thing' (3b16), and that <they signify> quality by 'for "human being" is said of many things' (3b17). Besides, when we say this <sc. 'human being'> we do not refer to any of the particulars definitely (*hôrismenôs*), but obscurely (*ep' adêlôi*), for we do not refer to Socrates rather than Plato or any other individual. For not everything possessing a kind of description is thereby a 'this' too, unless it is one and definite. When I say 'human being' I cannot point to the species (for it does not exist on its own)[147] but in pointing to an individual, e.g. Socrates, I say that human being is the kind of thing

(*toiouton*) Socrates is. Hence it will be a qualification concerning substance.

To prevent someone from taking him to regard the secondary substance as a quality such as white, since he said the latter also signified something qualified (1b29) and white also concerns substance, Aristotle imports the difference between them by calling the quality of secondary substances 'substantial' (*ousiôdês*), which renders <the phrase> 'it determines the quality concerning substance' (3b20). One has to understand in addition 'the species and genus of *substance*', for not every species and genus is such, unless indeed the genera and species in the other categories, when they are predicated in the essence, yield a substantial quality in virtue of the participation in substance present in them too.[148] So <Aristotle> says that the quality of secondary substances is substantial and determines, i.e. circumscribes and describes, the quality concerning substance, whereas <the quality> of white <determines> just that: quality. Hence white can be conceived without substance, whereas the genus and species <in the category of substance> cannot be considered without an individual substance. Moreover, they (the genera and the species <in the category of substance>) are completive parts of the substances, whereas whiteness is not.

However, since the differentia too, by determining the essence (*ousia*) of the genus, seems to specify and characterize the substances in <the category of> quality, it is worth asking (1) in what respect the differentiae differ from the white and (2) in what respect they differ from the genera and species <sc. in the category of substance>. <The answer is that> they differ from the white (1a) since the white is merely a qualification, whereas the differentia is a qualification concerning substance, and (1b) since the footed cannot be conceived without substance as the white can. (2) And because <the differentiae> signify differentiae of substances insofar as <they are> substances, they are in a way similar to substance, whereas genera and species are substances that have a certain resemblance to quality. For that very reason they are predicated in the essence, and the differentiae in quality. He also adds that of the things predicated by way of common terms the ones that are predicated proximately (*prosekhôs*), i.e. the species, appear to have a smaller extension, and <the ones that are predicated> more distantly (*porrôteron*), e.g. the genera, make the determination range over a wider extension.[149]

Now, of what is said concerning substance 'not being in a subject' is taken from its relation to the things that are in a subject, and 'to signify a this-something' from the practice of predication. What the substance receiving such relations is itself, is not stated at all. However, because the issue at hand is to divide how each thing is predicated and in how many ways, for this reason <Aristotle> pro-

vides their peculiar characteristics as the predication occurs, and because he is hunting for the peculiar characteristics of the categories in a more dialectical way, i.e. from speech. After all, the study of signifying words cannot be otherwise than insofar as they are spoken.

The conclusion of what has been said so far is that 'to be called this' is not a proprium of substance either – although not in the same way as the <characteristic> mentioned earlier <sc. failed to be a proprium of substance>. 'Not being in a subject' was not a proprium because it did not belong to substance alone, whereas this is not a proprium because it does not belong to every substance.

Some[150] raise the problem how we can say that a particular human being is a human being as well as an animal, rational, and mortal, if all these are not this-somethings. Well, because we call co-ordinated forms[151] this-somethings, but the argument was about things conceived in themselves.

But on what account do we call the individual substance a this-something, on account of (1) the form or (2) the matter or (3) the composite?[152] We shall say on account of all of these, but on account of matter (1) insofar as <the individual substance> serves as subject and reaches the actuality of receiving the form, and according to Plato (*Tim*. 50B) also insofar as it does not depart from its own nature; again, on account of the form (2) insofar as it is determinate and one in number, for Boethus too determines unity by means of 'this'. If someone says that matter, being undetermined, cannot be a this-something at all, we shall remind him that the current argument does not concern unrelated matter but matter that already has a relation with form. Of course the composite (3) which *is* the individual receives <the designation> 'this'.

If someone says that in the case of 'this' and 'of this kind' no real difference is involved but rather peculiar characteristics of verbal signification – the one <i.e. 'this'> being the sign of something being present and of definitely determining the thought, and 'of this kind' indicating something as being similar to 'this' – we shall reply to this remark too that the substance that is determined as to unity is present beforehand and that the identity and similarity present among the many substances (in virtue of which also the signification has room to exist) has priority over <the identity and similarity of> the word.[153] Because they exist determinately, they are named determinately, and not the other way around. But the entire approach from things being named to substances is true according to the Pythagoreans, since they used to posit that words are naturally related to things. And according to those who say that the parts of speech are at random (*allôs*) by convention[154] this approach <sc. of the Pythagoreans> proceeds improperly because it fails to obtain the principle of the categories, from which they <i.e. the categories> truly came forth.

It is worth asking whether, according to those who grant existence to species and genera, they <i.e. the species and genera> will be said to be 'this'. Indeed, Chrysippus too raises the problem concerning the Idea whether it will be called a this-something. We must also take into account the customary usage of the Stoics about generically qualified things, how according to them cases (*ptôseis*)[155] are expressed, and how in their school the universals are called not-somethings (*outina*),[156] and how, also, out of ignorance of the fact that not every substance signifies a this-something, also the Not-someone sophism (*to para ton Outin sophisma*) arises from the form of the expression (*lexis*). Namely 'if someone is in Athens, he is not in Megara; <but human being is in Athens; hence human being is not in Megara>'.[157] For human being is not someone (*ou tis*), since the common <human being> is not a particular <human being>, but we took it as a particular in the argument, and it was also from this that the so-called Nobody argument (*ho logos Outis*) derived its name. The same also applies to this sophism:[158] 'What I am, you are not; I am a human being; therefore you are not a human being'. For with this sophism too 'I' and 'you' are said with reference to individuals, but human being is not said with reference to any particular. Consequently, the mistaken inference arose, because it treated what is not particular as particular. But enough of this; let us proceed.

3b24-32 It also belongs to substances that nothing is contrary to them. [For what can be contrary to primary substance? For instance, nothing is contrary to an individual human being, nor to human being or animal. This is not a proprium of substance, but it applies to other <things> too such as quantity. For instance, nothing is contrary to two-feet-long, or to ten, or to any such thing, unless one would say that many is contrary to few or large to small. However,] among definite quantities no one is contrary to another.

<Aristotle> proceeds to another characteristic that belongs <to substance> in common with other <categories> too, i.e. to receive or not to receive contrariety. He inquires whether indeed not having a contrary belongs to substances, and having proved this, he shows that it is not a proprium of it from the fact that it also belongs to quantity. But one can also prove that 'there being nothing contrary' belongs to substances from the following considerations. Contraries are always ranked under one genus, but substance does not have any higher genus under which it can be ranked. Moreover, contraries have a relation one towards the other, but substance is unrelated (*askhetos*) and does not at all need the relation of contrariety. Further, contraries indicate one another, but substance is definite in virtue of itself.

However, Aristotle establishes that substances have no contrary from induction (*epagôgê*) on primary and secondary substances.

He believes that it is not a proprium of substance, for it is <a feature held> in common with definite quantity. For nothing is contrary to two, for certainly three is not: for why would this <number be contrary to two> rather this than any other definite number? However, only one thing is contrary to one thing. So neither three nor any other definite number is opposed to two. If such quantities do not receive contrariety either, this <feature> is not a proprium of substance, since it does not belong to it alone.

But if someone claims that in quantity too there is contrariety by positing many as the contrary of few and large as the contrary of small (3b30-1), and states that for this reason 'to have no contrary' *is* a proprium of substance because it belongs to it alone, <we reply that> perhaps these are not even quantities, but relations, as <Aristotle> will show in the discussion of quantity (5b10-29), so that their opposition too is not according to contrariety but according to relation. A little below (11b16ff.) he will set out the difference between oppositions. But since this makes no difference to the present discussion he leaves it as being a disputed issue and infers the same conclusion from what is agreed, saying that such quantity is not determinate. That of which neither the number nor the size is definite, and of which neither the weight is known nor, fundamentally, that in which its being (*to einai*) strictly consists, cannot be called definite, for example 'large'. For this is not definite as to length or breadth or number. If you name a line, you determine its <having> length, and you determine it even more if you add the number, and thus it becomes a definite quantity which does not have contrariety. The proof (*tekmêrion*) from determinate quantities is sufficient to <establish that> substance is not alone in having no contrary and that this <i.e. having no contrary> is not a proprium of substance. For it proves the same conclusion in the case of both one and many instances.

Some raise the problem how there is no contrariety in substance. For how is rational animal not contrary to irrational animal?[159] To this Iamblichus replies that 'one differentia is contrary to another differentia, but the whole is not contrary', and that 'that which receives contraries is not itself contrary. For if it were dominated by one of the contraries, it could not be suitably prepared for the reception of the other contrary. For instance, soul or body or individual substance or secondary substance will not in themselves be
107,1 contraries, given that they receive contraries. But neither if something were divided into contraries, e.g. animal, would it thus be contrary. For one may understand this, <Iamblichus> says, from the definition of contraries as well. We define them by being the furthest

separated from each other, but as they are mentioned here they exist together concerning the same substance of animal.'[160]

By raising problems against this I shall, as it seems to me, give the impression of not having grasped what is said. For in the case of agreed contraries the contrariety concerns the differentiae, but one is not contrary to the other as a whole because the genus of the contraries is the same. So white and black being contraries, one is a colour that splits the vision, the other a colour that concentrates the vision,[161] and both concern the same essence, that of the genus, and even though they are furthest apart they have this furthest distance as things that are under the same genus.[162]

And why is what receives the contraries and what is divided into contraries not a contrary? For nothing prevents it from being contrary to something else, even if it is not one or the other of the contraries it receives or into which it is divided. For example, although what is ill is divided into being ill from heat or from cold it is nevertheless contrary to what is healthy, and the body that receives health and illness is contrary to the incorporeal. Generally, divisions occur into opposites (*antikeimena*) and contraries, and each of the prongs is divided into contraries, as substance is divided into body and incorporeal, and body into ensouled and soulless and into having sense perception and not having sense perception.[163]

So perhaps it is better to say that rational is not contrary to irrational, for if irrational is the negation of rational, the negation is not a contrary, and if, <on the other hand,> it has an affirmative power indicating a different species from rational, the irrational is not by the same token contrary to rational, for it is produced from it and receives its status from it.[164]

Nor is one species opposite to another, but all contrarieties are observed in connection with differentiae and qualities. For that reason it is easy to reply to those[165] who raise the problem how Aristotle can say that fire is the contrary of water and air of earth, that these are contraries on account of their differentiae and qualities. He says that the hot and dry is contrary to the cold and moist, and the hot and moist to the cold and dry. The substances taken as a whole are not contrary to <substances> taken as a whole.

In what way does <Aristotle> say in the *Physics* that form is contrary to privation?[166] For if the form is substance, substance receives contrariety <after all>. A weak answer to the *aporia* would be to say that Aristotle customarily speaks in a more general way of contraries in terms of privation.[167] The truth is this: on the one hand there is form as substance, on the other form as state (*hexis*). So he says that the latter is opposed to privation, not form as substance.

Those who posit contraries among substances introduce contrarieties in another way too. They divide into two groups: one defines the

contraries with respect to a single substance, like those who say that the hot, cold, dry, moist and the other contrary potencies (*dunameis*) exist in the body with respect to matter. It is clear that they show not that substances are contrary, but that the qualities surrounding substance are. The other group claims that the principles stand apart in all respects and have nothing in common nor any relation to one another whatsoever, and that they exist absolutely (*apolutôs*) in themselves and have no need at all for an ordering (*suntaxis*) in relation to each other. These people posit that substances too are immediate contraries and they import contrariety towards substance. This is not because there is one thing which receives the contraries, while the contraries are different <from that> and do not have being in common either, as for instance Plato (*Soph.* 250A-C) reasons in the case of motion and rest both and each of which is said to *be* – but, they say, on account of total separation (*apostasis*) and complete abasement (*huphesis*) being (*to on*) in relation to not-being, principle in relation to extremity[168] and good in relation to evil will possess the contrariety of measurelessness to measure, of unlimitedness to limit and of such divided oppositions, in which contrariety with respect to substance is seen, although it is different way from how it was said to be earlier.[169]

Such, indeed, is the opinion on the basis of which certain others and especially the great Plotinus opposes <Aristotle> and uses arguments of this kind:[170] 'That nothing is contrary to substance is credible with respect to particular <kinds of> substances, individual, specific, and generic, because it is proven by induction, but it is not proven in general.'

One mode of defence against this would be to recall the doctrine about universals. It is not possible to deduce the most generic <universals> from prior and more causative ones; rather, it is necessary to divide everything ranked under them by complete divisions and to study the commonality in them all, so as not to pass over something among the particular species, and if we find no difference in them whatsoever, we grasp the sameness of the generic universal not from induction, but from complete division.[171] So in this case, given that all substances without exception are divided into primary and secondary substances, and neither of them <i.e. primary and secondary substances> possesses contrariety, substance as a whole cannot possess contrariety either.

A different <mode of defence> is this: when one of the *per se* attributes and completers of substance is taken, what is proved to be true in each case <sc. taken individually> is also thereby proved to be true of every case. For instance, rationality is present in each human being and <so> in every human being. So given that to exist in itself is essential (*ousiôdes*) to substance, 'not to have a contrary'

will also belong to it essentially (*kat' ousian*) and in this way it will be true of each and every substance.

But surely, Plotinus says,[172] not-substance is in general opposed to substance, and the nature of evil is contrary to the nature of good, and the principle of the worse things to the principle of the better ones. These are to be divided thus: if not-being, which we oppose to being as its contrary, does not subsist anywhere in any way, then it will not have any relation to anything else, given that it is nothing. If, on the other hand, it exists as a determinate being, then it is wrongly said to be cut off in all respects from that which is, since it participates in it <sc. in that which is>. But if they <i.e. being and not-being> are separate as two substances, they will have being itself as one. If, however, they are separately transcendent (*exêirêmenai khôristôs*) because of an eminent otherness (*ekbebêkuian heterotêta*, i.e. the Form of Otherness), then they will not share the relation of contraries since they have[173] nothing in common with one another. And if, as is usually said, not-being is produced out of being, just as the sensible <is produced> from the intelligible and the material from the divine as if the ultimate <were produced> from the first, how can it <sc. non-being> enjoy contrariety with it <sc. being>, in the sense of being in all respects separated from it, given that it <sc. non-being> has its entire existence from it <i.e. being>? How will <not-being>, which has no ratio of either comparison or opposition towards being, but falls away to extremity as nothing, be contrary to it as to the very cause that produced it,[174] a contrariety which causes it to be equal to that which was <supposed to be> its contrary? But if it subsists from the beginning *per se*, not-being will be of equal dignity to being, since it too would be primary. Moreover, why would one be being, the other not-being, given that <sc. on this view> they have equal priority in respect of <being a> principle and in the order of causation? Evil and not-being will have a privileged existence, and thus it will not even *be* evil since it exists *per se*, and it will be difficult to find out how the two <i.e. being and not-being> come together into one. And if they need a third party to bring them together or in which they will be one, then they will no longer be primary and contrary in the way mentioned. But if they do not come together because they have not come into existence one out of the other – given that they are contraries – nor out of things prior – given that they are primary – generation and this universe could not be fully established.

Consequently, these objections ensue for all those who posit evil and not-being at the beginning, and most of all for Plotinus and for the others who start from unification. For they presuppose the one and good at the beginning and are required to make the multitude that results from division adventitious (*epeisodiôdes*) and to claim that evil supervenes accidentally and has no priority whatsoever. As

it is expressed here, it <i.e. evil> is even defined in a self-contradictory way. Because it is called a principle, it may seem to be primary, but because it has a subsidiary existence (*paruphistatai*) among the last things on account of its departure (*ekstasis*) from being, it is plausibly called extreme. How can such a thing have contrariety towards the very first thing? And if it is produced from the first and everything which *is* is a descendant of that <principle>, it will no longer be contrary, for no contrary participates in being (*ousia*) from things which are repugnant to themselves. If the ultimate thing were said to be entirely separate from the first thing, <we reply that> in the first place it is impossible that something be entirely cut off from its own cause. For by abandoning itself in just this way it would destroy itself altogether. Furthermore, it would not be contrary in this way either, for what has nothing in common, will not have the ratio of contrariety in common either. But nor will it even be the case that the non-substantial (*to mê kat' ousian*) is contrary to the substantial (*to kat' ousian*), as they claim, for the very substantiality (*to tês ousias*) will belong to them in common, and no longer will the one will be being, the other not-being. They ought to have subtracted contrariety too from not-being for it to be truly not-being, since surely a contrary and what creates contraries is a kind of being, given that not-being cannot do or undergo anything, for it is even weaker than these <i.e. action and passion>.[175]

So neither statement is to be made at all, (1) that it both is-not and a contrary, and (2) both ultimate and a principle, i.e. that it creates contraries and cannot create anything at all. Otherwise, the dispute will not be about this, namely whether not-being is contrary to substance, but a far more justified question can be asked, i.e. whether not-being has a contradictory disposition to itself. If this is so, how can what annihilates itself still either exist or oppose substance? But these questions would also go beyond the discussion in an introduction, for this is more germane to a discussion of the first principles and is dealt with in more detail there.[176]

> **3b33-4a9** Substance is believed not to receive the more and less; [I do not mean that no substance is more of a substance than another – for this was said to be the case (2a11-16) – but that each substance is not said to be more or less just what it is. For instance, if this substance is a human being, it will not be more or less of a human being, neither in comparison with itself nor with another human being. (…) For neither is human being said to be more of a human being now than before, nor any other substance,] so that substance cannot receive the more and less.

We know each being by its own differentiae and those contradistin-

guished from them, for its own differentiae indicate the <features> present that belong to each thing, while the differentiae contradist- 30
inguished from them, being in different <substances>[177] by their peculiarities show the characteristics that are separate from them and thus knowledge becomes complete when we know what each 111,1
thing is and what it is not. So here, too, whereas *that the other <categories> are named synonymously after the secondary substances* and *that <substances> signify a this-something and suchlike* dis- 5
played the property of belonging <to substance>, but *that nothing is contrary to substances* and *that they do not receive the more and less* are studied under the heading of not-belonging <to substance>, and in this way the study of them is complete on both sides.

Again, the other way around[178] those features that are by nature said of many genera, e.g. contrariety and the more and the less, must be scrutinized in respect of each genus, <to see> whether they belong to it or not. Since in the preceding discussion the species was said to 10
be more of a substance than the genus (2b7-8), but it is now stated that 'substance does not admit of the more and less' (3b33-4), it is reasonable that he brings up and solves the objection that the two of them are not said in the same sense, but one *per se*, the other accidentally.[179] For the species is not more of a substance than the genus *qua* substance nor insofar as it *is*, but the species is prior to the genus *qua* being closer to the individual and primary substance. But 15
this is merely accidental whereas here <Aristotle> says that 'each substance is not said to be more or less insofar as it is what it is' (3b35-6). Hence the present statements are not contrary to what was said earlier.

But someone might say: snow is whiter than a swan to the extent that it is closer to what is whitest. Well, in that respect it is similar 20
to substance, having the more by accident. But to the extent that that which participates in quality participates in it more or less, the co-ordinated[180] quality has more and less. For quality is supervenient on substance, whereas substance does not come to be in something else so as to be participated more or less, but everything else comes 25
to be in it. Therefore, then, substance admits of accidental comparison (*sunkrisis*) but not *per se* comparison, which occurs in things of the same species. For human being is not more of a human being than another human being nor than himself, nor is Socrates in the Academy more Socrates than in Delium. The white body, however, can be both whiter than another white body by participating more in white- 30
ness, and it can be more or less white than itself, that is at different times, not of course at the same time.[181]

White is not said to be whiter than black, for the more is always said in relation to the less. The less, when increased, reaches what is similar; but the increase of black never renders black similar to white; 35

on the contrary, it puts it at a greater distance from it, so that a contrary cannot sustain the comparison of more and less with its own
112,1 contrary, nor with what is strictly different in species either: comparisons belong to things of the same species. So if the comparison of more and less is not found in substances of the same species, it will not be in substances generally. Note that this is not a proprium of substance
5 either. For in the case of numbers and definite quantity, too, three is not more than itself or anything else. Three cannot change itself since it is always definite in the same quantity, nor will it *be* more than four, for it is not said to *be* more in relation to four either. And generally each addition and subtraction creates a complete otherness of quantity. The increase does not occur in relation to something else
10 but in relation to what is the same and similar. Also, some of the relatives, such as equal, double, father and the like, do not admit of the more and the less. And in <the category of> quality the figures (*skhêmata*) are neither more nor less. For all these reasons, then, the more and the less do not belong to <the category of> substance nor is this not-belonging a proprium of it.

15 Someone might raise the problem whether he who is more rational is not more human.[182] Well, first he does not have more rationality on account of his substance, but on account of his state (*hexis*) or actuality. Moreover, it is not at all absurd for qualities that coincide with species, as rationality does with human being and heat with fire, to admit of the more and less, but it is absurd for the species itself.
20 For the virtuous human being, when he is called more of a human being, is not thereby intensified *qua* human but *qua* disposed in this way; and this signifies quality, not substance.

All right <the questioner may reply>, it is not surprising if the virtuous <human being> has the more with respect to the adventitious quality, given that the disposition is not essential. But rational
25 human being and hot fire are such in virtue of an essential (*ousiôdê*), not an adventitious, quality that completes the form (*eidos*). And if this were to admit of the more and less, the form (*eidos*) as a whole would also have to receive it, and so would substance.

Perhaps, then, if the differentia of rationality is essential (*kat' ousian*) it is specific (*eidêtikê*) and not regarded with respect to more and less, as e.g. in human being and spirit (*daimôn*). For surely, when
30 the less of human being is intensified it will never reach the perfection of spirituality (*daimonia*). But if it is with respect to a state or actuality such a differentia is no longer concerned with substance.[183]

But how is it that matter, being a kind of substance, itself admits of the more and less and appears[184] small and large and generally all
113,1 contraries, even though matter too is a kind of substance, just like the form as well?[185] Well, in itself it does not differ at all, for it is potentially everything in the same way and offers[186] the same appear-

ance and a receptacle of substance to all beings, since it is prime matter. Such a variation supervenes on it as a consequence of its relation to form.[187]

> **4a10-22** A proprium of substance seems to be most of all ['being receptive of contraries while remaining one and the same in number'.] (…) Such a characteristic is not apparent in the case of any of the other <categories>.

After saying what accompanies substance in common with other categories and does not belong to it alone, and what <does> not <accompany> every <substance>, thereby showing that none of these <features> are a proprium of substance, he proceeds to what seems to be its proprium most of all, i.e. 'to be receptive of contraries while being one and the same in number' (4a10-11).[188] 'Most of all' indicates its position relative to the ones mentioned earlier, i.e. that it is more of a proprium than they are; the addition of 'seems'[189] indicates that even this is not a proprium in the strict sense, but seems to be one because it belongs to substance alone. At the same time 'seems' indicates that it is not possible to grasp the proprium in the strict sense in the case of primary genera, evidently because of the simplicity and wholeness of primary genera.

Of course substance is not 'receptive of contraries' simultaneously, for something cannot receive contraries simultaneously (this is impossible), but successively as one of the contraries disappears and the other comes in. He also makes this clear in the case of the examples.

He states the mode of the proprium, that he called it proprium as something that belongs <to substance> alone, because of the fact that this characteristic is not seen in the case of anything else that is not a substance. For if it does not exist in the case of anything else, but the particular individual substance receives contraries one by one, it will of course be called a proprium not as something that belongs to all <of substance> (for the proprium that belongs to one thing alone and not to all of it is stronger than the one that belongs to all of it and not to one thing alone; for propria like to be restricted), but to <one thing> alone. In the fifth book of the *Topics* (*Top*. 5.1, 128b34-6) the proprium was defined in this way.[190] One may also study this by conversion (*kata tên antistrophên*).[191] For if the genus is a substance, it is always possible to take one individual under the genus, which is receptive of contraries while being the same, and if it receives contraries while being one and the same, such a thing is a substance. So it is a proprium when seen in the case of individual substance only. The examples concerning the particular human being sometimes proceed with respect to the body – as in the case of white and black,

and hot and cold – sometimes with respect to the soul, as in the case of bad and virtuous.

35 The secondary substances also seem to be receptive of contraries,
114,1 for as Socrates is foolish and clever, so is human being and animal. But if human being and animal are <receptive of contraries> because Socrates is, this does not belong to them *per se* but accidentally, because it belongs to what is ranked under them. 'One in number'[192] is added because it shows that if one takes human being universally it does not receive contraries, but if one takes human being in this <one particular case>, e.g. Socrates, it does.

5 But, they say,[193] if the genera and species receive contraries, e.g. human being receives cowardice and boldness, this will not only occur in <the category of> substance, but also in numerous others. For movement comes to be fast and slow, and disposition, state, and action receive contraries.

Well, first they take the universals (*ta katholou*) but not the common items (*ta koina*) existing together with the individuals.[194]
10 Furthermore, each of these is not one in number, but different in different individuals: one thing is like this, the other the complementary contrary, and they <sc. the universals> do not receive the contraries themselves, but what falls under them does. For the generic state is neither bad nor virtuous, but some <states> under it are virtuous, others bad, and that which is regarded as common does not undergo the change of the contraries. Hence that to which the
15 contraries belong <as features> is different from what is receptive of contraries one by one: the contraries belong <as features> to the genera, but the receptivity belongs only to matter and to the composite substances with matter, but merely accidentally to the genera. Therefore one should add to the characteristic of substance that it does not receive contraries 'accidentally', and one should also add
20 'according to the change within itself ',[195] so that we do not incur the problems raised concerning genera.

Again, they introduce here the intelligible substance as not receiving contraries. But we must give the same reply, that the discussion is not concerned with that now, but with what is <sc. here> called substance.

But, they say, what contrary does the sun receive, given that it is
25 always the same in one species? For nothing is contrary to its movement.[196] And how is 'to receive contraries one by one' true of eternal substances in general? The heavens can never come to a stop; yet rest is the contrary of movement. Even among the corruptible entities, however, fire is receptive of hotness, but not of coldness, and snow the other way around. Well, to the objections from eternal substances we must reply that here the characteristic is claimed to
30 belong to every substance that is able to come to be <something> in

processes of change, not to substance which is essentially characterized as unchangeable. To the <objections> from fire and snow, <we must reply> that <Aristotle> says they are receptive of contraries but that they are not constituted (*ousiôsthai*) by the contraries <sc. which they receive>. For fire does not admit of hotness; rather <hotness> is in its essence. Nothing receives itself, but something external, as for instance water receives hotness as an acquired quality, but not wetness, for this is naturally inhering in it. Hence also the heavenly bodies have their being in circular movement and cannot receive any contrary.[197] If such peculiarities are not qualities, but substantial differentiae and completers of substance, something cannot divest itself of what belongs to it essentially while persisting. Rather, it is only those things which possess one of a pair of contraries not by nature and inseparably that are 'receptive of contraries'. One should not demand receptivity in respect of all contraries; rather, it is sufficient too <to demand receptivity> in respect of some contrariety or other. Thus it can be shown that fire too receives contrariety as to place. But in which contrariety does the sun, which is an individual substance, participate? Well, even though it is not receptive of contraries, they say it is possible to get hold of some individuals in its genus, i.e. individual substance, that are receptive of contraries. If one accepts this, the characteristic feature <i.e. of admitting contraries> does not in fact belong to every individual substance, but only to some, <i.e. individual substance which is> subject to generation and corruption.

By means of this characteristic a further point is made clear,[198] that substance and especially the individual substance underlies everything everywhere and that everything else exists with respect to it and in it and that the receptivity attaches to nothing else. For the accidents do not suffice for their own existence, and therefore they do not underlie anything but need another foundation. Therefore, too, they do not receive contraries. The subject, e.g. the body, becomes white and black while remaining the same, but the white moves out when the black supervenes. And so, since animal and human being persist, they <sc. can> receive contraries insofar as they are substances in the particular human being, but colour does not persist and therefore does not receive <contraries>. For when the white leaves, colour leaves with it too and no longer exists, and together with the accruing of black, colour accrues with it, or, if this is not correct, <colour> surely exists when <white> exists, but colour does not, <as something> persisting, receive what enters and leaves.[199]

But, they say,[200] this is an accident concerning substance, and what substance is has not been stated. Well, because sensible substance is a conglomerate[201] and has its being in something else its characteristics too will be of the same kind as its nature. He who seeks being

itself seeks something invisible and stronger than the sensible substance, something that belongs identically to all as the form of substance in virtue of which being is said of each thing, whether universal, simple or composite, and of each of the nine <categories>. For white is said to be white on account of participation of being.

But, they say,[202] if sensible substance does not exist without magnitude or quality, how do we still separate the accidents, e.g. hot and dry? For what will substance be? For these are qualified substances, so with respect to what does the qualified substance exist? Obviously, with respect to the subject. So fire will not as a whole be substance, but <only> something like a part of it, which will be matter. Now this argument makes two false assumptions: the first is that it studies the mixture and conglomerate by setting it apart from substance in this realm, although no particular <conglomerate> exists on its own at all, but they all have their existence in some way in each other and with each other. The second is that it regards the hot and the dry and the specific differentiae as qualities and does not take into account substance in the sense of form. From all this it reaches the absurdity of believing that matter is strictly substance.

Archytas too discusses the same characteristic of substance, saying: 'A proprium of substance is to be receptive of contraries while remaining one and the same in number. For waking is contrary to sleep, slowness to speed, illness to health, and numerically one and the same human being becomes receptive of these. For he is awake and sleeps, and moves more slowly and faster, and is healthy and ill, and he is receptive of <contraries> like these, though not simultaneously.' In this passage the same characteristic of substance is stated, and by saying 'though not simultaneously' he states the reason for the successive change of the contraries, and in addition solves the *aporiai* that were adduced against it from naturally inhering <attributes>, eternal movers, and eternal beings.[203] For all of these accrue atemporally. He solved the disputes from the genera[204] by adding 'while remaining', since these of course do not remain: the colour in white does not receive black, but it leaves with the white and no longer remains the same.

Iamblichus points out this characteristic of substance in a more Pythagorean way by extending it by analogy to all substance.[205] 'In intelligible substance', he says, 'movement and rest, samenesses and othernesses belong to substance simultaneously, and there the contrariety exists in substance not successively but simultaneously, and in its case "receptivity" is spoken of in a different way from how it is viewed in composite substances. For, because extension comes to be, in this realm the subject is one thing, and what comes to be in it another. But in the case of the most simple substance that in which

it comes to be is not different from what comes to be in it, nor does it exist in different things, but everything is a unity.

In the case of eternally moving substance a conjunction (*sullêpsis*) and, so to speak, coherence (*sunokhê*) of its entire nature are seen in the heavens, and not because eternally moving substance embraces all <substances> and there is none external to it, but also because it alone is seen to be able to perform by itself not one arbitrary motion or merely two or three, but all motions simultaneously, whereas nothing ensouled or soulless that moves by impulse or choice is able to sustain two contradictory motions simultaneously (I mean forwards and backwards, or again to the right and left and up and down). It is something baffling and surprising about it that it belongs to each member of the contrariety to have its contrary in conjunction with it. For each individual ascent which is apparent and real[206] in one half of the horizon, which is a way up from what is below the earth to what is above it, immediately causes perforce the contrary motion, i.e. the one in the other half of the horizon, which is called descent. For in a certain way through itself <the upward motion> pushes and rolls forward the entire vault and presses it on, so as to cause the motion of that <descent> no less than the descent causes through itself the upward motion by means of the pushing. And, plausibly, it should also be thought of in terms of forward and backward <motion>. Because in every inhabited region forward <motion> is observed with reference to the so-called mid-heaven (*mesouranêma*), and backward <motion is observed> with reference to its opposite, which is called anti-mid-heaven,[207] the mutual pressing on and compensation by each other can be proved coherently (*akolouthôs*).

Although the four conditions mentioned <i.e. upward, downward, forward, backward> are conceived as common to the heavens as a whole, the poles present a small objection, because they do not partake of them because of the sameness (*tautotês*) of their position.

It is possible to observe the said features in the case of the planets too. For they perform ascents and descents and progressions and returns not only in the ways mentioned, but they also have direct and retrograde motions, and with them the motion to the right and left can be seen more clearly as they are borne from the centre to the north or the south and back to the centre from both sides. So the heaven possesses a cohesive motion of all motions consisting of <all> motions while embracing the contrary motions within itself simultaneously and producing the contrary motions from their contraries. Consequently, the contraries are present to the heavens too and are present simultaneously and exist in each other and depend on each other. However, <this contrariety> differs so much from intelligible contrariety, that the latter belongs to one thing and according to one

substance, whereas the former creates contrary motions in different things and with respect to different substances.

The ultimate nature of substance[208] does not have both contraries simultaneously as part of its nature (*sumphuton*) either. But if one of the contraries exists in it as part of its nature at all, it has its complement dispersed <i.e. in another part>, and receives most contraries as acquired from outside and not simultaneously either in terms of substance or in time, but receives different contraries in succession at different times and in a different part of the body. Hence with respect to this <ultimate nature (*phusis*) of substances> too, the feature of contrariety is observed <in it> in the same mode in which it exists (*pephuken*). So he has shown that this characteristic of substance is something common to all substance.'

Let us see which problems Aristotle adds to what has been said.

> **4a22-b19** Unless one objects by saying that statement and belief [are such <i.e. receptive of contraries while remaining one and the same in number>. For the same statement seems to be both true and false, e.g. if the statement that someone is sitting is true, the same statement will be false after he has got up. It is the same with belief. (…) If one would grant this, the cases would at least differ in mode. For in the case of substances the changing things themselves are receptive of contraries. (…) But statement and belief remain utterly motionless in all respects whereas the contrary occurs with respect to them because reality is changing (*tou pragmatos kinoumenou*). (…) Consequently, *by this mode*, i.e. on account of its own change, it can be a proprium of substance to be receptive of contraries – at is, *if* one would grant this, i.e. that belief and statement are receptive of contraries. However, this is not true. For statement and belief are not said to be receptive because they themselves receive any of the contraries but because the affection has occurred to something else. (…) But substance is said to be receptive of contraries by the very fact of receiving the contraries itself. (…)] Consequently, 'to be receptive of contraries while remaining the same and one in number' can be a proprium of substance.

Since both statement and belief seem to be true and false, and true is the contrary of false, but a statement is not a substance, but rather the statement <which consists> in an utterance is a quantity (cf. 4b32-5),[209] and the <statement which consists> in a belief is a quality, <Aristotle> plausibly raises the problem whether perhaps 'to be receptive of contraries' does not belong to substance.[210] He solves the problem by counter-objection (*antiparastasis*) and objection (*enstasis*).[211] For after first admitting that statement and belief receive true

and false he shows that they do not receive them as substance does. For substance receives contraries by changing itself, whereas statement and belief do so not by virtue of a change in themselves, but by the change of the thing (*to pragma*) <referred to>. Subsequently, he also rejects the receiving generally, for that which receives persists while receiving a certain change, whereas no change occurs in a statement and a belief but a statement and a belief are called true and false in virtue of a change in the <corresponding> thing: he properly said 'to be called' (4b9-10) and not 'to become'.

One may also handle it in this way: the statement uttered first is not one in number with the second, and that also according to Aristotle himself as well. For, he says (5a34), <the earlier statement> has been uttered and it will no longer be possible to get hold of what has been uttered. For a statement belongs to the things that move in transit, and is accordingly not of things which have position, either, so that the statement uttered first is the same in species as the second – the true one <the same in species> as the false one – and not the same in number, as was said <sc. to hold> with regard to substance. Belief, too, is speech inside[212] and it too exists in transit, and the same can be said about it too.

But some raise problems by way of objection against these arguments too and say that even if statement and belief do not undergo the affection that external things undergo, it does not therefore follow that they do not undergo <anything> at all: rather it is affected as a statement is and receives in itself a change in respect of being true and false. For *this* is the contrariety that belongs to statement and belief. Because, he <i.e. the opponent>[213] says, one might as well say that the soul is not receptive of contraries either, because it does not receive white and black. For it is not by nature fit to receive them, but it receives those <contraries>, which it is by nature fit to receive, <i.e.> wisdom and folly. So also statement and belief receive the change that belongs to statement and belief in respect of truth and falsehood, but not the <change> in respect of sitting and not sitting. So they will have the contrariety in virtue of change, but a change that is befitting to statement and belief.

So perhaps one should allow for a middle road between Aristotle's words and the objections against them, and say that this is a different mode of reception, when something, while itself remaining the same, nevertheless receives a different kind of relation because something else is affected, as we see in the case of relatives too.[214] For what was on the right beforehand comes to be on the left without itself changing at all, because something else changes place. And it is not at all surprising that, when reality (*ta pragmata*) changes, statement and belief which possess being true and false on account of their relation to reality, suffer a change of relation without being affected them-

selves. Aristotle, mind you, denied that <type of> reception in which the receiver is necessarily affected in a way. So even if <something> can be said to change according to the change of statement and belief, it does *not* change while being affected, as a body that becomes hot and cold.

But, he says,[215] on what foundation do we base our thought when we call some things substances, others affections? Is it because some are particular, a 'this', a subject, and not in a subject and because they are what they are without belonging to something else? But the secondary substance hardly has any of these characteristics: it is indeed said of, exists in and belongs to something else, and 'this' does not fit it. Well, he who says this focuses on the unrelated (*askhetos*) specific and generic substance, but not on the co-ordinated <substance> which has already become sensible, to which everything that was mentioned belongs in virtue of its coordination (*katataxis*) with the individual. If it belongs to them to be in and to belong to something else, this is not in the sense of being in a subject nor as the white belongs to the body, but as the parts of substance. For one must know this, that it is not possible to provide accurate definitions of the highest genera, but the statements about them rather resemble a suggestion (*hupomnêsis*) and description (*hupographê*), and one must not demand more from them <i.e. from the statements> than what they are capable of. So it suffices also to give some distinguishing feature concerning them from which it is possible to know what they are.[216]

This too is worth some attention, in what way substance is said to be receptive of contraries 'on account of its own change' (4b3). For according to those who say that matter is impassible,[217] matter does not alter or change or undergo contraries, but the changes occur around it. And if the form is unmovable in all respects and receives the qualitative contraries while remaining the same, it too will not possess the contraries on account of a change in itself. So if anything only the composite will possess the contrarieties while changing and altering, and in this way this proprium will be stated with reference to the individual composite substance only, and the specification of the proprium of substance will be confined to a narrow scope indeed.

However, if we shall make use of the doctrines of some Peripatetics and state that matter is affected, how will the change of matter, which is simple and stable with respect to being in potentiality only, not mean its corruption if it changes from what it is and proceeds to actuality? For the change of what is simple and does not have its being in something else but changes to something else will mean corruption because it departs entirely from itself. If someone who is careful about this says that the contrariety occurs *with respect to* matter, matter will no longer possess the contraries through suffering or changing in a certain respect itself, but accidentally *with respect to* itself. The

same argument applies to form: for if its intelligible characteristics remain the same, but the contrary qualities occur with respect to its sensible differentiae, the form will remain and be entirely unmovable, and something else will be altered; human being will not turn dark from pale on account of a change in his very form.

In response to this one can say in agreement with the current text (*ta paronta*) that each thing changes in the way it is by nature fit to change, and matter has as its change the reception of different forms at different times (for this, a receptacle, is precisely what it wishes to be), and the form has qualitative alteration. Perhaps Aristotle even refuted such problems in advance by saying 'remaining one and the same in number' (4a10-11). For it is clear that one must look for a change of such a thing. But so much is enough about substance.

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Notes

Commentaries on the *Categories* are referred to by the name of their author only.

1. i.e. categories. Cf. *Categories* 4, the preceding chapter.

2. I translate *ta onta* instead of *ta alla*, following Kalbfleisch's remark in the apparatus.

3. The same quotation is repeated and slightly expanded at 121,13-18 (= Pseudo-Archytas 23,17-21 (Thesleff)). For the two options 'predicated of ' or 'predicated in' see *Categories* 1a20-b9.

4. Plotinus *Enneads* 6.1 [42] 2, 1-8. Many of Plotinus' objections actually derive from the numerous *aporiai* produced by Lucius and Nicostratus. The larger part of Plotinus' 6.1 [42] 2-3 found its way into Simplicius' discussion of substance, as the notes will show. For this particular objection cf. Dexippus 2.2, 40,13-41,3.

5. cf. 73,30-74,22; see also Simplicius' definition of the intention (*skopos*) of the *Categories* at 13,11-15.

6. This is a reference to the immanent universal, for which see below 83,6-8.

7. This text, Pseudo-Archytas 22,31-23,2 (Thesleff), is among the first to defend the restriction of the categories to the sensible world as a means of assimilating the *Categories* to Platonism, see Szlezák (1972) 104-5, with Pseudo-Archytas 30,17-31,5 (Thesleff). 'Not without them' refers to time and place, cf. Simplicius 361,21-4 (= 24,7-11 Thesleff).

8. cf. Plato *Timaeus* 48E5-6, *Republic* 509D1-4 and especially the discussion of the five highest genera in the *Sophist*, one of which is *to on*, also called *ousia* (251A5, D1-5, E9; 252A2 etc.). Plotinus discusses this in *Enneads* 6.2 [43] 1 and uses it as a model for his own 'categorial' theory for the intelligible realm.

9. According to Aristotle *Metaphysics* 999a6-14 a class is not a genus if its members are in an order of prior and posterior. For the Neoplatonists' acceptance of these *quasi*-genera, see Lloyd (1990) ch. 3.

10. cf. *Metaphysics* 12.1, 1069a30-b2.

11. cf. 91,14-33. In this way Archytas' harmless remark 'all substance is physical, sensible and moving' was used by Iamblichus and Simplicius to explain Aristotle's distinction between sensible-eternal, sensible-destructible and unmoved substance at *Metaphysics* 1069a30-b1. Cf. Dexippus 41,7-42,3 with Dillon (1990) 75 n.13.

12. The distinction between divisive and constitutive differentiae is clearly stated in Porphyry *Isagoge* 9,24-10,21.

13. e.g. *Metaphysics* 7.10, 1035a2; *DA* 2.1, 412a6-9, 414a14-16. Cf. 74,18-19.

14. cf. Plotinus *Enneads* 6.1 [42] 2, 9-15; 6.3 [44] 4; Dexippus 2.5, 42,32-43,9. The problem reflects the urge to achieve a unitary account of all of Aristotle's philosophical works. For a detailed discussion of Boethus' problem and Porphyry's reply in relation to the structure of Plotinus *Enneads* 6.3 [44] see Chiaradonna,

'*Ousia ex ouk ousiôn*. Forma e sostanza sensibile in Plotino (*Enn*. VI 3 [44], 4-8)', *Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 10, 1999, 25-57.

15. 78,14: reading *on ti* instead of *onti*.

16. Apparently in his lost *Commentary to Gedalius*.

17. cf. Plotinus *Enneads* 6.3 [44] 4, 21-2. For the application of this rule to differentiae see below 80,10-13; 98,22-3.30-5.

18. This sentence echoes Plotinus *Enneads* 6.3 [44] 4, 29-37, who, as Dillon (1990) 78 n.19 remarks, thus provided a solution to his own problem; see also 94,24-31. However, contrast Porphyry 78,2-7 where the 'in' of 'in a subject' is explicitly identified with the 'in' of 'form in matter'. Ellis (1994) 85-6 correctly inferred that Porphyry's position implies that forms are in *prime* matter as in a subject, and therefore accidents. Elsewhere I have argued why this position is entirely in line with Plotinian metaphysics, see De Haas (1997) 205-6. Porphyry's distinction (recorded at 48,11-33 above) between prime matter as the primary referent of 'substrate' and the commonly or particularly qualified object (*to koinôs ê idiôs poion*) as its secondary referent, may serve to reconcile these seemingly contradictory statements concerning the relation of form to matter.

19. Simplicius works from the assumption that Aristotle was influenced by (Pseudo-)Archytas. Because he believes that Plato and Aristotle both depend on the Pythagoreanism of (among others) Archytas, he feels obliged to explain why Aristotle omitted the threefold division of substance which Archytas discussed at this point. Note how the first of these rather desperate explanations returns as the interpretation of Aristotle's *lexis* at 80,17-20; the same problem arises at 91,28-30. Cf. Porphyry 88,16-17; 89,27-32.

20. Of course the separate terms 'form' and 'matter' were familiar (also in their relation to the notion of *ousia*), but the specific meaning of the couple 'form and matter' as the two parts of the composite in Aristotle's metaphysics was not familiar.

21. Plotinus *Enneads* 6.1.2, 8-12; 6.3.4, 1-2.

22. cf. 78,24-31.

23. Plotinus *Enneads* 6.1.2, 12-15; 6.3.4, 2-7.

24. cf. 76,11.

25. It is remarkable how easily Simplicius dismisses Plotinus' rigid demands on substantiality by having recourse to the Neoplatonic theory of participation by ever diminishing degrees and to the material indeterminacy that reigns in the lowest realms of the universe. For similar vocabulary see Simplicius' account of prime matter at *in Physica* 230,21-7, with De Haas (1997) 120ff.

26. cf. Plotinus *Enneads* 6.3.4.

27. Each level of the Neoplatonic universe can be described as a class or order (*taxis*). Forms or universals immanent in either species or individuals are called *katatetagmenon*, 'co-ordinated'. Forms or universals that transcend their species or individuals are *akatatakton*, 'non-coordinated'. Cf. Lloyd (1990) 64-8, who has an important discussion of these terms. Following Porphyry and Iamblichus (see below 79,30-80,5) Simplicius believed that in universal predication the non-coordinated universals are predicated of the co-ordinated universals; see e.g. 27,15-28,8; 53,6-14. Cf. Dexippus 1.26, 26,3-12.

28. i.e. because it amounts to an identity statement, see 53.4-9 with Lloyd (1971) 359.

29. The same distinction is known from the explanation of famous paralogisms such as: Coriscus is a human being; human being is other than Coriscus; therefore Coriscus is other than himself. See Lloyd (1990) 62-5; id. (1971) 359.

30. Simplicius strikes a mean between two rival solutions and thus formulates

a novel account of universal predication which stresses Neoplatonic causation and participation: the predicate is the immanent universal *qua* likeness of its transcendent cause (not, e.g. *qua* extended in matter). Therefore I tend to agree with J. Pinborg, *Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter*, Stuttgart, 1972, 39, who believes 79,30-80,7 to be Simplicius' criticism of Porphyry, whereas S.K. Strange, 'Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic Interpretation of the Categories', in: *ANRW* II 36.2, 963 n.29 suggested it is merely an amplification.

31. Plotinus *Enneads* 6.3.5, 23-9. Cf. *Categories* 3a21-2.

32. cf. 97,24-102,10, in connection with *Categories* 3a7ff.

33. Usually this phrase is taken to refer to physical parts (hands, head etc.), cf. *Categories* 8b15-16 and Simplicius 97,5-6. The commentators also use it to elucidate the status of form and matter, genus and species, and the differentiae, all classed as 'parts of substances' in one way or another. See 78,29-31; 84,17-18; 98,30-2. Cf. Dexippus 2.6, 43,23-5.

34. Possibly a reference to the derivation of *ousia* from *einai*: if there is no primary *ousia*, nothing else can be (*einai*), and that is why primary *ousia* is *ousia* in the proper sense of the term; cf. 81,10-12.

35. This is the Peripatetic point of view which Simplicius ascribes to Alexander and Boethus (see below 82,6-9): the common or universal *only* exists in the individual.

36. Kalbfleisch p. 573 emends *autais* to *autois* which is grammatically correct, although *aporiai* is easily understood as the antecedent instead of the more unusual *ta aporoumena*.

37. According to Henry (1973) 235-9, who provides an analysis of Simplicius' argument, this is an *aporia* which derives from Plotinus' oral teaching. Cf. Dexippus 2.8, 44,4-19.

38. Since a definition (*horos*) consists of genus and differentia, neither highest genera (the categories) nor individuals can be properly defined, cf. e.g. Ammonius 44,8-15; Philoponus 63,14-21. However, it is possible to list their essential characteristics by means of a description (*hupographê*), see 29,16-20; 45,23-4; 92,7-10; 159,9-12.

39. For this Stoic division see e.g. DL 7.101-3 with Long and Sedley I 58.

40. *Categories* 2, though only 'to be in a subject' is more or less defined. Definition by negation is employed by Aristotle in the case of 'accident' at *Topics* 102b4-14: 'it is neither definition, nor property, nor genus', though criticized for its dependence on other terms. Aristotle prefers 'something which can belong and not belong to any one particular thing'. Porphyry paid heed to Aristotle and lists the definitions in reverse order, *Isag*. 13,3-5. Ammonius 36,23-6 and Philoponus 51,24-52,2 turn the question why Aristotle defines the most worthy thing (substance) by means of negations into a recognition of the principle of negative theology: negation is the proper way to refer to the divine, cf. Plotinus *Enneads* 5.3.14.

41. cf. Porphyry 90,12-92,35; Dexippus 2.10-11, 44,32-45,11; Ammonius 36,2-21; 40,4-5; Philoponus 50,1-51,21.

42. Kalbfleisch suggests *Metaphysics* 7.7, 1032b1-2 where form is called primary substance but in view of the reference to incorporeal substance one should rather think of *Metaphysics* 12.7, 1072a31-2 where the divine Mind is called primary substance. The same problem arose from *Physics* 1.1 which is mentioned below 82,14-22.

43. The transition at this point to Alexander's views on universals is paralleled by Dexippus 2.12. Since Simplicius goes on to state Iamblichus' reply (= Dexippus 2.11) this arrangement of arguments probably derives from Iamblichus. It is

possible that Alexander himself discussed the problem in his lost commentary on the *Categories*.

44. cf. *Phys*. 1.1, 184a23-4; 1.7, 189b31-2; 4.1, 200b24 with Simplicius *in Phys*. 14,30-20,27; 208,27-32, where he argues along similar lines as here. Philoponus *in Physica* 10,23-19,9 explicitly notes the apparent contradiction between *Physics* 1.1 and a further text, *Posterior Analytics* 1.2, 72a1. For a recent attempt to solve these problems see R. Bolton, 'Aristotle's Method in Natural Science: *Physics* I', in: L. Judson (ed.), *Aristotle's Physics*: *A Collection of Essays*, Oxford, 1991, 1-29.

45. i.e. the relation between common language and the things signified. This relation concentrates on what ordinary people *call* substance, cf. 82,4.

46. The doctrine of the threefold universal was already amply defended at 68,32-71,2. Cf. Philoponus 58,13-59,2.

47. cf. Proclus *Institutio Theologica* (*Elements of Theology*), prop. 65 coroll. (p. 62,15-17 Dodds).

48. cf. 290,28-291,18.

49. First Simplicius takes Alexander as referring to the immanent universal since he is talking about the constitution of the individual, but this universal is not posterior to individuals. On the other hand, the universal which *is* posterior to individuals is the concept but this cannot play a role in the constitution of individuals. Therefore Alexander's account would be inconsistent – unless he speaks of constitution in the conceptual mode as well, leaving the natural constitution of the individual unaccounted for.

50. cf. 82,7-9. Alexander *Quaestiones* 1.11a discusses the interpretation of *DA* 1.1 402b7-8: 'the universal is either nothing or posterior' and defends the conclusion that the universal is not a thing (*pragma*) with a nature of its own. Apparently Iamblichus turned this statement against Alexander's division of substance. For this division see De Haas (1997) 235-6.

51. Abasement (*huphesis*): it is common Neoplatonist doctrine that procession (*proödos*) consists in abasement of the One, or complete unity. Hence procession results in an ever-increasing multiplication, differentiation, and extension down to prime matter (e.g. 220,29-34). It should be noted that abasement affects the form or essence itself and is to be distinguished from accidental intension and remission of qualities which may be caused by the form's substrate (if it has one) or by the vicissitudes of the composite (e.g. 290,16-25). Abasement is often described in terms of participation or in terms of distance from a cause (e.g. 76,25-77,4; 77,14-15; 290,26-291,18). Being the measure of the demiurgic process, abasement is to be regarded as good, as opposed to the perversion (*paratropê*) caused by a form's substrate (so Proclus *in Timaeum* I 364,28-365,3). For the general background compare Proclus *Platonic Theology* II 41,23-8: *henôsis* grants remaining, *huphesis* determines procession and differentiation, and *ephesis* completes the reversion (cf. Simplicius 83,25-7); *Platonic Theology* III 6,25-7,1; *Elements of Theology* prop. 29, 36, 97, 125; *in Alcibiadem* 1,7-9.

52. In other words, if Alexander means that the incorporeal and the corporeal share the same *koinon* inasmuch as they derive from this unique substance as being equals by virtue of immediate division, he is wrong. However, if he means that they share the same *koinon* in a different sense, i.e. inasmuch as they derive from it in a hierarchy of ever declining participation in which the incorporeal ranks higher than the corporeal, he is right. This, of course, is the Neoplatonist doctrine which Simplicius has already explained above, 76,25-77,4; 77,14-5.

53. cf. Plato *Parmenides* 144B1-C8. Apparently the Neoplatonic notion of a chain (*seira*) consisting of an ordered series of ever weaker participations in a single substantial form is here attributed to Plato on the basis of the *Parmenides*.

Note that the five genera of the *Sophist*, one of which was substance (*ousia*), only dominated the intelligible realm, and continued to do so in Plotinus' reception of the *Sophist* in *Enneads* 6.2 [43].

54. cf. Porphyry *Isagoge* 1,18-2,13 (genus); 3,22-4,14 (species); 7,27-8,3 (encompassing).

55. cf. Ammonius 39,2-8.

56. cf. 76,8.

57. Of all commentators Simplicius provides the longest list of solutions to this important question. Lloyd (1981) 74-6 provides a translation of parts of Simplicius 84,12-85,17. However, his attribution of these solutions to Porphyry is not warranted by Simplicius' text.

58. cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 9.8, esp. 1049b5.

59. This is Porphyry's solution, cf. Porphyry 90,12-34; 91,4-5. Note that Simplicius also treats individual substance as a class at 88,13-18; 90,31-2.

60. Simplicius is probably referring to Archytas' *dianoêtê ousia*, see 76,20-2; 77,7-11.

61. Here and at 82,32-3 and 88,20-3 universals and particulars appear as mutually dependent, which is a compromise between the Platonic and Peripatetic positions. However, because the Neoplatonic universals are causes Simplicius will grant them ontological priority at 85,10-13.

62. cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 2.19, *Physics* 1.1, with n. 44 above.

63. cf. Aristotle, *Categories* 2b31-7, *Topics* 102a31-5.

64. As usual Aristotle means the *definiens* 'is a rational animal' rather than the *statement* 'human being is a rational animal'. I follow custom in translating 'definition' throughout.

65. cf. Dexippus 2.19, 47,14-27.

66. In support of the Neoplatonic view of universals Ammonius 40,19-21 emphasizes that Aristotle rightly says 'is said' (2a34-5 *legetai*), 'for universals do not need primary substances, i.e. particulars, in order to exist, but in order to be said of them.' Cf. Philoponus 52,30-1.

67. cf. Olympiodorus 63,21-3.

68. The Greek has these examples at the end of the sentence but the sequel shows that they cannot illustrate 'what is already affected and in a certain disposition'.

69. i.e. they have to be considered as individuals.

70. Although the combination of *logos* and *onoma* recalls the definitions of synonymy and homonymy in *Categories* 1 in which *logos* should certainly be rendered 'definition', the following examples make clear that *logos* is here used in the more general sense of 'description'.

71. Following the suggestion in Kalbfleisch's apparatus and reading *estai* instead of *ginetai*.

72. The distinction is between whiteness as an individual instance of a quality, and whiteness as part of the description of a subject's condition.

73. cf. Dexippus 2.17, 46,30-47,5. Note that Ammonius 37,22-38,22 and Philoponus 53,18-55,2 avoid the problem by arguing that Aristotle is not giving any of three kinds of division (genera into species, whole into parts, ambiguous expression into its senses), but an ordering (*taxis*) of substances.

74. Keeping *autê* against Kalbfleisch p. 573.

75. cf. Dexippus 2.18, 47,6-13.

76. Usually 'not being said of a subject' and 'not being in a subject' are characteristic of *primary* substances, not species, cf. 88,10-11; 89,29-30. The division of the genus substance only yields two species when primary substance is

taken as the class of individual substances as a whole (see n. 59 above). This class as such is characterized by being numerically one and by 'not being said of nor in a subject' in the sense of being the common *logos* of these characteristics which produces them in individual substances. Compare Dexippus 2.18, 47,9-11: 'We will say that being one numerically is the common principle (*logos*) of primary substance as a whole, which is particularly proper to the species (*eidos*), but common also is "not being said of a subject nor being in a subject" ' (tr. Dillon (1990) 86, modified).

77. Reading *phasin* for *phêsin*, following Kalbfleisch. There is no parallel for this problem in Dexippus.

78. cf. Ammonius 41,19-42,20; Philoponus 59,5-60,14.

79. This is an adaptation of Aristotle's text at 2b22-4: 'Of the species which are not genera, one is no more of a substance than the other.' Simplicius specifies that these species are not genera in the sense of not being subordinate one to the other, but on an equal footing.

80. cf. Ammonius 43,4-14, Philoponus 59,21-6 who explicitly distinguish the vertical (*kata bathos*) from the horizontal (*kata platos*) approach to substance.

81. i.e. probably Plotinus, in view of the fact that the next *aporia* at 89,30-90,6 which is introduced with 'he raises the *additional aporia*' (*prosaporei*) has its parallel in Dexippus 2.14, 46,8-17 which is attributed to Plotinus. There seems to be no corresponding passage in Plotinus for these *aporiai* so either Dexippus misattributes his *aporia* or we have two more 'oral *aporiai*' from Plotinus (not discussed by Henry op. cit.). Cf. Dillon (1990) 84 n. 36. For this *aporia* see Dexippus 2.13, 45,32-46,7.

82. Reading *autôn* as Kalbfleisch conjectures in his apparatus, in view of Dexippus 46,1.

83. It should be noted that Simplicius' concept of proprium (*idion*) is much wider than the traditional medieval concept associated with Porphyry's tree. For instance, we shall often find Simplicius discussing the propria of the categories, e.g. 93,28-9; 97,25-6; 101,34. Nevertheless, he always seems to have in mind the Porphyrian classification of propria (*Isagoge* 12-22), reported at 93,10-17 below: a proprium may belong (1) to *only one* species though *not to all* of its individuals (as e.g. to be a doctor belongs to human being), (2) *to all* individuals of a species, though *not* to that species *alone* (as e.g. two-footed belongs to human being), (3) to *only one* species and *all* of its individuals, but *not always* (as e.g. to turn grey belongs to human beings in old age (*sic*)), and (4) to *only one* species and *all* of its individuals *always* (as e.g. the capacity of smiling belongs to human being). The latter (4) is the more familiar type of proprium. For Simplicius' use of this classification cf. 92,15-22 (= report on Iamblichus); 93,20-9; 102,13-22; 104,14-18; 105,26-7; 106,4-10; 112,4-19; 113,8-27, 120,3-6.

84. cf. Dexippus 2.15, 46,18-21; 2.29, 53,26-54,2.

85. If Simplicius is right about Iamblichus, and if Dexippus 2.30, 54,10-22 also derives from Iamblichus (see Dillon (1990) 99 n. 85) Iamblichus provided both an easy solution (perhaps here at 2b7) and a 'deeper' solution (at 3b33). See further Simplicius 111,10-18; Porphyry 97,7-22; Dexippus 2.29-30, 53,26-54,10 who adds what is probably Iamblichus' solution at 54,10-22. There a distinction is made between variation of degree in form and in e.g. rationality or goodness, which accompanies the form. A good human being is more of a human being not *qua* human being but *qua* human being-in-a-certain-condition. As Dillon op. cit. 98 n. 83 notes, the *aporia* is superfluous in view of Aristotle's own elucidation of the point, *Categories* 3b34-4a9. However, Simplicius' insistence both here and earlier at *Categories* 2b7, 90,16-31, shows its importance for the Neoplatonists. They

regard the genus (or category) of substance as a hierarchical series in which the more and less is governed by degrees of participation. So there is a real sense in which species of substance are more or less substance on account of their distance from their *cause* which may also be called substance most of all. Porphyry 93,18-24 (*ad* 2b7) takes account of this problem by pointing out (1) that *non-subordinated* species and genera are equal in this sense, and (2) that there is no variation in substance even if there is variation in *value*: Socrates may be valued higher than the horse Boucephalos, but they are equal *qua* substances.

86. i.e. among the primary substances, cf. 82,6-7. Here too Simplicius regards individual substance as the complete class of individuals, see n. 59.

87. i.e. the form, cf. 78,13-15.

88. cf. Philoponus 48,1-6.

89. i.e. they prefer the universals 'before the many' to the universals 'after the many'.

90. The lemma as preserved covers only 3a7-21 although the next lemma (102,11) begins at 3b10. For clarity's sake I have followed the suggestion of the editio Basileensis (b) to insert the lemmata 3a21-2 and 3a33-b9 after 96,30 and 100,12 respectively; cf. the apparatus in Kalbfleisch and n. 108.

91. cf. 81,19-20 with note 38.

92. Reading *estô <tou>* as Kalbfleisch suggested.

93. cf. Ammonius 44,10-21.

94. i.e. in the strict sense, belonging to the genus under discussion *only* and to *all* instances of it; see n. 83.

95. cf. *Physics* 1.1, 184a23-4: 'one must proceed from the general to the particular', e.g. starting from the general description 'circle' one has to articulate the different parts of the definition of a circle (184b2-3). Compare Simplicius *in Physica* 16,17-18: '… what is common and universal (*ta koina kai katholou*) is characterised by a more general and more evident mode of cognition (*holoskheresteran ekhonta gnôsin kai prophanesteran*) …'.

96. cf. Porphyry 93,25-94,16, and n. 83. Porphyry's division of *idion* makes another appearance at 113,27-31. Cf. Porphyry 98,35; Dexippus 2.33, 55,9-27.

97. cf. Ammonius 44,18-25.

98. cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 7.15, 1040a2-5.

99. Apparently proper individuals are individuals whose essence is completed by the secondary substance, which is then not *in* them by definition.

100. cf. 91,15-17.

101. cf. Plotinus *Enneads* 6.3.5, 14-23.

102. *Qua* white thing white is not predicated of it as of something else, i.e. essentially; *qua* Socrates (or piece of wood) white is predicated of something else (*ti kata tinos*), i.e. accidentally. It seems wrong to understand *to leukon* as 'whiteness', if only because it is not at all clear that whiteness is itself white.

103. cf. e.g. Plotinus *Enneads* 6.8.18.

104. cf. 134,25-32. Compare Dexippus 1.21, 22,26-23,16; Philoponus 33,10-20.

105. The passage that follows, 96,3-16, is a paraphrase of Plotinus *Enneads* 6.3.8, 19-37.

106. Deleting the comma before *kai* in 96,13 as superfluous, in agreement with the critical text of Plotinus (ed. Henry-Schwyzer^2, Oxford 1982).

107. Perhaps an allusion to Arist. *Metaph.* 7.3, 1029a9 *ou gar hikanon*, if (wrongly) applied to matter instead of the argument up to that point. For *agonon* see B. Fleet, *Plotinus, Enneads III.6. On the Impassibility of the Bodiless*, Oxford, 1995, pp. 292-8 (*ad* III.6 [26] 19, 24-41).

108. The editio Basileensis inserts the lemma 3a21-32 *before* 'He calls it proper

etc.', which has the effect of attributing this statement to Aristotle instead of Archytas. However, since this statement is attested for Archytas (see Szlezák 1972 *ad loc.*) and contradicts Aristotle the lemma is better supplied *after* this statement. Cf. n. 90.

109. cf. 1a24.

110. cf. Ammonius 47,5-14; Philoponus 68,23-69,11.

111. Kalbfleisch's conjecture *hôste* (app. *ad loc.*) is not necessary, since 97,19 *hôs* takes up 97,18 *houtôs*.

112. In recent times the problem of the categorial status of the differentia in Aristotle and the commentary tradition has received considerable attention, see especially D. Morrison, 'Le statut catégoriel des différences dans l'"Organon" ', *Revue Philosophique* 183, 1993, 147-78 and De Haas (1997) 180-250.

113. This is one of Porphyry's definitions of the differentia, *Isag*. 11,18-19.

114. Boethus seems to echo Aristotle *Metaphysics* 7.12, where the ultimate differentia is identified with the *eidos*.

115. I take it that here Simplicius' response to Boethus starts. He explains that Boethus is right about the individual differentia though not about all differentiae of a given genus taken as a class.

116. cf. *Top*. 6.6, 143b2-10.

117. For the distinction between divisive and constitutive differentiae, see Porphyry *Isagoge* 9,24-10,21. The term *morphôtikê* instead of *sumplêrôtikê* or *eidopoiêtikê* is unusual, and even confusing in view of the next sentence which states that the differentia is indeed in a sense the form (*morphê*) of the genus, even though it is not *morphôtikê*. For the general rules of dialectic applied here, cf. Arist. *Top*. 6.6, 144a28-b3.

118. Reading <*ê*> with Kalbfleisch.

119. cf. e.g. *Top*. 4.2, 122b16-17; 4.6, 128a23-9; 6.6, 144a20-2. Cf. Alexander *Quaest*. 1.8, 18,8-24 with Ellis (1994) 81-2 and De Haas (1997) 202-3.

120. cf. the definition of accident, Porphyry *Isag*. 12,24-5.

121. cf. Porphyry *Isag*. 12,26-13,8, including the example of the Ethiopian used below.

122. Both cases were illustrated in the previous sentence. Cf. *Top*. 6.6, 145a3-10; Porphyry *Isag*. 9,7-23.

123. This problem of the categorial status of the differentia is also discussed by Porphyry 95,10-96,1; Dexippus 2.21, 48,20-49,25; Ammonius 45,5-46,19; Philoponus 64,9-68,9; 70,23-71,13, and Boethius 192Aff. Dexippus uses similar terms as Simplicius, which again betrays their dependence on Iamblichus. For a detailed analysis of the problem and the various answers given by the commentators, see De Haas (1997) 180-250. Porphyry, Iamblichus, Dexippus, and Simplicius defend the solution that the differentia is in some sense a *tertium quid*, a substantial quality (*poiotês ousiôdês*). Ammonius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus, and David (Elias) reject this as the unwarranted introduction of an eleventh category and argue that the differentia is a substance. In support they adduce, among other arguments, the rule that substances consist of substances, see above 97,15-20; cf. Ammonius 45,10-16; Philoponus 66,17-18.

124. The necessity arises because the division into substance, accident, and intermediate is regarded as exhaustive. The existence of the intermediate, which is not mentioned in the *Categories*, is argued for at 98,22-30.

125. Simplicius seems to distinguish three notions of being a part of a substance: (a) *qua* part of the composite of matter and form; (b) *qua* part of the form, i.e. excluding the matter; (c) *qua* itself changing (not just establishing a difference) in virtue of the relations to the subject. If the differentia is realised differently in different subjects, or differently in the same subject if the subject changes, this

shows that it is dependent on its subject in the way a part is dependent on the whole.

126. Though *hairesis* usually means 'philosophical school' in Simplicius, here *hairesis peri tôn diaphorôn* probably has the weaker sense of 'interpretation' or 'opinion'. Cf. 100,3 and esp. 100,32-101,1 which is part of a quotation from Iamblichus; the use of *hairesis* as well as the entire discussion may (again) derive from him.

127. cf. 101,34-102,6; Dexippus 2.20, 47,28-48,19.

128. cf. Arist. *Metaph*. 5.14, 1020a33-b1. At 101,12-24 Simplicius uses this view of the differentia to solve a problem concerning the synonymous predication of differentiae. Cf. 130,14-19 where Iamblichus is reported to have positioned number as measure as having some *ousia* of its own, without being either accident or substance.

129. The 'definition' at *Categories* 1a24-5 reads: 'By "in a subject" I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.' Simplicius' addition is in the genitive, which reflects Iamblichus' turn of phrase (cf. Dexippus 2.21, 49,7) rather than Aristotle's. Cf. Kalbfleisch app. *ad loc*.

130. 99,12: I prefer *poiôseôs* (*hapax*) with Kalbfleisch, perhaps a neologism (cf. LSJ s.v.); the reading *poiêseôs* in the *libri* is undoubtedly the *lectio facilior* and does not seem to make sense. Simplicius himself marks his statement as a curious one, but this is because the *qualification* consists in the *formlessness* which constitutes the lack of determination in the subject which is met by the constituents of its essence (genus, species, differentia).

131. i.e. the Peripatetic perspective (the sensible substance is the only existent) is merged with the Platonic perspective: differentiae and secondary substances exist both separately and together with matter. Simplicius allows for Alexander's view but only as part of the more comprehensive Platonic system.

132. For this meaning of *diataxis* cf. 337,11.

133. i.e. the differentiae. It seems that in this passage Simplicius rejects Aristotle's reforms of division at *Metaphysics* 7.12, 1038a9-26 where we are advised to always take the differentia of the differentia – if this is what Simplicius means by 'arrangements proceeding within a quality'. At least he is opposed to an emphasis on the differentia to the detriment of the genus. In the next paragraph Iamblichus is reported to have argued against Aristotle's advice at *De Partibus Animalium* 1.3, 643b9-644a11 to divide by multiple differentiae at a time instead of one. On Iamblichus' view we find differentiae only at the level of the *infima species*; on higher levels we find only genera, since the results of earlier divisions (genera plus differentiae) are to be regarded as genera: in this sense the differentiae turn into genera, not vice versa (as *Metaphysics* 7.12 implied). Perhaps in an attempt to reconcile Iamblichus with Aristotle, Simplicius argues that in this framework 'multiple differentiae' may distinguish an *infima species* such as human being from its fellow species in the same genus (i.e. they are constitutive instead of divisive). Even the genera at higher levels can be regarded as differentiae when they are used to distinguish an *infima species* from other higher genera, e.g. human being from inanimate substance; cf. 110,28-111,2. – For preliminary remarks on the notion of division in the commentators see L.P. Schrenk, 'Proof and Discovery in Aristotle and the Later Greek Tradition: A Prolegomenon to a Study of Analysis and Synthesis', in: id. (ed.), *Aristotle in Late Antiquity*, Washington 1994, 92-108. I am indebted to Andrew Coles for discussion of this passage.

134. Understanding *paraiteitai* from 99.32 *paraitêsometha*, as Kalbfleisch suggests.

135. cf. 98,1-4.

136. cf. n. 90.

137. cf. Dexippus 2.22, 49,26-51,2.

138. i.e. if the *aporia* stands and neither the name nor the definition of the differentia are predicated of its subject. Simplicius now returns to the initial problem.

139. Judging from 101,11-12 the passage reflects Iamblichus' opinion, compare Dexippus 2.22, 50,10-51,2. Since there is no obvious beginning of the report of his views in the remaining text it seems likely that the lacuna (which may have been larger than my translation suggests) contained a reference to Iamblichus by name. Kalbfleisch suggests <we may answer as follows>; he rightly places quotes around 100,27-101,11.

140. Here I resort to transliteration because of the ambiguity of *eidos*, as between species and immanent form, on which the argument turns.

141. Reading *tôi tês ousias sunonumôi* with Kalbfleisch p. 573 who adduces 308,9.

142. Since the preceding paragraph (inspired by Iamblichus?) seems to contradict the *Topics*, Simplicius adds a qualification in line with the solution defended at 99,3ff.

143. cf. Dexippus 2.23, 51,3-10, who has this part of the commentary in a very abbreviated form.

144. Since the text has no main verb, I supply it from the conditional clause as if *tode legoi* were repeated; cf. Urb. adding *touto phêsin* after *poioumenos*.

145. Reading *hupostaseôs <paristas>*, following Kalbfleisch's suggestion; cf. 103,8.

146. Here Simplicius has the more general *poion* instead of Aristotle's *poion ti*.

147. That is to say: in the sensible world. The Neoplatonist Simplicius is not excluding the possibility of separate intelligible forms, cf. 99,25-32.

148. The nine non-substantial categories derive their existence from substance (see e.g. 103,4) and may be said to participate in substance at least in that sense. Simplicius suggests that in virtue of this participation genera and species in those categories are able to behave similarly to genera and species of substances so as to qualify their respective subjects substantially, i.e. essentially. For instance, in 'white is a colour' the genus colour is an essential (quasi-substantial) qualification of the species white.

149. This contorted sentence is an unfortunate combination between Aristotle's vocabulary at *Categories* 3b21-3 and Simplicius' explanation of it in his own technical language. Although the meaning is clear enough the text may be corrupt. For a clear formulation compare Philoponus 74,7-10.

150. cf. Dexippus 2.23, 51,11-14.

151. i.e. forms *qua* enmattered, i.e. neither *qua* themselves in abstraction from matter, nor *qua* transcendent. On the term 'co-ordinated' (*katatetagmenon*) see n. 27.

152. cf. Dexippus 2.23, 51,15-22.

153. cf. 103,7-8.

154. I propose to read *<kata> sunthêkên*. The classical text for the debate about the relation between words and the things they signify is, of course, Plato's *Cratylus*.

155. *Ptôsis* or case is one of the Stoic *lekta*, hence not a linguistic object or an extra-linguistic physical object. For a thorough defence of this interpretation see Richard Gaskin, 'The Stoics on Cases, Predicates, and the Unity of the Proposition', in R.R.K. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle and After*, London, 1997, 91-108, with ample

discussion of rival interpretations. It should be noted that Gaskin and others consider Simplicius' report on Stoic thought here as unreliable, see Gaskin op. cit. 100 n. 23, 104 n. 33.

156. On this topic see now the wide-ranging study of Victor Caston, 'Something and Nothing: The Stoics on Concepts and Universals', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 17, 1999, 145-213. Caston regards Simplicius as a reliable source for the Stoic view on universals, op. cit. 158, 200-4.

157. The argument can be supplied from a scholium on Philoponus 72 (*codex Marcianus* 217) and David (Elias) 178,1-12. Cf. Long and Sedley 30E (= *SVF* 2.278 part). Chrysippus is reported to have devoted three works to this type of argument, Diogenes Laertius 7, 198,1-4 (cf. Long and Sedley 37B5). It highlights the absurd consequences of treating the universal like an individual (*tis* replacing the *tode ti* of the preceding discussion), probably as a means of showing that the Platonic Form does not behave in conformity with elementary logic when treated as the individual the Platonists believe it to be. By consequence the initial question (105,1-2) should be answered in the negative: Forms cannot be called 'this'.

158. Cf. Gellius *Noctes Atticae* 18.13. Long and Sedley vol. II, p. 183 *ad* 30E 11-14 think it unlikely that the Stoics would regard this second argument as comparable to the Not-someone argument 'since "human being" this time occupies the predicate position and signifies a corporeal *koinôs poios*, not a universal *ennoêma*'. However, in view of the spatial connotations of 'human being is in Athens' I venture to doubt whether we can be expected to restrict the signification of 'human being' to the universal concept (i.e. according to the Stoics, the internal object of the psychological state which is conception, *ennoia*; cf. Long and Sedley, vol. I, 182). Similarly, 'I am a human being' in the you-and-I argument brings an individual under the universal concept which must be different from the corporeal *koinôs poios* the individual itself is. Rather both arguments turn on unwarrantly identifying the universal *ennoêma* with a corresponding individual *koinôs poios*. Note that Simplicius objects to both arguments in the same way, by simply denying the identification of 'human being' and 'someone'.

159. cf. Dexippus 2.24, 51,23-52,4.

160. Simplicius quotes Iamblichus' answer even more elaborately at *in De Caelo* 169,2-27 where it is preceded by Alexander's comments on the same lemma, and followed by a quotation from Aristotle *De Generatione et Corruptione* 2.3, 330b30-331a3 which contains this answer. Philoponus *in GC* 229,22-230,7 *ad loc.* explains that composite substances (the subject matter of the *Categories*) are not contrary, although substances *qua* form are, in virtue of the contrariety between the specific differentiae that constitute them.

161. This definition derives from Plato *Timaeus* 67E5-6.

162. Here I follow the interpretation of Kalbfleisch *ad* 107,10.

163. Note that this description of division follows Plato's rules of dichotomy, not Aristotle's later reforms of divisions; for Simplicius' interpretation see 100,3-12.

164. cf. the addition in MS a at Philoponus 74,20.

165. cf. Dexippus 2.25, 52,5-10; Philoponus 74,17-27; 78,11-15.

166. cf. *Physics* 1.7, 191a13-14; Dexippus 2.27, 52,18-53,4.

167. This seems to be a criticism of Alexander's solution, cf. Alexander *apud* Simpl. *in De Caelo* 168,17-169,2 (so Kalbfleisch p. 573).

168. i.e. prime matter.

169. Apparently Iamblichus and others used the principles of Neoplatonic emanation to construct a kind of substantial contrariety not envisaged by Aris-

totle, which holds between the highest and the lowest ranks of the procession and is described in terms perhaps most familiar from Plato's *Philebus*.

170. cf. Plotinus *Enneads* 1.8.6, 28-30; Dexippus 2.28, 53,5-25.

171. Simplicius counters Plotinus' rejection of induction as definitive proof by the necessity of exhaustive division in the case of the highest universal principles, which, so Simplicius seems to suggest, is no longer a case of induction. In fact the demand for complete division secures the possibility of so-called perfect induction. Compare Aristotle's remarks on how division secures the completeness of the list of essential characteristics sought after at *Posterior Analytics* 2.13, 97a35-b6.

172. ll. 109,5-29 are a paraphrase of Plotinus *Enneads* 1.8.6.

173. Reading *ekhousai* for *ekhousi* with Kv and Kalbfleisch p. 573.

174. Reading *pros aut<o> tên enantiôsin* with Kalbfleisch.

175. Punctuating *kai toutôn. Amphotera* with Kalbfleisch.

176. The outline of this debate is discussed by R. Chiaradonna, 'Essence et prédication chez Porphyre et Plotin', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 82.4, 1998, 600-4.

177. Alternatively, one may read *en heterois* ('in different entities') with A, instead of *en heterais* [sc. *ousiais*].

178. i.e. now starting from the characteristics rather than from the categories.

179. cf. Philoponus 76,2-77,9 but contrast Dexippus 2.29, 53,26-54,2 who treats this issue as an *aporia* rather than a point already envisaged by Aristotle. For *enstasis* see n. 211.

180. cf. n. 27.

181. The point is that being more white than swans is accidental to snow *qua* snow but essential to the immanent whiteness that snow possesses in virtue of its participation in the quality. Contrast Philoponus 75,22-7 who explains different shades of white from the presence of blackness in the mixture that constitutes it.

182. cf. Dexippus 2.30, 54,3-22.

183. Simplicius strikes a mean by carefully distinguishing two perspectives on the differentia, without solving the matter.

184. Reading *phantazetai* with Dexippus 2.31, 54,24.

185. cf. Dexippus 2.31, 54,23-34.

186. Reading *parekhetai* with Dexippus 2.31, 54,34.

187. For Simplicius' notion of prime matter as indefinite three-dimensional extension see Simplicius *in Phys.* 225,22-233,3 with De Haas (1997) 102-31. Here he remains within the boundaries of his source of inspiration: Plotinus, *Enneads* 2.4.8-9 and 3.6.

188. cf. Porphyry 98,3-100,8; Dexippus 2.9, 2,35-9; Ammonius 51,4-52,14; Philoponus 77,25-80,19.

189. cf. Dexippus 2.33, 55,9-27 showing that Aristotle's careful expression was attacked as being indecisive and unclear.

190. i.e. according to the classification of propria given in n. 83, the characteristic of admitting contraries is of type (1).

191. For the technical use of conversion in the surviving commentaries on the *Prior Analytics* see T.S. Lee, *Die griechische Tradition der aristotelischen Syllogistik in der Spätantike. Eine Untersuchung über die Kommentare zu den analytica priora von Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Ammonius und Philoponus*. Hypomnemata, vol. 79, Göttingen, 1984, pp. 79-94.

192. cf. Dexippus 2.34, 55,28-56,8.

193. cf. Dexippus 2.35, 56,9-57,8, who provides only a loose parallel.

194. For once Simplicius seems to distinguish *ta katholou* (transcendent or non-coordinated universals, cf. 114,21-2) from *ta koina* (immanent or coordinated).

195. cf. *Categories* 4b3-4.

196. Circular movement does not have a contrary according to Arist. *De Caelo* 1.3, 270a18-20 and 1.4, and is therefore eternal; cf. Dexippus 2.37, 57,13-31. However, Philoponus *Contra Aristotelem* (Wildberg) fr. 87-107 – taken from Simplicius *in De Caelo* 170,11-197,15 – opposed this tenet and argued among other things that (1) circular movement is contrary to each kind of rectilinear movement, (2) clockwise and anticlockwise movements along the curve of a semicircle and along the perimeter of the universe are contrary; cf. Chr. Wildberg, *John Philoponus' Criticism on Aristotle's Theory of Aether*, Berlin, 1988, 224-31. Also at *in Cat*. 80,3-19 Philoponus seems willing to grant contrary movements to all heavenly bodies except the fixed sphere. On this debate see my 'Contraries in the Sky: Iamblichus, the *Categories*, and Astronomy', in preparation.

197. On Simplicius' interpretation the question of the contrary of circular movement does not arise: as parts of the heavens' nature it is outside the scope of the contraries discussed here.

198. cf. Dexippus 2.38, 57,32-58,19.

199. The *eisionta kai exionta* echo Plato's discussion of the images of the Forms entering and leaving the receptacle, *Timaeus* 50C. The argument turns on the distinction between the essential contrariety in the case of accidents and the lack of such contrariety in the case of substances. Genera of substances may be said to persist insofar as their particulars persist while receiving contraries; since the particulars cannot encounter something contrary to their own essence, neither can the genera, so that no substance will ever have to yield to its contrary. On the other hand, particular accidents do have essential contraries to which they will always have to yield, so that their genera cannot be said to persist either.

200. cf. Dexippus 2.39, 58,20-59,8, where this *aporia* is attributed to Plotinus, see *Enneads* 6.1.2, 15-18.

201. *Sumpephorêmenon* recalls Plotinus 6.3.8, 19-23 (referred to above 96,3-4) where substance is called a *sumphorêsis tis poiotêtôn kai hulês*.

202. cf. Dexippus 2.40, 59,9-35, who attributes this problem to Plotinus, cf. *Enneads* 6.3.8, 12-14. Chiaradonna, '*Ousia ex ouk ousiôn*' (see n. 14) has argued that, ironically, Dexippus and Simplicius refute Plotinus by means of the arguments that Porphyry used to refute Boethus (above 78,20ff.). These arguments, which represent Peripatetic orthodoxy, are presented by Plotinus himself in *Enneads* 6.3.4-5, but they do not survive his scrutiny in 6.3.6-8.

203. cf. 114,23-115,10.

204. cf. 114,5-20.

205. In short, Iamblichus is going to describe three different kinds of receptivity of contraries: (1) intelligible substance possesses coexistent contraries merged in the unity of the essence of a single substance; (2) eternally moving substance (116,33ff.) possesses contraries as different but interdependent and hence simultaneous, though in different parts with respect to the essential movements of different substances; (3) sublunary substance (117,30ff.) possesses only accidental contraries and does so successively, in different parts, and at different times. For Iamblichus' application of Pythagorean doctrine to the *Categories* see now J.M. Dillon, 'Iamblichus' *Noera Theôria* of Aristotle's *Categories*', in H.J. Blumenthal and J.P. Finamore (eds), *Iamblichus*: *the Philosopher* [Syllecta Classica 8], Iowa City, 1997, esp. pp. 70-1.

206. I am grateful to Concetta Luna for suggesting this tentative interpretation of the printed text (*dokousa kai pheromenê*). If the text is corrupt, Barrie Fleet suggested one might read *phainomenê* or *ephorômenê* instead of *pheromenê*, thus reinforcing *dokousa*. Indeed, it may seem appropriate for Simplicius to emphasize

generally accessible observation as a means of convincing his readers of such a baffling conjunction of contraries in the physical realm.

207. Reading *klimati* instead of *apoklimati* (which was the reading of MS A before correction). The point seems to be that clockwise motion in the direction of mid-heaven may be regarded as forward motion, and anti-clockwise motion, i.e. in the direction of anti-mid-heaven, as backward motion. Sextus *Adversus Mathematicos* 5.14-20 explains that among the twelve signs of the zodiac four 'centres' (*kentra*) are singled out: horoscope (*hôroskopos*), mid-heaven (*mesouranêma*), setting (*dusis*), and anti-mid-heaven (*antimesouranêma*) or subterranean (*hupogaion*). The sign that rises *before* each of these centres is called its 'cadent place' (*apoklima*), the one that rises *after* each of them is called its 'ascension' (*epanaphora*); cf. Proclus *in Remp*. 2, 44,13. Now, the phrase *en hekastôi oikêseôs apoklimati* in our text would make sense only if *oikêsis* refers to the four centres – but I have found no parallel for this. Moreover, in that case expressing the notion 'forwards' by referring to each *apoklima* would make the reference to mid-heaven and anti-mid-heaven superfluous and even misleading. Fortunately Sextus *Adversus Mathematicos* 5.83-85 (which parallels our passage in many respects) suggests to us a different reading when he points out that the same sign of the zodiac is not observed to be at the same position at the same time by 'dwellers in every region' (*tois en panti klimati katoikousi*). Therefore the reading *en hekastôi oikêseôs klimati* ('in every region of dwelling' i.e. 'in every inhabited region') seems most likely. The corruption of *klimati* into *apoklimati* can easily be explained from the context. For *oikêsis* in a similar context compare Diogenes Laertius 4.58.5-6, Geminus *Elementa Astronomiae* 5.43, Ptolemy *Tetrabiblos* 1.5.6, Cleomedes *Meteora* I.4.62-3 (Todd).

208. i.e. substance in the sublunary realm.

209. cf. 124,8-10.

210. cf. Dexippus 2.41, 60,1-23. According to Dillon (1990) 108 n. 112 this *aporia* may derive from Alexander of Aphrodisias.

211. cf. Ammonius 52,22-53,6 who defines *antiparastasis* as 'to admit the puzzle and to grant its premises, but to show that even if they obtain, they will do no damage to what he has said', and *enstasis* as 'not to accept the puzzle at all, but to refute it as stated'.

212. Plato *Sophist* 263E3-5, *Theaetetus* 189E4-190A6; cf. Porphyry 64,28-65,3, listing *logos endiathetos* as one of the kinds of *logos*.

213. cf. Porphyry 98,7-22. Dillon op. cit. 108 n. 112 identifies Alexander of Aphrodisias as the opponent; cf. E. Schmidt, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias in einem altarmenischen Kategorien-Kommentar', *Philologus* 110, 1966, 284ff.

214. This is a definition of 'Cambridge change' *avant la lettre*.

215. cf. Dexippus 2.42, 60,24-61,12 attributed to Plotinus, see *Enneads* 6.1.3.

216. cf. 92,3-27. Plotinus was aware that a genus cannot be properly defined, cf. *Enneads* 6.3.22, 18-20.

217. This position is amply defended in Plotinus *Enneads* 3.6, which has now been admirably discussed by B. Fleet, *Plotinus. Ennead III.6*: *on the impassivity of the bodiless. Translation and commentary*, Oxford, 1995.

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English-Greek Glossary

abasement: *huphesis*
absolutely: *apolutôs*, *haplôs*
abstraction: *aphairesis*
accident: *sumbebêkos*
accident, inseparable: *sumbebêkos*, *akhôriston*
accompany: *parakolouthein*
account (n.): *logos*, *paradosis*, *apodosis*
account for (v.): *paradidonai*
actuality: *energeia*
add in the margin: *exô paragraphein*
adventitious: *epeisodiôdês*
agree: *homologein*
ambiguity: *amphibolia*
analogous: *analogos*
animal-itself: *autozôion*
anti-mid-heaven: *antimesouranêma*
apprehensible by discursive reasoning: *dianoêtos*
argument: *logos*
assume: *hupotithesthai*
attribute: *parakolouthoûn*

be an accident: *sumbebêkenai*
be immanent in: *enuparkhein*
be inferior: *elleipein*
be superior: *huperekhein*
become an object of: *hupopiptein*
belief: *doxa*
belong: *epiballein*, *huparkhein*, *prosêkein*
bestow: *metadidonai*
body: *sôma*

call: *epikalein*, *legein*
case: *ptôsis*
category: *genos*, *katêgoria*
causative: *aitios*
cause: *aition*, *aitia*
characterize: *kharaktêrizein*, *eidopoiein*
characteristic (n.): *kharaktêr*, *idiôma*
characteristic of (adj.): *oikeios*
clarify: *anakathairein*
class as prior: *protattein*
close: *prosekhês*
coherence: *sunokhê*
coincidence: *suntukhia*
common: *koinos*
common item: *koinotês*
common parlance: *koinê khrêsis*
commonality: *koinotês*
communicate: *metadidonai*
comparison: *sunkrisis*
complete (adj.): *holoklêros*
complete (v.): *sumplêroun*
complete reality: *entelekheia*
completive: *sumplêrôtikos*
composite (adj.): *sunthetos*
composite (n.): *sunamphoteron*, *suntheton*
comprehensible: *gnôrimos*
conceive: *noein*, *epinoein*
concept: *epinoia*
conceptual: *kata tên ennoian*
conceptual content: *ennoia*
conglomerate: *sumphorêsis*
conjunction: *sullêpsis*
consider: *theôrein*
consistency: *akolouthia*
constitute: *hupestanai*, *ousiôsthai*
constitution: *hupostasis*
constitutive: *sumplêrôtikos*, *sustatikos*, *morphôtikos*
constrain: *anankazein*
contemplative: *theôrêtikos*
contend: *anankazein*, *apodidonai*
contradictory: *enantios*
contradistinction: *antidiairesis*
contradistinguish: *antidiairein*
contrariety: *enantiôsis*
contrary: *enantios*
contribute: *sunteleia*
contribution: *sunteleia*
conversion: *antistrophê*

coordinated: *katatetagmenos*, *suntetagmenos*
coordination: *katataxis*
counter-objection: *antiparastasis*
create: *huphistanai*

definition: *logos*, *horismos*, *horos*
degree, to the same: *episês*
description: *hupographê*, *perigraphê*, *logos*
descriptive: *hupographikos*
determinate, definite: *hôrismenos*
determination: *aphorismos*
determine: *horizein*, *diorizein*, *aphorizein*
differ: *diapherein*
difference: *diaphoron*, *diaphora*, *diaphorotês*
different: *diaphoros*
differentia: *diaphora*
differentia, specific: *diaphora eidikê*
differentiate: *diaphorein*
differentiation: *diakrisis*
dignity: *axia*
discussion: *logos*
disposition: *hexis*
disposition, in a: *diakeimenon*
disquisition: *diataxis*
distinguish: *aphorizesthai*
distinguishing characteristic: *idion*
dittography: *dissographia*
divide: *diairein*
divided: *meristos*
divided, in a divided way: *diêirêmenôs*
division: *diairesis, tomê*
divisive, dividing: *diairetikos*

elucidation: *didaskalia*
embrace: *perilambanein*
encompassing: *periektikos*
encounter: *epiballein*, *prosballein*, *entunkhanein*
endow: *endidonai*
essence: *ousia*, *to ti ên* (*einai*)
essence, to have an: *ousiôsthai*
essential: *ousiôdês*
example: *paradeigma*
exist: *huphistasthai*
exist prior to: *proüparkhein*
existence: *hupostasis*
existence, have subsidiary: *parhuphistasthai*
explain: *didaskein*
explanation: *aition*
expression: *lexis*
extend: *diateinein*
extension: *diastasis*
extreme: *eskhatos*

fall (under): *piptein* (*hupo*)
feature: *idiôma*
foreign: *allotrios*
form: *idea, eidos*, *morphê*
form, put together: *apartizein*
foundation: *hupobathra*

general, in a general way: *holoskherôs*
generic: *genikos*
genus: *genos*;
give an account of: *apodidonai*
grasp: *noein*

heavens: *ouranos*
homonymously: *homônumôs*
homonymy: *homônumia*

immanent: *enulos*
immaterial: *aülos*
immediately: *amesôs*
immortal: *athanatos*
impassible: *apathês*
in virtue of itself: *kath' hautos*
include, comprise: *periekhein*, *perilambanein*
incomplete: *atelês*
incorporeal: *asômatos*
indefinite, undetermined: *aoristos*
indefiniteness: *aoristia*
independent: *kath' heautos*
indeterminacy: *aoristia*
indicate: *apodidonai*
indifferent: *adiaphoros*
individual (adj.): *atomos*
individual (n.): *atomon*, *kath' hekaston*
indivisible: *adiairetos*, *atmêtos*
induction: *epagôgê*
infer: *sunagein*
intelligible: *noêtos*
intension: *epitasis*
interpreter: *exêgêtês*
investigate: *metadiôkein*
irrational: *alogos*

knowledge: *noêsis*, *gnôsis*

later-born: *husterogenês*
level, on the same: *isostoikhos*
life: *zôê*
limit: *peras*

mark off: *diorizein*
material: *enulon*
mathematical: *mathêmatikos*
matter: *hulê*
meaning: *sêmainomenon*
measure (n.): *metron*
measure (v.): *metroun*
measurelessness: *ametria*
mention: *mnêmoneuein*
mid-heaven: *mesouranêma*
mixture: *migma*
mode: *tropos*
more and less: *mallon kai hêtton*
mortal: *thnêtos*
motion: *kinêsis*

name (n.): *onoma*
name (v.): *prosagoreuein*
natural: *phusikos*
nature: *phusis*
negation: *apophasis*
noetic: *noeros*
non-coordinated: *akatataktos*
non-differentiated: *adiaphoros*
non-rational: *alogos*
notion: *ennoia*, *logos*

objection: *enstasis*
opposite: *antikeimenos*
opposition: *antithesis*
order: *taxis*
ordering: *suntaxis*
ordinary language: *sunêtheia*
otherness: *heterotês*

paronymously: *parônumôs*
paronymy: *parônumia*
partake: *metalambanein*
partially: *en merei*
participate, partake: *metekhein*
participation: *methexis*, *metalêpsis*
particular (adj.): *to kata meros*
particular (n.): *kath' hekaston*
particular property: *idion*
pass (from A to B): *metabainein*
peculiar: *idios*, *oikeios*
peculiarity: *idiotês*
perceive: *theôrein*
pervade: *khôrein* (*dia*)
position (in the text): *taxis*, *edaphion*
posterior: *husteros*
potency: *dunamis*
potentiality: *dunamis*
predicate: *katêgoreuein*
predication: *katêgoria*
pre-encompassing: *prolêpsis*
presuppose: *prolambanein*
principally: *proêgoumenôs*
principle: *arkhê*, *logos*
prior: *proteros*
proof: *tekmêrion*, *apodeixis*
proper: *oikeios*, *idios*
properly: *oikeiôs*, *prosphorôs*
property: *idiotês*, *idiôma*
proportion: *analogia*
proprium: *idion*
psychic: *psukhikos*

qualification: *poion*, *poiôsis* (*hapax*)
qualifying: *poiotikos*
quality: *poion*, *poiotês*
quality, substantial: *ousiôdês*

raise problems: *aporein*
rank: *tattein*
ratio: *logos*
rational: *logikos*
rationality: *logikotês*
reading: *graphê*
reason: *dianoia*
recapitulation: *epanalêpsis*
receptacle: *hupodokhê*
reception: *katadokhê*
receptive: *dektikos*, *epidektikos*
receptivity: *to epidektikon*
relation: *skhesis*
remission: *anesis*
remove: *anairein*
remove along with oneself: *sunanairein*
reside in: *enuparkhein*

sameness: *tautotês*
secondary: *deuteros*
secondary status: *deutereion*
semantic: *sêmantikos*
sensible: *aisthêtos*
separate: *khôristos*
separation: *apostasis*

set apart: *antidialambanein*
signification: *sêmasia*
signify: *sêmainein*
signifying: *sêmantikos*
similarity, resemblance: *homoiotês*, *aparallakton*
simple: *haplous*
simpliciter: *haplôs*
simplicity: *haplotês*
simultaneously: *hama*
sketchy: *hupotupôtikôs*
solution: *lusis*
sophism: *sophisma*
soul: *psukhê*
species: *eidos*
specific: *eidêtikos*
state: *hexis*
statement: *logos*
strictly: *kuriôs*
strip away: *aphairein*
subject: *hupokeimenon*
subordinate: *hupallêlos*
subsist: *huphistanai*
substance: *ousia*
substance-like, substantial: *ousiôdês*
subsume: *hupagein*
successively: *para meros*, *ana meros*
suggestion: *hupomnêsis*
suitably: *epitêdeiôs*
superior: *kuriôteros*
superiority: *huperokhê*
supervene: *epiginesthai*
supremacy: *huperbolê*
supreme: *kuriôtatos*
synonymous: *sunônumos*
synonymously: *sunônumôs*
synonymy: *sunônumia*
system: *suntaxis*

take in hand: *prokheirizein*
teaching: *didaskalia*
text: *lexis*
thought: *dianoia*, *ennoia*
transcend: *exaireisthai*
transcendent: *exêirêmenos*
transference, by: *metaphora* (*kata*)
truly: *kuriôs*

ultimate: *eskhatos*, *teleutaios*
underlie: *hupokeisthai*
undivided: *ameristos*
unified: *sundedemenon*
universal: *koinos*, *katholou*
unlimitedness: *apeiria*
unrelated: *askhetos*

verbal: *lektikos*

wholeness: *holikotês*
word: *lexis*

Greek-English Index

References are to the page and line numbers of the Greek text which appear in the margins of the translation.

adiairetos, indivisible, 80,23; 82,11
adiaphoros, indifferent, 81,25-6; non-differentiated: 83,9; 84,26-7; 99,12
aisthêtos, sensible, 76,15; 77,8
aitia, cause, 76,1; cause of movement, 77,10
aition, cause, 83,6; explanation, 79,2
aitios, causative, 77,29; 80,4
akolouthia, consistency, 83,18 (cf. 89,31)
allotrios, foreign, 85,26; 88,19
alogos, irrational, 77,20; non-rational, 78,1
ameristos, undivided, 82,20
amesôs, immediately, 98,25
ametria, measurelessness, 108,19
amphibolia, ambiguity, 92,29
anairein, to remove, 82,31-5; 84,12-13.23.31
anakathairein, to clarify, 75,31
analogia, proportion, 89,4.10
analogos, analogous, 93,26
anankazein, to contend, 77,13.17; to constrain, 85,6
anesis, remission, 98,14
antidiairein, to contradistinguish, 78,21; 110,30
antidiairesis, contradistinction, 83,24
antidialambanein, to set apart, 84,24
antikeimenos, opposite, 77,22.25
antimesouranêma, anti-mid-heaven, 117,14
antiparastasis, counter-objection, 118,11
antistrophê, conversion, 113,28
antithesis, opposition, 77,26
aoristia, indeterminacy, 79,22; indefiniteness, 90,5
aoristos, indefinite, undetermined, 94,33-4; 104,27
aparallakton, similarity (exact), 79,21-2
apartizein, to form, to put together, 78,27; 96,6
apathês, impassible, 119,32
apeiria, unlimitedness, 108,19
aphairein, to strip away, 83,15
aphairesis, abstraction, 83,8
aphorismos, determination, 104,6
aphorizein, to determine, 93,26; 99,6; 102,20.30; 103,22-3.32; 104,27.33
aphorizesthai, to distinguish, 83,33
apodeixis, proof, 82,26
apodidonai, to give an account of, 81,18.20; to indicate, 85,23-6; to contend, 86,23
apodosis, account, 85,27; 88,12
apolutôs, absolutely, 108,12
apophasis, negation, 77,29; 78,2; 81,20.29
aporein, to raise problems, 76,13.23; 77,4
apostasis, separation, 108,18
arkhê, principle, 77,2-3
askhetos, unrelated, 104,29; 105,30; 119,22
asômatos, incorporeal, opposite of corporeal, 76,16; 77,28-9; 82,2; incorporeal, prior to (in)corporeality, 77,29-30
atelês, incomplete, 95,15
athanatos, immortal, 77,20-1.28
atmêtos, indivisible, 88,22
atomon, individual (n.), 80,1-4.19; 82.6ff; 84,1-6; 88,21; 104,30
atomos, individual (adj.), 80,31; 84,21; 101,27
aülos, immaterial, 82,20; 91,4

autozôion, animal-itself, 83,3
axia, dignity, 89,18

dektikos, receptive, 113,12.35; 115,4
deutereion, secondary status, 89,2
deuteros, secondary, 79,15; 80,29; 82,16; 83,32-3
diairein, to divide, 80,27; 83,21.32; 92,3; 95,23; 107,13; 108,6; 109,7
diairesis, division, 86,10; 88,19-20; 89,26; 91,16-33; 93,31; 94,1.24; 107,16-7; 108,29.32
diairetikos, divisive, dividing, 77,23-4
diakeimenon, disposition, in a, 87,30-1; 100,17
diakrisis, differentiation, 83,26-7; 97,28
dianoêtos, apprehensible by discursive reasoning, 76,19
dianoia, reason, 76,21; 94,33; thought, 92,30; 119,17
diapherein, to differ, 84,25
diaphora, difference, 91,16; 103,21; differentia, 77,22; 80,7.9.13; 92,10; 96,26; 97,26-102,10; 103,32; 107,25; 110,28-9
diaphora eidikê, differentia, specific, 99,17-8
diaphorein, differentiate, 83,14
diaphoron, difference, 78,15; 83,13
diaphoros, different, 83,5; 88,4
diaphorotês, difference, 83,2
diastasis, extension, 116,30
diataxis, disquisition, 99,33
diateinein, to extend, 82,33; 83,28; 91,18; 104,5
didaskalia, elucidation, 75,28; teaching, 76,20
didaskein, explain, 81,17
diêiremenôs, divided, in a divided way, 92,19
diorizein, to mark off, 76,20; to determine, 97,1
dissographia, dittography, 88,24
doxa, belief, 118-19 *passim*
dunamis, potency, 108,8; potentiality, 84,19-20; 95,15

edaphion, position (in the text), 88,26
eidêtikos, specific, 112,28
eidopoiein, to characterize, specify, 98,10; 103,32
eidos, species, 80,7-8; 81,4.22; 83,5.33, 84,3; 88,6.18; 97,29; 101,2; 105,7; form, 82,6; 88,1-2; 93,24; 104,23
elleipein, to be inferior, 89,18
en merei, partially, 93,23
enantion, contradictory, 83,22; contrary, 92,34
enantiôsis, contrariety, 105,25; 106,28; 107,6.24-5.32; 108,5.20; 109,16; 110,6
endidonai, to endow, 83,4
energeia, actuality, 84,18-9; 95,15; 104,24
ennoia, conceptual content, 75,30; notion, 79,12; 83,9.16; thought, 83,8
ennoian, ***kata tên***, conceptual, 83,19
enstasis, objection, 111,12; 118,11
entelekheia, complete reality, 95,14
entunkhanein, to encounter, 84,35
enulos, immanent, 79,9; material, 91,4-6; 99,24
enuparkhein, to reside in, 83,7
epagôgê, induction, 106,3; 108,25.32
epanalêpsis, recapitulation, 86,34
epeisodiôdês, adventitious, 109,32; 112,24
epi pollois, many, over, 82,28
epiballein, to belong, 77,23; to encounter, 80,30
epidektikon, receptivity, 115,4.13
epidektikos, receptive, 114,15.28; 115,4
epiginesthai, to supervene, 115,18
epikalein, to call, 85,32
epinoein, to conceive, 84,24.28
epinoia, concept, 91,28
episês, to the same degree, 77,2; 79,6
epitasis, intension, 98,14
epitêdeiôs, suitably, 106,33
eskhatos, extreme, 79,22; ultimate, 79,11; 109,16; 110,9.19
exaireisthai, to transcend, 77,22-3
exêgêtês, interpreter, 96,3
exêirêmenos, transcendent, 77,23; 80,3.6; 83,1; 109,12
exô paragraphein, to add in the margin, 88,26

genikos, generic, 88,8
genos, genus, 80,6-7; 105,7; category, 75,27; 92,5; genus, as principle,

77,1.3.12.22; genus, logical, 76,14.25; 81.4; 83,33-84,3; 88,6; 92,9; 97,30
gnôrimos, comprehensible, 85,25; 87,16; 89,9-10
gnôsis, knowledge, 76,24
graphê, reading, 88,26

hama, simultaneously, 113,18; 116,28-9.36; 117,31.33
haplôs, absolutely, in the strict sense, 77,12; *simpliciter*, 88,6; 93,11
haplotês, simplicity, 113,16
haplous, simple, 80,29-30; 82,19; 91,25; 98,4
heterotês, otherness, 116,27
hexis, disposition, 100,16.22; state, 86,20; 101,19; 108,3
holikotês, wholeness, 112,17
holoklêros, complete, 92,21
holoskherôs, general, in a general way, 92,23
homoiotês, similarity, resemblance, 80,6; 93,26; 103,7; 104,1.35
homologein, agree, 77,4
homônumia, homonymy, 86,29; 91,3
homônumôs, homonymously, 81,7; 85,31; 86,6; 94,20-1
hôrismenos, determinate, definite, 77,28; 102,21; 103,13; 104,32; 105,1-2
horismos, definition, 83,20; 92,4-5.15
horizein, to determine, 88,9; 104,26
horos, definition, 81,19-20
hulê, matter, 77,8; 78,11; 91,16; 96,4; 99,25-32; 104,23
hupagein, to subsume, 78,18
hupallêlos, subordinate, 89,17
huparkhein, to belong, 78,26; 84,11; 111,9
huperbolê, supremacy, 90,6
huperekhein, to be superior, 89,18
huperokhê, superiority, 77,23
hupestanai, to constitute, 83,18
huphesis, abasement, 83,26; 108,18
huphistanai, to create, 76,26; to subsist, 109,8.21
huphistasthai, to exist, 76,3.7
hupobathra, foundation, 87,6
hupodokhê, receptacle, 95,15
hupographê, description, 75,30; 81,20; 92,7
hupographikos, descriptive, 88,12
hupokeimenon, subject, 76,12; 78,25-9; 80,21ff; 85,10
hupokeisthai, to underlie, 76,10
hupomnêsis, suggestion, 119,27
hupopiptein, to become an object of, 76,22
hupostasis, existence, 79,9; 82,8; 99,26; 103,4; 105,7; 109,17.24; constitution, 83,19
hupotithesthai, to assume, 76,25
hupotupôtikôs, sketchy, 75,27
husterogenês, later-born, 83,9
husteros, posterior, 82,22; 83.17

idea, form, 95,11; 101,3
idiôma, feature, 84,26; property, 92,21; 93,21.23; characteristic, 104,32; 110,31
idion, distinguishing characteristic, 75,30; 86,11; 88,9-10.15; 101,31; particular property, *opp*. *koinon*, 92,4.26; 93,10; proprium, 90,13; 92,14-21; 93,20.29; 96,20; 101,34; 104,17; 105,26; 113,19
idios, peculiar, 80,10; proper, 90,13-14
idiotês, property, 88,22; 111,4; peculiarity, 110,31
isostoikhos, level, on the same, 83,24

katadokhê, reception, 106,33
katataxis, coordination, 119,24
katatetagmenos, ***katatakhtheis***, *opp*. *akatataktos*, co-ordinated, 79,25; 104,21; 111,22-3; 119,22
katêgoreuein, to predicate, 76,12.15; 79,26.28; 86,13-14; 100,13
katêgoria, predication, 80,2; 85,20; 88,5; 104,11; category, 78,8.18-19; 85,25; 90,7; 92,25.30-1; 102,2; 105,6
kath' h(e)autos, in virtue of itself, 79,19; independent, 82,8
kath' hekaston, individual (n.), 82,15; 84,27-8; 85,12; particular (n.), 82,17
katholou, universal, 82,18.20; 84,23; 85,11; 88,20; 108,27; 114,8
kharaktêr, characteristic, 79,7
kharaktêrizein, to characterize, 79,19; 81,3; 91,5; 103,33
khôrein (dia), to pervade, 83,28

khôristos, separate, 82,6.9; 91,12.28; 95,16
kinêsis, motion, 77,10
koinê khrêsis, common parlance, 79,3
koinos, common, 76,14.24; 78,15; 82,13-83.16; 85,9; 88,23; 92,4.26; universal, 80,29; 82,8.14-83,24; 84,24-85,14; 105,14
koinotês, common item, 83,1-16.23-6; 114,9; commonality, 83,12; 108,29
kuriôs, proper, in the proper sense, strictly, 77,3; 90,14; 92,16; truly, 79,18

legein, to call, 79,26-7
lektikos, verbal, 104,32
lexis, expression, 105,13; text, 80,14; word, 84,33-4
logikos, rational, 77,20
logikotês, rationality, 80,12
logos, account, 78,9; argument, 77,19; 86,7; 104,29; definition, 77,6; 86,2.15ff; 87,31; 100,14.28; description, 87,31.33; 88.3; discussion, 76,13; 78,5; 100,18; notion, 77,6; principle, 85,13; 88,15; principle, formative, 85,16; 88,18.23; ratio, 109,17; 110,13; statement, 118-19 *passim*
lusis, solution, 81,17; 88,14

mallon kai hêtton, more and less, 79,9-10; 90,1-5.16-31; 92,32-3; 111,5.8.11.21
mathêmatikos, mathematical, 77,6
meristos, divided, 91,25; 92,17
mesouranêma, mid-heaven, 117,12-13
metabainein, to pass (from A to B), 84,35
metadidonai, to bestow, 76,4; to communicate, 85,11; 102,1
metadiôkein, to investigate, 79,12
metalambanein, to partake, 79,10
metalêpsis, participation, 115,31
metaphora (kata), transference, by: 81,8.10
metekhein, to participate, to partake, 77,3.18; 81,7; 100,17; 109,10; 110,8; 111,21-2.30; 115,7
methexis, participation, 95,13
metron, measure, 95,25.28; 108,19
metroun, to measure, 95,24-7
migma, mixture, 96,9
mnêmoneuein, to mention, 78,32; 79,1; 80,19
morphê, form, 91,16
morphôtikos, constitutive, 97,33

noein, to conceive, 76,11; 84,30; 103,36; to grasp, 107,5
noeros, noetic, 77,9
noêsis, knowledge, 85,1
noêtos, intelligible, 76,15.24-6; 82,3.6; 91,1-2.10; 93,25

oikeios, characteristic of, 82,7; peculiar, 79,9; 80,23; proper, 85,24; 92,24
oikeiôs, properly, 77,23
onoma, name, 86,14-5; 87,31; 100,14.28
ouranos, heavens, 114,26
ousia, essence, 85,10.19; 98,10; substance, *passim*
ousiôdês, essential, 109,3; 112,25; substance-like, substantial, 78,23; 80,11; 85,20; 88,23; 101,1
ousiôsthai, to constitute, 115,32; to have an essence, 102,2

para meros, ***ana meros***, successively *opp*. simultaneously, 116,18.29
paradeigma, example, 81,21.31; 92,8
paradidonai, to account for, 82,4
paradosis, account, 75,29
parakolouthein, to accompany, 113,8
parakolouthoûn, attribute, 75,30
parônumia, paronymy, 86,29
parônumôs, paronymously, 85,30
paruphistasthai, to exist, to have subsidiary existence, 110,5
peras, limit, 95,31; 108,19
periekhein, to include, comprise, 77,22
periektikos, encompassing, 84,1
perigraphê, description, 92,26-7; 103,14; 119,27
perilambanein, to embrace, 81,27; to include, comprise, 77,10
phusikos, natural, 76,18
phusis, nature, 77.28; 82,4.16.19; 83,1; 85,13; 95,15; 104,26

piptein (hupo), to fall (under), 78,19
poion, qualification, 103,35; quality, 87,28; 99,5
poiôsis (hapax), qualification, 99,12
poiotês, quality, 78,20; 80,12; 99,19.32; 107,25
poiotês ousiôdês, quality, substantial: 98,22; 101,16; 103,22.25.27
poiôtikos, qualifying, 78,23
proêgoumenôs, principally, 80,26
prokheirizein, to take in hand, 75,29
prolambanein, to presuppose, 77,4
prolêpsis, pre-encompassing, 83,3.5
prosagoreuein, to name, 85,33
prosballein, encounter, 82,18
prosêkein, to belong, 80,21; 92,21
prosekhês, close, 77,1
prosphorôs, properly, 81,16
protattein, to class as prior, 82,15
proteros, prior, 79,17; 82,16
proüparkhein, to exist prior to, 77,26
psukhê, soul, 86,19-21; 95,27
psukhikos, psychic, 77,6
ptôsis, case, 105,10

sêmainein, to signify, 81,25.30; 85,22-3; 103,20
sêmainomenon, meaning, 79,4
sêmantikos, signifying, 84,33; semantic, 82,21
sêmasia, signification, 85,20; 91,20; 104,32; 105,1
skhesis, relation, 82,21; 89,4; 91,8; 104,7.9.29; 108,12; 109,9.13
sôma, body, 76,16
sophisma, sophism, 105,12.17-18
sunkrisis, comparison, 111,26
sullêpsis, conjunction, 116,33
sumbebêkenai, to be an accident, 76,6
sumbebêkos, accident, 76,5-6; 78,22; 81,5; 85,20-1; 98,9; 101,28
sumbebêkos akhôriston, inseparable accident, 98,13
sumphorêsis, conglomerate, 96,3
sumplêrôtikos, completive, 84,32; 86,16; 98,1.22-3.28; 101,5; 112,24; constitutive, 80,2.9.11; 99,28; 100,27
sumplêroun, to complete, 82,33; 84,17; 94,7
sunagein, to infer, 89,28-9
sunamphoteron, composite (n.), 78,7; 91,17
sunanairein, to remove along with oneself, 76,8; 84,14.20
sundedemenon, unified, 83,26
sunêtheia, ordinary language, 82,5
sunokhê, coherence, 116,34
sunônumia, synonymy, 86,28
sunônumos, synonymous, 86,14
sunônumôs, synonymously, 81,8; 86,5.9; 94,22; 99,27; 100,13
suntaxis, ordering, 108,12; system, 77,11
sunteleia, contribution, 94,29
suntelein, to contribute, 79,20; 85,10; 88,21; 94,5; 99,5
suntetagmenos, *opp. akatataktos*, coordinated, 79,25
suntheton, composite (n.), 78,11.13; 104,30
sunthetos, composite, of matter and form (adj.), 77,9; 78,13
suntukhia, coincidence, 85,15
sustatikos, constitutive, 77,25

tattein, to rank, 76,10; 82,2
tautotês, sameness, 116,27; 117,18
taxis, order, 75,27; 76,9; 82,4.21; order of argument, 89,23.30; position (in the text), 97,2.15.23
tekmêrion, proof, 106,25
teleutaios, ultimate, 117,30
theôrein, to consider, 83,19; to perceive, 84,27
theôrêtikos, contemplative, 86,21
thnêtos, mortal, 77,21.27
to kata meros, particular (adj.), 84,28
to ti ên (einai), essence, 90,11-12; 101,3
tomê, division, 88,6.13
tropos, mode, 113,19 (of *idion*)

zôê, life, 77,10

Subject Index

References are to the page and line numbers of the Greek text which appear in the margins of the translation.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, 82,6.22; 83,16.21; 85,6; 90,31; 99,19
Archytas, 75,31; 76,9.19; 77,7; 78,32; 79,19; 91,14.29; 92,27; 96,27; 116,11
Aristotle, *Metaph*. 77,5; 91,22; *Phys*. 82,15; 91,22; 107,31; *Top*. 113,27

belief, *doxa*, 118,6-119,16
Boethus, 78,4.20; 97,28; 104,27

characteristic (distinguishing), *idion*, 75,27-31; 88,7-18; 92,14-93,33; 97,25-6; 101,34; 95,34-96,30; 101,30-102,6; 113,20-34
Chrysippus, 105,8
contrariety, 105,24-110,25; 113,8-118,3

definition, see description
degrees of being, 79,6-12; 83,24-9; 88,33-89,22; 90,16-33; 108,12-21; 109,5-110,18; 110,28-113,5
description, *hupographê*, vs. definition, 79,28-31; 81,19-20; 87,30-88,5; 92,1-13; 119,26-30
differentia, *diaphora,* 103,32-104,6; categorial position of, 80,8-14; 97,24-102,10

heavens, 116,33-117,30

Iamblichus, 79,29; 82,10; 83,21; 90,30; 92,14.29; 99,7; 100,3.[27]; 101,12.22; 106,29; [107,2]; 116,25

Nicostratus, 76,14

order, logical, 89,23-90,6; of categories, 75,31-76,12

Peripatos, 82,7; 85,2; 120,7
Plato, 76,25; 83,27; 95,11; 104,25; 108,15
Plotinus, 76,13; 79,6; [96,2]; 108,22; 109,5.31; [114,23]; [119,17]
Porphyry, 78,21; 79,29; 90,30; 93,10.17; 94,24; *Isag*. 84,4
Pythagoreanism, 91,14.21; 105,3; 116,25

soul, 86,18-22; 95,10-12
statement, *logos*, 118,6-119,16
Stoics, 105,9
substance, problems of division, 88,4-23; 90,8-91,33; 93,33-95,9; 119,17-30; problems of priority, 80,21-81,14; 82,1-83,29; 84,12-85,33; 87,1-8.14-27; 88,33-89,22; 94,10-15; sensible vs. intelligible, 76,14-77,11; 78,4-5; 82,1-83,29; 90,33-91,13; 114,21-3; 116,25-31; as form, matter, and composite, 78,5-79,22; 80,17-81,14; 104,22-31; 119,31-120,24
synonymity, 100,13-101,30; vs. homonymity, 81,8-14; 85,27-34; 86,3-34

time, 95,23-33

universals, 82,14-83,20; 84,1-85,17; 105,7-20; 108,26-35; 114,5-20

Simplicius
On Aristotle Categories 6

Barrie Fleet

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Introduction

Quantity

Simplicius begins his discussion of Quantity by outlining the Peripatetic arguments for putting Quantity second after Substance in the order of Categories; he then gives pseudo-Archytas' arguments for the placing of Quality above Quantity. At this stage Simplicius appears to be non-committal, but in his introductory remarks to his commentary on chapter 7 (Relative) he comes down firmly on the side of pseudo-Archytas.

He then turns to a lengthy discussion of the words 'Quantity is either discrete or continuous' at 4b20 of Aristotle's text, pointing out that the terms 'discrete' and 'continuous' denote not species but differentiae of Quantity; the true species are magnitude (*megethos*) and amount (*plêthos*), being continuous and discrete Quantity respectively. But this leads to difficulties, e.g. speech, although it is clearly discrete, can hardly be described as an amount; nor can time, which is continuous, be described as a magnitude. This therefore leads to a further division by differentiae into 'that which consists of parts which have position' and 'that which consists of parts having no position'. Simplicius briefly considers this new division, showing that it does not coincide with the original division – although he does not appear to consider this problematic: 'So it is hardly surprising that several divisions within the same thing can be made according to this or that point of view' (123,23-5).

After a lengthy passage (123,29-126,4) in which he discusses the differences between the continuous and the discrete, Simplicius, in reply to the objection that since the discrete is prior to the continuous (or *vice versa*) the status of Quantity as their genus is compromised, suggests that in so far as both partake equally in Quantity, Quantity is the genus of both. He calls in Plotinus, who says that both the continuous and the discrete are known as Quantity 'by measure and limit', although in different ways.

After dealing with two further general objections, that (a) magnitude is not a quantity, so requiring us to envisage two categories, Quantity and 'so much' (*pêlikon*), and (b) downward thrust (*rhopê*) should be established as a third species alongside number and magnitude, Simplicius turns his attention to problems concerning the species of Quantity, first discrete Quantity, i.e. number and speech (129,10-133,9), and secondly continuous Quantity, i.e. line, surface, body, time and place (132,13ff.). His answers to various problems are based on the principle enunciated at 132,28, that

Quantity is what measures and is measured, quoting his predecessors Porphyry and Iamblichus in support of his arguments; furthermore he is able on more than one occasion to cite a passage of Plotinus that answers a problem raised elsewhere. He concludes this section with a strongly 'intellective' passage from Iamblichus (135,6-29).

Simplicius then turns to the second division of Quantity, that into parts that have position and those that do not (135,30-141,9). He draws a distinction between place (*topos*) and position (*thesis*) by showing that something such as a point can have a position without being in place *per se* – taking issue with Iamblichus on this question. Of things not having position speech and time are unproblematic according to his division, but number presents certain difficulties; number, according to this second division, joins time and speech, in that none of these have parts with position, unlike surface, body and place. Iamblichus is reported as having suggested a third division into what has order (*taxis*) and what has not, and a fourth division into *per se* and *per accidens* Quantities. Two further problems are raised, concerning (a) the categorical status of change, and (b) the impossibility for anything to have position in the universal flux, if 'things whose parts persist are said to have position'.

Simplicius then, at 141,10, turns to the absence of contrariety as the particular feature of Quantity, showing that although each of the seven sub-species can have a contrary, this is only in terms of another category; e.g. a black surface is the contrary of a white surface not *qua* quantity but *qua* quality. Not even great and small are contraries *qua* quantities. There follows a lengthy discussion (143,9-147,23) about the nature of 'great and small' and 'much and few' as indeterminate quantities, with extensive quotations from Iamblichus; Simplicius allows Aristotle's distinction between opposition and contrariety – Quantity can allow opposition within itself, e.g. between the differentiae which mark out its species; but there can be no contrary to a quantity *per se*. He continues with a discussion of 'up and down' (147,24-150,12) and of 'more and less' (150,14-151,8). He finally discusses and supports Aristotle's claim that 'to be said to be equal or unequal' is the unique feature of Quantity.

Simplicius
On Aristotle
Categories 6

Translation

Textual Emendations

129,17 after *to diôrismenon* add *te kai hôrismenon*
131,24 after *metrei* add *katho sullabê*
132,10 after *ekhei* add *tên brakhutêta*
138,18 *arithmei tis* for *arithmeitai*
139,15 after *en* add *tois sunthetois hoion en*
147,31 *hôs oimai* for *hôs oietai*

Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*

CHAPTER 6

On Quantity 120,25

4b20 Quantity is either discrete or continuous.

After Substance[1] Aristotle proposes to explain Quantity.[2] We must first discover his reason for putting them in the order according to which Quantity was placed second after Substance.[3] They say,[4] then, that Quantity coexists[5] with Being,[6] since <Being>, by its very being, is something, and *ipso facto* must itself be either one or many; that most things are common to Substance and to Quantity, such as having no contrary, and not admitting the more and the less – although Quality has both these attributes;[7] that that which is in extension and lacking quality[8] is prior to the quality that comes-to-be in it; and that when other things are removed, the substance[9] is not removed if the extension is left behind; but when this is removed the corporeal substance is removed along with it. Consequently Quantity is close to Substance. He says in addition that, even in the case of changes,[10] quantitative change, i.e. increase and decrease, is closer to substantial change, i.e. coming-to-be and passing away, than alteration, which is qualitative change. Yet although Quantity is in this way close to Substance, it is something other than Substance. For quantitative change is to do with the substance when the form[11] remains the same, for example when a one-year-old child gets bigger. For that which endures and admits each of the two <quantities> in turn is necessarily different from each of them. Quality too is shown to be different from Substance in this way, in that it (the substance) changes from one affection to another, or from one disposition to another.

Yet Archytas[12] put Quality after Substance, giving status to it in something like[13] the following manner: 'Their order is as follows: Substance is placed first because it alone acts as substrate[14] to the rest[15] and because it can be thought of by itself, while the other <categories> cannot be thought of without it. For either they are predicated[16] of it or said to be in[17] it as in a substrate. Quality comes second; for if there is no "something" there can be no "such-and-such".'[18] On this point it is the duty of anyone who is intellectually

curious to ask further what each of the two philosophers had in view when the one put Quality, the other Quantity, first <after Substance>. It seems, then, that Archytas postulated that that which is knowable *per se*, which truly produces completion in all genera, which is present in an undivided manner to all things, and which is participated in by them[19] – that this is pre-existent; and he seems to have given the genera their status according to their kinship with it. For that very reason he puts Substance before all else, because, in that it acts as substrate for everything else, it provides them with Being from itself, just as Substance *per se* imparts being to all things.[20] He further tells us that Substance both is and is thought of by itself, while other categories cannot be and be thought of without it. So in this way it would be akin to that which is *per se* and which is independent of all relation. That is why Substance was put before all the other genera. Now the only way in which we recognize intelligible substances is according to kinds,[21] and, if we are to recognize the sensible <substances> by referring them to those (to the intelligible ones), we will come to know them from the specific features and the marks which characterize Substance, which are considered according to Quality; hence Quality will quite reasonably have pride of place after Substance over the others.

Furthermore, if on the one hand when quality is removed all particular character and all individuality, both intelligible and sensible, is removed, while on the other hand when quantity is removed only the sensible and composite[22] is removed, then I think it is clear to what extent Quality is different from Quantity in respect of kinship with intelligible substance. But if anyone were to want to put the other categories in order according to their relation to sensible substance, not taking intelligible substance into account, in this way too, since substance according to the form is <substance> in the strictest sense,[23] that which is akin to the form, i.e. Quality, would be more akin to Substance. Furthermore, if quality is without parts, unextended and distributed throughout bodies in an undivided manner, while quantity is extended, separated and divided, then Quality would quite reasonably be put first as being more akin to the unembodied principles.[24] If this seems to be the case, then we must add that just as Substance is prior to Quantity, because being is granted to Quantity from Substance, so also Quantity would come after Quality, because it has its very character and individuality from Quality.[25]

But, they say, Quantity co-exists with Being; for being is *ipso facto* either one or many. Rather Quality, the very character because of which a thing is said to be one,[26] co-exists with being prior to Quantity, since it exists both as the unity and the plurality because of the character of the qualified thing.[27] But even if more features held in

common with Substance belong to Quantity <than to Quality>, one should not, according to the divine Iamblichus,[28] work out their essential order from accidents and non-essential concomitants. It should perhaps[29] be said that things further apart often reveal more clearly the similarity in the dissimilarity, just as the indivisible unit in number[30] seems to be similar to the unit prior to number – and they say that matter has a similarity in its dissimilarity to the primary cause.[31] It was perhaps to these or similar arguments that Archytas was looking when he put Quality before Quantity;[32] but Aristotle postulated that the compound and corporeal substance was primary because this was more comprehensible to the normal habit of speech,[33] so he quite reasonably set Quantity alongside it in that it is more akin to it, more comprehensible <than Quality> and co-exists with the extension of such a substance. It is not surprising that each of them produced his own order according to his suppositions.

Quantity is divided into the continuous (*to sunekhes*) and the discrete (*to diôrismenon*), since these fall under the genus of Quantity. For in their very essence, Quantity is predicated of them[34] – and not as an accident or as a mere name; rather each partakes in Quantity equally, since both admit in a similar manner the equal and the unequal,[35] and the double and the half. But this division is not made into species of Quantity, but into differentiae,[36] since the species of Quantity are magnitude (*megethos*) and amount (*plêthos*), and the continuous and the discrete are its differentiae. For magnitude is continuous quantity, and amount is discrete quantity. Aristotle himself made number and speech[37] species of Quantity according to the differentia of the discrete, and line, surface and body according to that of the continuous – and also place and time, which is perhaps more accurate. For it does not seem correct even to Iamblichus that amount should be equated to the discrete, since speech is something discrete, like number, but speech is not an amount. For even if speech is manifold, even so the 'being many' which partakes of amount is one thing, just as people are many, and the 'being an amount', when characterized in this way, is something else.[38]

But perhaps not even magnitude is the same as the continuous, since time is continuous, as he shows, but it is not a magnitude; for there are three species of magnitude – line, surface and body – and none of them is time; for even if a period of time is said to be long – 'All things long and countless time …'[39] – it is nevertheless much.

He makes a further division within Quantity, saying that 'one consists of parts which have position within it,[40] while the other consists of parts having no position'. This division is different from the one previously given. For continuous entities are not the same as those which have position, but that which consists of parts having position is always continuous too, while continuous entities do not

always have position – at least, time is continuous, but does not consist of parts having position. Again, everything discrete consists of parts not having position, but not everything not consisting of parts that have position is thereby discrete. For again time consists of parts not having position, but is not discrete. So it is not surprising that several divisions within the same thing can be made according to this or that point of view – for example 'living creature' can be divided according to rational and irrational, and again according to mortal and immortal. But even the sub-divisions do not always match the sub-divisions according to such differentiae; for not only do rational animals have feet, but many of the irrational ones do also.[41]

It remains to say just what things are continuous, and what things are discrete. In (his work) the *Physics*[42] he says that those things whose limits are one are continuous, just as those things whose limits are together are contiguous. In this work he says those things which join together at a single common boundary are continuous, while those which have no common boundary 'at which their parts join are discrete'.[43] He subsumes number and speech under the discrete; for there is no unit as an intervening boundary joining two and three together in the number five. If anyone were to say that the unit is that which joins each of the two parts, since the unit is not the limit of number as the point is of the line, but a part, the unit would be something over and above the five, and we would no longer have five but six, nor would that unit, at which the parts join together, be the common boundary. For a number is composed of units and can be divided into units, which is why its division is not infinite, but can proceed only as far as the units; but a line is not composed of points nor can it be divided into points, which is why it can be infinitely divided.

But when he says that speech too belongs to discrete quantity, we should understand that he means not speech in mental conception, but in vocal expression;[44] for that sort of speech is a quantity, since all speech is made up of nouns and verbs, and each element of speech is made up of syllables, and each syllable can be measured in terms of time, either a long or a short time; long syllables have the same sort of ratio to short ones as the number two has to the number one; one and two are numbers, and number is discrete quantity; therefore speech too is discrete. For in it there is nothing common to grasp which joins its parts together; for example in the word 'Socrates' there is nothing common in the syllables to grasp which joins them to each other. It is not possible to say that the sense joins them together; for sounds without signification like 'blituri'[45] can be measured in the same way, and they are not coherent. In this way speech in vocal expression is discrete, while that in mental conception is not even a quantity at all, but either an activity or an affection or a compound

of the two, as Iamblichus says. But Porphyry[46] says that it is quality.[47] Therefore number and speech are species of discrete quantity, while of the continuous line is first; for in the point, according to which the line is divided, it has a common boundary and that is where the parts of the line join together with each other. After line comes surface, and this has the line as its common boundary according to which it can be divided; and after surface comes body, which can be divided by surface.

It is worth noting how he says that the parts of body have as their common boundary line or surface.[48] There is <a reading> where 'and surface' is written. For the common boundary of bodies is always a surface, just as a line is of surfaces, and a point is of lines. Porphyry notes this and says: 'There are some solid bodies which have continuity according to line; for by "body" Herminus[49] thinks we should understand not natural body (for that is a substance), but mathematical, which is understood in terms of nothing more than extension in all directions.' Yet mathematical bodies are divided not by line but by mathematical plane.[50] Perhaps then he was referring to solid angles; for the parallel surfaces of a solid body are joined to each other by a line with angles.[51]

But how is it that the line when divided still has the point as the common boundary, while the surface when divided has as its common boundary the line, or the body the surface? For when things are divided they no longer have a common boundary at which their parts join together, since they are circumscribed by their own limits and have their own boundaries. The answer is that one should consider the division in terms of potentiality, and not in actuality, and in potentiality the point is what is common in the line, the line in the surface, and the surface in the body – if the common limit is to be one, which must be the case for the continuous. For when these are taken in actuality and become two, if they are adjacent, they bring their limits together and cause the things that are delimited to be touching; otherwise they cannot be touching.[52]

But a body, in so far as it is extended in three ways and can by nature be measured, is a quantity; but in so far as it is a substrate, remains the same and one in number and is receptive of the contraries, in that respect it is a substance. Consequently the followers of Lucius[53] are wrong to criticize Aristotle on the grounds that he transfers body, which belongs to substance, to quantity.

It is worth noting how he says: 'Further, in addition to these, time and place are quantities.'[54] For neither time nor place are united to body, but they are external concomitants. Place surrounds body and extends with bodies over the extension of the bodies; in so far as it is itself a extension and a surface, it would be a quantity, but in so far as it surrounds and is a limit, it is relative to something. But place is

continuous because its parts too join at a common boundary; for the parts of a body meet at a certain common boundary and, being parts of the place, occupy certain places, which themselves too meet at a common boundary at which the parts of the body also meet. But if the place is the surface of what surrounds in that it surrounds, and if the surface is continuous, then it is evident that place too is continuous. But he did not employ this proof because it had not yet been determined just what place is. For the question belongs to natural science.[55]

It is worth noting that in this passage he says that the continuous parts of body are not in place *per se*. For they too occupy place, but not *per se*, since they are not in place *per se*, nor are they surrounded *per se*.[56] But time itself is a quantity, since it is viewed as 'in extension'[57] and is the number of movement.[58] It is something continuous, since past and future join together at the present as a common boundary and are bound together at that point. Time seems to be continuous in the strictest sense. For each of the other continuous things could also be divided, but time is always continuous and never composed of things that touch. In this respect, then, it differs from other continuous things, and because these are composed of entities that have position, while it is not. Let this much be said by way of clarification of Aristotle's doctrines.

Certain people[59] are puzzled as to how Quantity is said to be the genus of the discrete and the continuous, since the discrete is by nature prior to the continuous. (a) For there can be no common genus where the one is more and the other less, the one prior and the other posterior,[60] because <(i)> the removal of any one of the species[61] does not cause the genus to be removed with it, whereas <(ii)> the removal of the species which are simultaneously opposite to each other does cause the removal of the genus.[62] <(iii)> So in cases where one is more and the other less, and one prior and the other posterior, when the more and the prior are removed, then the less and the posterior are removed with them, so as a consequence the genus too is removed.[63] For this reason, then, where the prior and the posterior are found, nothing can be predicated as a genus. But they show from the fact that the discrete can remove without being removed that it is by nature prior to the continuous. For when three is removed,[64] the triangle is removed, but when the triangle is removed the three is not removed. And the discrete is carried along with this.[65] For the three is carried along with it by the triangle. But the continuous is what carries it along, since the triangle introduces the three. <(b)> Furthermore, they say, the one is simple, exists and is known *per se*, while the other has taken in addition position as well.[66] This can be seen also from the sciences, they say; for arithmetic is prior to geometry. But it is clear that this would not be true unless number too were prior to size. <(c)> Some people establish the same point from the fact

that the continuous can be divided infinitely; this, then, could not be the case if the discrete did not exist. <(d)> In my opinion it can also be claimed that we say that that which can be measured is quantity, that all measure is according to number, and that number is discrete quantity. Therefore this is prior to the continuous.

In reply to this it seems incontrovertible to argue that the discrete is not by nature prior, since the discrete has its being from the division of the continuous, and certain continuous things, like atoms, are indivisible. One should rather say that in so far as they have the prior and the posterior,[67] they are not under the same genus, but in so far as they communicate directly through themselves with Quantity[68] and there is nothing which prevents the continuous from partaking equally with the discrete in Quantity, in this respect Quantity would be the genus of both. For immediate participation is sufficient for this. For even if the three is quantity prior to the triangle, even so the continuous too is quantity prior to the triangle. We can see that this is the case also with affirmation and denial.[69] For affirmation is by nature prior to denial; yet in the case of making an assertion and in the case of telling the truth or a lie, we see that affirmation and denial are equal and so say they are of the same genus. This is what Aristotle has in mind in the case of the discrete and the continuous when he on each occasion puts the discrete first. For in his first division of Quantity he says: 'Quantity is either discrete or continuous',[70] and in his enumeration of individual instances he presents firstly what is subsumed under the discrete, saying: 'Number and speech are discrete things'.[71] He marks them off[72] as opposite members of the genus Quantity according to their equal participation in Quantity.

Furthermore Plotinus raises the following issue in his first treatise on Being:[73] 'If the continuous is Quantity, the discrete cannot be Quantity; but if both are quantities, we must show what is common to them both.' He resolves the question in the third treatise[74] when he says that the 'so much' is common to them, evidently viewed as measure and limit, according to which each is known as quantity. For this is not given to magnitude by number, as some think, but there is a particular measure of what is united and coherent yet still discrete. For each has its particular nature; for example in the cosmos at large the nature of the continuous, which is called magnitude, is interpreted according to unity and coherence, while the nature of the discrete, which is called amount is interpreted according to summation and juxtaposition. For in terms of the Being of its magnitude the cosmos is one and is thought of as spherical and assimilated to itself, being extended and coherent, while in terms of its amount what is considered is its organisation and its orderly arrangement of so many, let us say, elements, animals or plants, and so many contrarieties or so many similarities. If then these things are separated out in this

way in their images,[75] they differ at a much earlier stage in their intelligible genera, and even before that in their *per se* immaterial forms, having measure and limit, as has been stated, as the common feature.

The supporters of Lucius and Nicostratus[76] object to the division firstly as wrongly calling even magnitude a quantity (*poson*). It should have been described as 'so much' (*pêlikon*) and <only> number as a quantity. What is common <to magnitude and number> should have been called either something else, or 'quantity' in a sense different from that of one of its species. But even if the continuous is in the broadest sense magnitude while the discrete is quantity, they are often interchanged (at all events we call water, which is continuous, a quantity, and not a magnitude – for it is extensive, not large; and we call time too a quantity); for this reason he quite reasonably did not make two categories out of quantity and 'so much', and did not divide (it) according to 'so much' and quantity, but according to the continuous and the discrete, which are never interchanged.

They criticize also the fact that the division is <only> into two. For as a third species after number and size he should have established weight or downward thrust,[77] as Archytas and later Athenodorus[78] and Ptolemaeus[79] the mathematician did. But it should be stated that weight belongs to the category of Quality, like density and thickness and their contraries, which are determined according to their quality, not their quantity.[80] But where would the mina and the talent,[81] when spoken of as weights, be included? We shall certainly not claim that they belong in the category of prior quantities, but in that of *per accidens* quantities; for they are not <determined> according to number or magnitude in an unqualified sense. But it should be noted that perhaps downward thrust is not a *per accidens* quantity in the way that white is, i.e. because the surface is a quantity,[82] but is a quantity *per se*, because it admits *per se* the particular characteristic of Quantity, the equal and the unequal,[83] just as other categories admit excess and deficiency. For I think we should pay attention to Archytas who also divides quantity in three ways. He writes as follows:[84] 'There are three differentiae of quantity: one of them consists of downward thrust, like the talent; one in magnitude, like a length of two cubits; and one in amount, like the number ten.' Iamblichus accepts this division, since it becomes the triad according to the most perfect measure of quantity,[85] and since it is in harmony with realities. He writes: 'For quantity in terms of downward thrust is not the same as size or amount, but is considered rather in the case of change, and possesses quantity in terms of weight or lightness. This division is left in the following state: "Of quantities some have downward thrust, others do not". It is clear that the division is not the same as that into the continuous and the discrete, or that into

what has position and what does not. In the universe at large this division seems evident, as being into the four elements which have downward thrust, and the heavens which do not. In the case of changes movements in a straight line[86] happen with downward thrust, having a beginning and an end, and as it takes place are marked off at intervals by rest, while circular movement is continuous,[87] having no beginning and no end as if it were perpetual, and is without downward thrust. Such a difference is evident also in the case of bodiless quantities. For if someone were to posit the soul as a *per se* quantity, it will have downward thrust where it inclines towards the body, and upward thrust where it inclines away from the lower world towards the intelligible.[88] But intellect is a quantity without gravity. Why then do we call the vocal intervals quantities, but the degrees of downward thrust not quantities?'

In reply to Cornutus[89] and Porphyry, who claim that downward thrust considered in terms of weight and lightness is quality, <Iamblichus> says that downward thrust is not weight or lightness, but the measure of weight and lightness. 'For by themselves heavy or light things would proceed to infinity if they had no boundary from within themselves; but when the force of gravity resulting from the measures produces a boundary and limit, it is then that they come to a good proportion.' These then are the problems concerning quantity in general, and their solutions. 129,1

They find problems individually with each of the species of Quantity, and when dividing number first they say that there is one nature of a number according to which it is definite and just so much[90] (putting the accent on the first syllable), and another nature according to which quantity belongs to it, taking the word 'quantity' as indefinite (and accented on the second syllable).[91] It is the latter nature which is revealed when we say that number is quantity, and the former has been passed over by those discussing it.[92] We should immediately challenge them; for number does not have the feature of being just so much as one thing, and being just so great as another.[93] For (a) if everything that partakes of number has the feature of being just so great, how could number be anything other than the so great? For it is not quantity that has been taken in by number as that which is analogous to matter, but the discrete <and the definite>,[94] which is already number. For the discrete produces only quantitative amount, but with the addition of the definite it produces number. Furthermore (b) it is a particular characteristic of compound and enmattered entities that they themselves are one thing while their being is another; for example, the compound man himself is one thing, and being a man – the reality according to the form – is another. But immaterial and incomposite forms, as Aristotle demonstrates,[95] have as one and the same feature individuality and being individual. But

if someone wanting to invest each entity with being requires its essence to be one thing, and its particular character and form to be another, let him realise that formal number[96] and each of the other forms coexist with the essences of entities, being neither prior nor posterior to them, but invested with being according to their essences, just as their essences are numbered according to numbers.

Plotinus[97] asks why, when number in the intelligible world is of substantial form, number in the sensible world is not substance. The answer is that not even the other things, which exist as one thing in another in the sensible world,[98] are considered as being *per accidens* in the intellect, but exist *per se*; for example justice in the sensible world is a state of the soul, since it exists by participation and, as it were, affection, while in the intellect it is just what it is. For the account (*logos*) of justice in the soul is a substantial reality. In this way number and each of the other forms, being participated in a divided manner in the sensible world, becomes an accident, but in the world of immaterial forms each subsists unique in form, determined according to the actuality in its essence. This then, as the divine Iamblichus says, is another sense of the words.

Plotinus finds another problem with unitary number[99] according to which five horses are interpreted and other things are similarly measured according to the addition of units: is the number inherent, or does it act as a measure by being something apart – like a ruler?[100] 'If it acts as a measure by being something apart, substrates will not be quantities since they do not participate in quantity; then let what is apart be a measure in that it acts as a measure – but why should it be a quantity? For the form of Quantity is not itself a quantity.'[101] Plotinus himself resolves the problem when he says:[102] 'If the numbers which are in things can be classified under no other category, then they would be quantity.' But Iamblichus says: 'Like the other enmattered forms, number is present in, and co-exists with, things that are enumerated; but it does not have its being in them in an unqualified sense, nor is its being supervenient on them by concurrence, nor does it arrive with the status of an accident, but it has some substance of its own along with the things <that it is in>, according to which it determines the things that participate and arranges them according to the appropriate measure.' Iamblichus says that it is not surprising that Quantity <as a form> is a quantity, since it provides itself with what it gives to others. He writes: 'The separable forms of the True Form begin from themselves in a primary manner, and according to their self-directed activity they provide themselves with their own particular form and at the same time endow other things <with it> from themselves.' I think we should note how Quantity <as a form> is said to participate in itself in such a way as to be a quantity, and how Equality <as a form> is equal, and so on. For that which

participates is something other <than that in which it participates>, and then it participates.[103] But number is quite reasonably said to be a quantity. For a differentia consisting of the definite along with the genus of quantity makes the whole a quantity. But number would be a quantity, because the genera are predicated of the species by the same name. Whether number exists according to counting or being counted,[104] it would thus on every occasion belong to the category of quantity. So much for number.

They are also puzzled about speech[105] – how speech can be included in quantity – firstly because it is things that lack combination which are classified under categories, while speech is entirely according to combination;[106] secondly, if speech is of a certain length, it is a quantity as regards its length only *per accidens*, but in so far as it is significant speech which exists according to its impact on the air, whether the speech is the impact or the imprint of the impact which gives it shape, it is in fact either an affection or an action – an action of the imaginative impulse of the leading part of the soul, an affection of the air. Thus speech in vocal expression will belong to the category of either Action or Affection, or to both Action and Affection, but not to Quantity. But if someone were to determine sound and speech only according to the impact, he will classify it under Motion;[107] if according to the air which is impacted upon, there will not be just one category, if in fact the signification and the co-signification[108] and the activity and that in which the activity occurs and takes place are not just one. Iamblichus meets this point when he writes:[109] 'We do not say that the utterance (*phônê*) consists in an impact on the air in an unqualified sense; for a finger can impact on the air, but does not yet make an utterance; but an impact which is of a certain intensity, strength and force, so as to become audible, which is equalized with the measure of our hearing, and which contains in itself excess and deficiency – this would strictly be called utterance. So positing utterance according to the size of the impact and a measure of a certain quantity he reasonably declares that utterance itself is a quantity.' These are the very words that the divine Iamblichus wrote.

I think it is worth questioning why according to this argument the particular objects of both taste and smell would not be quantities. For the quality of a flavour and of an odour, if it is of a such an intensity and kind as to be perceptible, would be able to be both tasted and smelt. But not even Aristotle clearly says that speech is a quantity according to that common feature, but 'because it is measured by long and short syllables'.[110] But they say that this is not sufficient; for not even speech is measured *qua* speech, nor does the syllable *qua* syllable <measure it>,[111] but because it occurs in a longer or shorter time, so that time would be that which measures the time taken, the shorter measuring the longer, the time of the syllable measuring that

of the speech. Therefore the syllable measures the speech *per accidens*.

In reply to this Porphyry[112] says that, when a syllable is spoken in a brief time, it is not for that reason that it is short, but because it has shortness by its own nature. Similarly the long syllable. For the former is spoken in a short time because of the limitation of the breath when the wind-pipe is constricted, the latter in a long time because of the amount of breath when the wind-pipe is made broader, so that the former is spoken in a short time because it is short by nature, and the latter in a long time because it is long by nature. It is possible to pronounce the syllable short by nature over a long period of time, and the syllable long by nature over a short period. For in this respect metric time differs from rhythmic.[113] For the one employs natural lengths, the other exchanges the natures of each. For when it changes the dactylic metre to the rhythm of the paeon, it sometimes employs long syllables as short, and vice versa. But metric time, if necessary, changes the letters – for example it calls *xêros* (withered) *xeros*, and *Dionusos* (Dionysus) *Diônusos*. If then that which is short by nature differs from that which is short in time in these cases, a short syllable is not spoken because of the short space of time, but is spoken in a short space of time because it is short.

Why then, they ask, did he not say that speech is measured by the written characters rather than by the syllables? The answer is that the written characters, when viewed in that light, do not produce enunciation (*ekphônêsis*), but the letters, when thought of according to their potentiality and their expression do have length <and brevity>[114] as the quantity of the speech. That is why a syllable can be made up of a single letter just as much as of a number of letters, and the length or brevity of its enunciation occurs whatever the nature of the letters.

In what sense, they ask, does he say that speech is measured by long and short syllables?[115] For the short syllable is sufficient to measure exactly[116] even the long.[117] The answer is that not every short syllable, by becoming doubled, exactly measures the long. For in fact they postulate a syllable longer than the long. Therefore the long syllable must measure the long, and the short the short. Rather every short syllable is measured by a short one, but not just once and not always by the same one, but on different occasions by different syllables; the long similarly is not always measured by the same long or the same short syllable, but only when that which is measuring exactly happens to be commensurate with the length of what is being measured exactly. But 'is measured' can mean also 'is composed of these; therefore, in that speech is made up of syllables as its measures, it would be a quantity by its very being, but not quantity in an unqualified sense, but a signifying quantity, just as place is a sur-

rounding quantity. Therefore its particular quantity is not supervenient (*epeisodiôdês*), just as in the case of number or magnitude.

But I think it worth asking whether all quantity is a measure as something that measures. Number at any rate measures discrete things, and cubit measures the continuous; but what does speech measure? The answer is that syllables measure the parts of speech, but speech is measured. For quantity is not only what measures, but also what is measured.

In reply to the first of the puzzles,[118] which states that it is things that lack combination which are classified under categories while speech is considered entirely according to combination, it must be said that both noun and verb comprise speech according to that signification of speech, or rather all diction, even if it lacks signification,[119] for it too is measured exactly by the syllables and is for that reason a 133,1
quantity. Secondly, even if speech is according to combination, even so, in that it is a quantity it is classified under Quantity as its genus, just as even the substance composed of many substances is classified under Substance, and composite colour under colour, i.e. Quality. For the classification under which simple entities come, under that also fall the entities composed of those simple entities.

But why, they ask, does he tentatively say: 'If five is part of ten'?[120] The answer is that it is not a question of ambiguity, but because it is possible to divide ten in many different ways, for example into six and four, seven and three, eight and two, and nine and one. Such are the problems and their resolutions concerning discrete quantity.

The same person[121] has the following question about the continuous: 'Body *qua* body, and surface, line and in general magnitude, *qua* surface, line and magnitude, are not quantities, but are said to be quantities because of the fact that they share in being so much and in number; therefore only number is quantity.' But he resolves this in the third treatise[122] when he says that it is the forward progression of the point. If it is to one <dimension>, it becomes a line; if to two, a plane; if to three, a body; and if the extension is much, then it is great; if it is little, it is small; whenever the progression occurs in relation to a common boundary, such a result is continuous, but when the boundary is particular, it is distinct.[123] Therefore magnitude too is a quantity; it is indefinitely so when it is great or small or, in the case of amount, much or little; but when it is defined by some measure or number or cubit it is said to be determinately so.

It is worth noting that even if the line, or in general the continuous quantity, is determined by a measure, it becomes a determined quantity but has this feature by participation, while by its own definition it is an extension only, and not a quantity.[124] For if that because of which it is a quantity is a quantity, it is possible to say that that extension participates in quantity, although it is not a

quantity by its own definition. Perhaps then the continuous is not by its own definition determinate quantity in that it is measured, but because of participation, nor is it indeterminate quantity or quantity in general by its own definition if it is not measured;[125] but it is quantity in that it is separated into one or two or three dimensions by its own definition.[126] For just as number possesses quantity by its being discrete, so too does magnitude by its <three-dimensional> extension.[127] For, I think, that which is apart from what is one and without parts, being likely to be carried into the infinite and the indeterminate, lacked measure according to which it became a quantity, so that it might be defined by becoming a quantity. But being twofold according to the discrete and the continuous, it needed twofold quantity.

But why, they ask, if he has not explained beforehand about place or time, does he use <the terms> as if they were understood? The answer is that he does not propose to expound their substance, since that was the task of natural science, which he concerns himself with in the (work entitled the) *Physics*. But he classified them under the appropriate genus, quantity, according to the common conception of them, which is sufficient for the study of logic.

But perhaps Andronicus,[128] they suggest, did better by making place and time categories on their own, subordinating Where and When to them. In answer to this it must be said that there is one conception of time according to which time is a extension, and another of When according to which the relationship (*skhesis*) of things in time to time is referred to.[129] In the case of place too, and the things in place, the same argument will apply. That is why Aristotle is right to place quantities in one category, while putting in another the relationship to these quantities.

But in my opinion one might justifiably ask why he did not make the participation in Substance or Quality or some other quantity (such as the participation in number or magnitude) special categories – just as he put the participation in time and place in other categories.[130] The answer is that whether the accidents are considered as being in the substance, or whether the substance as being in the accidents, these things are inherent in each other, and for this reason their relationship is taken together, and it is not the case that their substance is one thing and their relationship to substance another. But time and place are in a way considered from outside, and each is itself one thing and the relationship of things in place and time to them another. For in nature time and place seem to be among concomitants from outside, just as matter, form and change belong among things that complete the substance.[131] But perhaps When does not reveal what is in time in an unqualified sense, nor does Where what is in place, but rather the particular character of time and place

in that they are what they are, just as quantities too were counted within Quantity in that they are extensions.

If anyone thinks that we ought to bring time under the category of the Relative as being the measure of movement,[132] he ought to divide measure in two ways, either *per se* or according to its reference to the thing measured, since measure *per se* is the quantity, the principle and the genus of all quantities, but when relative to what is measured it would belong to the Category of the Relative. In this way time as the measure of movement, in as much as it is a measure, would be a quantity *per se*, but in relation to movement it would be a Relative; and it is not surprising that according to various conceptions it is classified under different categories.

After time they find place problematic.[133] If it is that which surrounds body, either it belongs to Substance, as being a quality of substantial form which brings completion to substance, and not a quantity, or else, if it is considered only according to its relation, it will be allocated to the category of the Relative. In that case the same point must be made, that according to its extension, in so much as, being the limit of that which surrounds in that it surrounds that which is surrounded, place is a surface – in that respect we must call it a quantity. But in respect of its relationship to what is surrounded it is no surprise that place is put in the category of the Relative, just like time.[134] The problems, then, and their solutions concerning the first division of quantity have proceeded thus far.

The divine Iamblichus displays his own intellective understanding[135] on this point too; he reveals to us the first principles both of the two species of Quantity and of the single compass of the two, writing more or less as follows: 'Since the power of the One, from which all quantity is generated, is extended unchanged through the whole universe and gives definition to each thing as it proceeds from itself, in that it pervades the whole in an entirely undivided manner, it brings the continuous into being, by making its progression single and uninterrupted, without division; but in that it comes to a halt in its progression at each of the forms, and defines each, and gives each its individuality, in this respect it brings about the discrete; and in respect of being the one strictest cause which encompasses both these activities at the same time it brings about the two quantities. In respect of its universal identity which remains whole in each and all of the parts, it produces the continuous; but in respect of the self-identity in each of them and on account of the fact that it is whole in each of them, it generates the discrete. In respect of the unity of the intelligible quantities among themselves it gives existence to the continuous, and in respect of the unity of the parts which is divided among them it generates the discrete. In respect of its halted activity it fashions the discrete, in respect of its progressing activity it fash-

ions the continuous; since it both rests and progresses at the same time, it generates both. The power of the intelligible measures encompasses at one and the same time in the same embrace both that which rests and that which progresses. As a result if anyone attributes to the intelligible and divine measures what is alien to them, he is deceived by Peripatetic fallacies if he attributes only what is unmoving, by Stoic fallacies if he attributes only what progresses.'[136]

5a15-5b10 Furthermore some quantities are made up of parts that have position relative to each other among themselves [while others are made up of parts that do not have position. For example the parts of a line do have position relative to each other, since each of them lies somewhere; you can distinguish them and say just where on the plane surface each lies and to which of the other parts it is adjacent. Similarly the parts of a plane surface have position, since you can say in just the same way where each lies and which of them is adjacent to which. This is also true of the parts of solid figures and of space. But in the case of number you can never demonstrate that the parts have any position relative to each other, or that they lie anywhere, or say which of the parts are adjacent to which. This is equally true of time; for none of the parts of time persist – and how could that which does not persist have a position? It is better to say that they have an order, since one part of time precedes another. This is true of number too, since in counting one comes before two, and two before three; so in this way the parts of number have order, although you could not say that they have position. Speech is the same, since none of its parts persist – once a word has been uttered it no longer exists so as to be heard; consequently none of the parts of speech can have position, since none of them persist. Therefore some quantities are made up of parts that have position, while others are made of parts that do not.

Only those items that we have mentioned can be called quantities in the strict sense; all the others are quantities *per accidens*. For it is with an eye to the former that we call the latter quantities; for example something white is called large because its surface is large, or an activity or movement is said to be long because the time taken in performing it is long. For none of these can be called a quantity *per se*. For example if you say how long the activity is you will determine it by the time taken – say a year or so; in saying how large something white is you will determine it by its surface measurements – you will say that the white object is just as large as its surface measurements. Therefore only those items mentioned can be called quantities in the

strict sense and *per se*;] nothing else is a quantity *per se*, and at most is one *per accidens*.

After the first division of Quantity he adds a second, according to which 'some quantities are made up of parts that have position relative to each other among themselves, while others are made up of parts that do not have position'. He needed this on account of the fact that the one <division> did not admit all the differentiae. For everything that is made up of parts that have position is continuous, but the continuous is not entirely made up of parts which have no position. For time has no position. Conversely everything that is discrete has no position,[137] but not all that does not have position is discrete. For again time, although not having position, is not discrete. Therefore the second division is included so that the differentiae omitted by the former division can be added, and such a division is called an additional one, being a second division of the same genus according to different differentiae. For just as in the case of the animal the division which distinguishes the mortal and the immortal does not admit the divisions according to rational and irrational, nor vice versa, and for that reason there is need of an additional division, so here too he makes use of the two divisions in order to include all the differentiae in the category of quantity.

It is worth asking what is meant by 'that which has position'. Is it the case that, as some think,[138] that which has position needs the following three things: <(i)> the place in which it is positioned; <(ii)> the co-existence of parts, and not that some should be there while others are absent; and <(iii)> the possession of continuity and conjunction <of the parts> with each other? The answer is that things having position must always have in addition the co-existence of their parts with each other, but not always existence in place, either <(a)> according to the nature of the things or <(b)> according to Aristotle's explanation. For <(a)> things not extended in more than one dimension, like the line, are not in place, and consequently cannot even be put in a place, but they are said to have position. And <(b)> Aristotle did not say without qualification that, having position, they are in place, but 'the parts that have position relative to each other among themselves'. In other words, according to Iamblichus, when all the parts co-exist with each other, then being belongs to the whole composed of them by their conjoint possession. For by saying 'relative to each other' he shows that he does not mean position according to place, but according to relation, contrasting these things with those things that have their being in respect of coming-to-be, whose parts never persist.[139] Strictly speaking position is said of things which are in place, but in fact it is said also of each of the quantities whose parts co-exist, that the parts are positioned in that in which the parts are

parts, as the line is in the surface, and the surface is in the body. For even the point, when they speak of the unit as having position, is positioned not as in a place, but in a line. So each of the continuous quantities, as far as is in its nature, has also its own position. When body is in a place it has also position in a place, but surface has position in a body, line in a surface, and point in a line. For Aristotle clearly states that the parts of the line are postioned in the plane.[140] In general, if he wanted things which have a position to have a position in place, he would not have said that the parts of the place have position; for the place would not be in a place – otherwise we would be looking for place prior to place *ad infinitum* – but place, being like a surface, has its position in body, of which it is the limit as the surface is. Aristotle himself writes: 'Just as the mathematicals have being, so they have position somewhere.'[141]

One might perhaps be surprised that the divine Iamblichus writes the following about place: 'Place could on the one hand <a> be like surface in a body – being its limit it surrounds the body; or on the other hand <(b)> it could be like place in what is surrounded by it – for it could be said to be positioned in what gives it its *raison d'être* as place.'[142] For the place to be in a place, and the pitcher in the wine (for even that will follow according to the same analogy) – surely that will be an incongruity. Further on he writes: 'Perhaps <(c)> place has position *per accidens* because the body that contains it itself has position; the surface too is in place *per accidens*.' Place and surface are the same thing in respect of the substrate, and it is better to understand it in this way according to Aristotle's conception of place. But if someone were to say that place is the dimension that always contains body, but that *per se* it is empty of body and is viewed as something other than body, could not this also be said to be made up of the parts of itself that have position, being continuous and having parts that co-exist with each other? And where could it be positioned? For this is not the limit of anything. So perhaps what is order[143] in the discrete is position in the continuous. For just as the discrete needed order on account of its detachment from unity, so that in accordance with it it might remain close to unity and not be torn apart and confounded in disorder,[144] so also the continuous, falling away from that which is without parts, where all is in uniformity, needed position by means of which it joins different parts to each other according to the congruity of the form, so that they should not be confused.[145] According to this conception it is not necessary for things that have position to have position somewhere, as in something else. For in my opinion the word 'position' (*thesis*), which is said to be derived from the <Greek> words 'run' (*thein*) and 'aim at' (*iesthai*), indicates extension.[146] So much for the things that have position.

In his enumeration of the things that do not have position he puts

speech first and says that this is not positioned anywhere, nor do its parts have position relative to each other. For if things which have position are to persist, and if a word once uttered no longer exists, how could it have position? He thinks the same holds good in the case of time too; consequently he clearly demonstrated that things that 138,1
have position must have parts that persist. 'For how could that which does not persist', he says, 'have a position?'[147] Such things are said to have order in that the first syllable of the word is spoken, followed by the second, just as the first interval of time elapses, followed by the second. Therefore although time is continuous, it cannot be said to 5
have position; for since it accompanies movement, and since all movement has its being in coming-to-be,[148] time is subject to the same condition, and despite its being continuous it has no position because its parts do not persist.

But why does number not have position? For its parts seem to persist. Iamblichus says: 'It is so because the unit is a point without 10
position, and number is made up of units, and not even its parts persist. For even if the things which are counted exist, the number is not anywhere, since not even speech is anywhere just because what is named by it exists. Just as speech exists while it is being spoken, so number exists while it is being counted, and for this reason the parts of neither persist, so they do not have position.' This is what the 15
divine Iamblichus says. But I am surprised that number is said not to have position because its parts do not persist. For it is not the case that, just as speech has its being while being spoken, so number has its being while being counted. For even if no one is counting my five fingers,[149] they are still endowed with number according to their form. It is rather because it <number> is not continuous; for things having 20
position must be continuous and in a series, since in this way the position of the parts relative to each other will be seen – which parts are adjacent to which. For in the triad it is not possible to say which unit is adjacent to which, while in the case of the line it can be seen clearly which part is adjacent to which.

He clearly ruled out having position in the case of speech and time; 25
why did he then not do so in the case of number, instead of saying: 'You would not exactly get position'?[150] The answer is, as the commentators say, that number too appears to admit position on account of what is counted. But perhaps it is a special characteristic of things having position that their parts persist, but speech and time do not possess this characteristic, while number does; and if it had continu- 30
ity, it would be one of the things that have position. But even if speech, time and number do not have position, they do have order, as has been stated, instead of position. In the strict sense order is interpreted in the case of discrete things when understood in terms of earlier and later, as it is also in the case of time, in that the past is prior to the

present, and the present to the future – so that in this case too order seems to be interpreted according to such a distinction. But in a number the order is not in each of its units; for there is no order of the units in the triad; but there is in the aggregate of numbers, because the unit is prior to the dyad, the dyad to the triad etc.[151] In speech the order consists in the fact that some parts of the speech are prior to others, and some syllables to others. But here too I am puzzled as to why the divine Iamblichus, on the question of speech, says that it does not appear to reveal an order if one considers only its length and detailed exposition (*diexodos*) and if it is lacking signification. For why else does one syllable precede another? It is clear to anyone that there is order in the word, and that nobody would speak the name 'Socrates' by pronouncing the syllable '-cra-' first.[152] Turning his mind in speculation to the quantities that have position he says: 'This genus offers a seat to anything whatsoever that is a quantity, both the simpler in compound things and these compounds in simple things. For simple can be taken in two senses; the one, as being bound up with the compound and embraced by it, as surface is by body, has position <in the compound as in> body,[153] while the other as being superior and set apart will provide a seat within itself for compound things. We therefore need in addition position, so that we can conceive of the continuity with secondary quantities.'[154]

I think it is worth noting that according to the first division there were five continuous things, but two discrete. But according to the second <division> there were four things that had position – line, surface, body and place – and three that did not – number, time and speech, of which two, according to Iamblichus, – number and time – had order. Speech, he says, in one way has order, but in another way does not, a distinction he has made earlier, so that there is a third division too according to which some quantities have order, and others do not. He goes on to add a fourth division, according to which some quantities are quantities in a prior sense – such as are so *per se*, like number, size, time and suchlike, of which quantity is predicated in their essences; others are *per accidens*, such as are said to be quantities incidentally, as the white object is said to be much or large, not *qua* white but in respect of its surface, and the man is said to be tall in respect of his height, and movement great either because of the time taken or the space covered. For if anyone were to give its quantity, he would say 'lasting a year' when giving it in respect of its time, and 'a furlong' in respect of its space. So in this way even movement seems to partake in quantity, but not to be a quantity.

Much ambiguity seems to have arisen concerning change, since some say it is classified under the category of the Relative, while others put it under several categories in which it can be viewed (for change as increase and decrease belongs to Quantity, while as quali-

tative change (*alloiôsis*) it belongs to Quality; local movement is different as is substantial change); others, considering the potential and the actual commonly in all the categories,[155] say that change, being the perfect realization of the thing changed *qua* thing changed, is common, according to Aristotle's account,[156] to all ten categories. Others place it in the category of Action and Affection. Plotinus defined movement *per se* as prior to active and passive as a separate category,[157] but Iamblichus wants it to be quantity; he writes: 'If being for change is from intervals[158] and if it has its detailed exposition (*diexodos*) *per se* in interval – it would be a quantity *per se* – since speech too is viewed quantitatively because it is as long as it is as a result of extensions of a particular size, and is measured by length of a particular size and is measurable.' It is not surprising that change is a quantity in respect of the interval, but it is surprising that in respect of the change from potential to actual it can be viewed in all the categories,[159] and can be interpreted variously according to its various natures. But perhaps even the white is not extended over the surface in an unqualified sense, but the white in a process of coming-to-be has a particular extension which extends together with the surface which is something other than the white – just as movement was said to have a particular extension other than time and place. For qualities progressing towards coming-to-be do not keep their formal lack of parts, but descend[160] even *per se* into generated extension.

The same people[161] are also puzzled about the subject matter of the passage, claiming that nothing has position. For if those things whose parts persist are said to have position, and if nothing persists in the universal flux, in the strict sense nothing would have position. The answer is that even if the matter were in continuous flux, and one were to grant this, and even if bodies have additions and subtractions *ad infinitum*, even so there is clearly something which persists, either the second substrate,[162] as some say, or the unique quality,[163] as others say, or the substance according to the form or the indivisible and compound substance, or some such thing which endures throughout the changes and is known from start to finish;[164] for discourse is about the evident, not about what is unclear and in dispute. Secondly by the argument, they say, by which Aristotle says that the white is a quantity *per accidens*, because the surface is a quantity, by this argument the surface too will be a quantity *per accidens* by partaking in amount. But we should remember the earlier passage[165] in which 141,1
we said that the species of quantity according to the amount is one thing, and the quantity according to the magnitude another, which is a particular magnitude and in contrast to the quantity according to the amount. Furthermore, if certain indeterminate predications[166] accompany the prior quantities which are seven in number,[167] in the

way that much and few accompany amount, and big and small accompany magnitude, and if we usually predicate these properly of the *per se* quantities but *per accidens* of the others because of what is prior such as the surface or the time, then it is clear that surface and time are revealed as quantities in a prior sense, since it is because of these that what are attributes of quantity co-exist with the other things.

5b11-6a9 Furthermore there is nothing contrary to Quantity [– since in the case of determinate quantities it is clear that there are no contraries; for example there is no contrary to two or three cubits, or to a surface, or to anything like that – unless someone were to say that much is the contrary of few, and great of small. For none of these is a quantity, but belong among relatives, since nothing is said to be great or small *per se* but by reference to something else; for example a mountain is called small and a grain large because the latter is larger and the former smaller than other things of its own kind. Therefore the reference is to something other, since if they were called small or large *per se* the mountain could never be called small or the grain large. Similarly we say that there are many men in a village, while we would count several times their number in Athens as few; we would say that there were many people in a house, while many times their number in a theatre would be reckoned as few.

Furthermore two cubits, three cubits etc. signify a quantity, while great and small do not signify a quantity but a relation, for great and small are considered in relation to something else. So it is obvious that these belong among relatives.

Furthermore, whether or not you count them as quantities, there is nothing contrary to them; for how could there be a contrary to something which cannot be taken *per se* but only by reference to something else?

Furthermore, if great and small are to be contraries, the result is that things will admit contraries at the same time and things will be their own contraries; for it happens that the same thing is great and small simultaneously – small in comparison with one thing, and great in comparison with something else – and the consequence is that the same thing is both great and small at one and the same time and admits contraries simultaneously. But nothing apparently admits contraries simultaneously; for example, although a substance may appear to be receptive of contraries simultaneously, nothing can simultaneously be ill and well or white and black; nor can anything else admit contraries simultaneously. Yet the result is that things

are their own contraries; for if great is contrary to small and if the same thing is simultaneously great and small, then a thing can be its own contrary. But for something to be its own contrary is impossible.] Therefore great is not the contrary of small, nor much of few.

In the case of Substance, after the division into its species and differentiae, he proceeded to its particular features and concomitants; he now does the same in the case of Quantity. First he explains what the features are which belong in common to Quantity and the other categories, and then in the same way considers its particular features. He accordingly, then, states that 'There is nothing contrary to Quantity.'

Perhaps it would be better, therefore, before a discussion of Aristotle's words, to deal with each of the species of Quantity and see in what way they have no contrary, and in what way what appears to be a contrary in each of the species of Quantity does not belong to it as a quantity, but in terms of another category under which it is brought. For example line,[168] in so far as it is line, admits of no contrariety; but in so far as it is a line of a particular sort it admits of the straight and the curved when these are considered in relation to the line. Again, surface, in so far as it is extended in two dimensions, has no contrary; but roughness and smoothness are considered in its case not *qua* surface, but *qua* surface of such-and-such a kind according to its quality – just as it is white or black not *qua* surface but *qua* surface of a particular sort. Body too in so far as it is body, i.e. in so far as it has three dimensions, has no contrary. For, as the divine Iamblichus says, the bodiless is not the contrary of body, because contraries belong within the same genus, and these are not within the same genus. But perhaps nothing prevents their genus from being the same, i.e. substance.[169] For we say that of Substance there is on the one hand body, on the other the bodiless. But if the bodiless were to signify denial and privation, it would not be the contrary of body; for the contraries belong to affirmation. But if it too 142,1
demonstrates affirmation, it is either better than body and a cause of body,[170] or else it is worse and has its being in body.[171] In either case they would not be contraries, since contraries need to be of equal power and in the same way particular to the appropriate genus.

Moreover there is nothing contrary to time in so far as it defines movement by its own measure. But if anyone thinks that day is contrary to night he should realise that time does not cause the contrariety in so far as it is time (for time is the same, since when it is day in one place it is night in another), but in so far as the air is made light in one place and dark in another. In so far as it is of such a kind, it is not a quantitative, but qualitative.[172]

There is nothing contrary to number either. For it is determined and has no contrary, for example two or three; for everything that is determined is something single, and in this respect, like the equal, does not admit being more or less; but the unequal does admit more and less because it is indeterminate. But what answer would we give if someone were to say that the odd and the even are contraries, making these the two species of number, and claiming that the one is the continuous species of Quantity itself, and the other the discrete, positing these as contraries?[173] The answer is that even in the case of Substance the division is into opposites.[174] For within the genus animal there was the rational and the irrational as well as the mortal and the immortal; yet we agreed that there is nothing contrary to Substance, since it is one thing to consider contrariety which is to do with the substance and the quantity – it being accidental according to the qualities in them – and another thing to consider the fact that there is no contrary to Substance itself or Quantity itself.

Even speech, in so far as it is a quantity, has no contrary. For truth and falsity belong to speech in so far as it is significant, but not in so far as it is uttered in articulation and is measured by long and short syllables.[175]

Place is the remaining quantity,[176] and there is some dispute about this – that perhaps it admits contrariety in terms of up and down, which seem to be species or parts of place. But some do not think that 'up' and 'down' exist by nature, but that they are considered according to their relationship to us; they say that 'up' is what is over our heads, and 'down' is what is below our feet, and they reckon the same thing up and down according to the different relationships. It is clear that in this way they would not be contraries, since contraries do not belong to the same thing at the same time. Others do not reckon 'up' and 'down' according to relationship but according to the extension of the universe, both that from the centre to the limits, and that from the limits to the centre, for these are different by nature. But in reply to these people it must be said that 'up' and 'down' do not signify place, but the category of Where, just as yesterday and today do not signify time, but When, i.e. that which is according to time. That is the opinion of Andronicus too.[177]

But perhaps up and down are differentiae of place, and yesterday and today of time – but not in so far as place and time have them as quantities; rather place has them according to position and its local character, which has been presented in the category of Where, and time according to the measures of movement. For place and time are presented in the category of Quantity only in terms of their extension, while in terms of their particular characteristics place comes under the category of Where, and time under that of When. Consequently

in so far as place is quantity it does not have 'up' and 'down', but it has these in so far as it is a particular quantity.[178]

Yet Aristotle says:[179] '… unless someone were to say that much is the contrary of few, and great of small'. For these appear to be contrary quantities. But he shows first that (a) they are not quantities but relative to something; and secondly that (b) whether or not they are quantities, they are not contraries. That (a) great and small are not quantities but relative to something he demonstrates as follows:[180] 'If small things are called great, and great things small, when compared with things of like kind, then nothing will be great or small *per se*, but will have their reference to something other and will be relative to something. But if the antecedent, then the consequent.' In this syllogism he passed over the hypothetical premiss[181] as being obvious. For if great things are called small, and small things great, it is clear that nothing will be such *per se*. But he demonstrates the additional assumption[182] from the fact that the mountain is called small and the grain large when compared with things of like kind. Then he demonstrates the same in the case of much and few as well, saying that what would be counted as many in the village or the house relative to the village or the house would be few relative to the city or the theatre respectively. He adds a second proof from the force of signification. For 'three cubits' and 'great' do not signify something like, but the former signifies a quantity, and the latter a relation. He constructs his proof aptly from the significations, since the categories are distinguished according to them. This syllogism too is of this kind: Everything that displays quantity is a quantity; much and few, great and small, do not display quantity; therefore they are not quantities.

Then he establishes circumstantially that (b) whether or not they are quantities, they are not contraries. He shows this as follows: great and small, much and few, are not what they are *per se*, but are related to something other; but such things are not contraries, because contraries are *per se* and exist by their own nature.

He then proves the same point by a *reductio ad absurdum*: 'If great and small are to be contraries, the result is that things will admit contraries at the same time; but that is impossible.'[183] The hypothetical premiss is obvious from the statement that the same thing is great and small.

He then draws another conclusion from the same assumption, which is even more absurd, that the same thing is its own contrary. 144,1 This is clear, if the same thing is both great and small. But it is impossible for it to be its own contrary, since contraries are destructive of each other – but nothing is self-destructive according to nature. It is clear that nothing prevents things that are relative to something from having opposites at the same time, because they are related to

different things in different respects. But contraries cannot co-exist, since they conflict with each other.

'Perhaps', says Iamblichus, following Andronicus, 'great and small, much and few, are not only relative to something, but also indeterminate quantities. For whenever we say "great" we reveal an indeterminate quantity. For it is not revealed by how great a magnitude, or by what magnitude, it is great, or by how great an amount it is much; but when we say "greater" or "smaller" then they are considered in terms of their relation to each other. Aristotle at any rate considered great and small only according to their being relative to something, just as Plotinus considered them only in their strict meaning; for he says[184] that what is great relative to something else is called great instead of greater.'

Certain people challenge Aristotle for saying[185] that 'what cannot be taken *per se*, but only by reference to something else' has no contrary; they say that there are many contraries among things that are relative to something, for example knowledge and ignorance, virtue and vice. 'So perhaps', says Iamblichus, 'it was inadequately expressed, and the full argument would be as follows: what does not exist *per se* but is referred to something else, is the contrary of none of those things to which it is referred; for the large grain is referred to the small grain, and the large is not the contrary of small.'[186] Perhaps it would be better to say that Aristotle did not remove all opposition (*antithesis*) from quantity; for he did not remove opposition in terms what is relative to something, but only that in terms of the contrary. Consequently even if there is some *opposition* within quantity in terms of what is relative to something, that does not mean that Aristotle's argument, which says that there is no *contrary* to quantity, is shaken.

We ought to know that within quantity there are both the determinate and the indeterminate; what is already circumscribed and thought of according to a determinate measure is determinate, e.g. two, or three, or one cubit long, while that which is without circumscription and where there is uncertainty as to the extent to which it is more or less – that is indeterminate, e.g. many, few, great, small. Indeterminate quantity itself is spoken of in two ways, one in an unqualified sense, one relationally.[187] That which is not referred to something else of like kind but is thought of in terms of its own difference from things not of like kind, is spoken of in an unqualified sense; an example is when we say that the small mountain is great, not referring it to things of like kind but to the house, which is great when referred to things of like kind – then we call it large in an unqualified sense. For it is said to be larger than the house by participating in size *per se*.[188] But things that are compared with their like and which have great and small in terms of comparison are considered not in an unqualified sense but in terms of their relation

to something. The same argument fits the case of many; for amount is one thing when considered *per se*, and another when considered in terms of a relationship to something else. Consequently such things admit more and less, and contraries belong to them simultaneously.[189]

The divine Iamblichus wants the *per se* great and small, and the *per se* much and few, to be considered among the *per se* immaterial forms, the former in terms of their excess of power, the latter in terms of the amount of pure seminal principles (*katharoi logoi*);[190] he wants to view relational <great and small, many and few>, which are spoken in terms of comparison, among the enmattered forms, which include the more and less, and at the same time the contraries that are simultaneously related to one thing and another. He writes: 'As the form approaches matter a certain power, a mixture of the two, comes-to-be; for in so far as this power partakes of the form, what is enmattered is likened to it and becomes great and small; but according to its own indeterminacy it partakes of the more and less, relationship to something and change to contraries. This being the case, people like Plotinus, who thinks that all these terms are used in an unqualified sense, do not conceive them correctly; for common speech often uses them where there is a relation, and those who call a grain large are speaking relationally in terms of the comparison with what is of like kind, which reveals what is larger. "But magnitude", says Plotinus,[191] "is not one of those items relative to something; but the larger is, just as the double is." Now this is not the case; for the conception of magnitude extends both to magnitudes that are *per se* and to magnitudes that are in relation to each other. For nothing would be called larger if it did not partake of magnitude and display excess in terms of magnitude.[192] "But many", says <Plotinus>,[193] "is nothing other than a large amount considered numerically, so that it would not be relative to something." Now it would be easier to set up in opposition another form of number which is said to be a quantity relative to something in which the ten proportional relationships[194] are included; for in this both the more and the less are to be found. But even if someone were to say that amount is the expansion of number in an unqualified sense, and that few is the contraction of number,[195] even so in the procession of the different numbers there is a certain consonant difference in their relation to each other according to which they exceed or are exceeded, and are more or less. In the case of the continuous, as the point proceeds either a short or a long distance there come to be, many differentiations of relationship, both of excess and deficiency, as it
146,1 <the point> comes to a halt in its progression quickly or slowly, defining its excess in relation to its deficiency either rationally or irrationally. For just as the unit, proceeding forward to become many or few, creates the variations within numbers, just so the point too

produces the different relationships within magnitudes. "But what is the limit of the progression in terms of the much and the few, the great and the small? For it does not proceed to infinity, but has some measure even in its progressing."[196] The answer is that it is clear that each form draws along, together with its own character, some measure of quantity commensurate with that character. For the form brings along with itself not only a shape, but also a magnitude which arrives in the matter together with extension. This also has latitude (*platos*)[197] "down here" on account of what is to some extent indeterminate in its enmattered nature, but if it far exceeds the limit either in the direction of more or less, then it is thought to be monstrous, like the Cilician woman seen in our day, whose height was four cubits, and dwarfs which have been born in many places. Therefore something indeterminate in terms of excess or deficiency passes into each genus and species among enmattered things, but the same seminal principles (*logoi*) pervade everything, which, when partaken of, cause what partakes to be of the same character as themselves, e.g. magnitude, beauty, *et al.* Whatever partakes of them unconditionally will be endowed with form in an unqualified sense, while those in some relationship will be among things relative to something – just as if someone were to call <something> warm in an unqualified sense, but warmer in a relational sense, and some things <existing> *per se*, and others in something else, and some things immaterial, and others enmattered.'

The divine Iamblichus, paying attention in a more intellective manner to what has been said about quantity, writes: 'This is the common conception about all quantity: that which is divisible among the consituent parts is quantity; for this extends equally to amount and to magnitude. Part of this is what is countable, part what is measurable, and each is spoken of indeterminately and determinately to some extent; for example length is spoken of determinately, because it is within limits, but indeterminately, because it is unclear up to what quantity the limits are determined. But if all things which are in accordance with participation in the same genus are determined, then it makes no difference if one thing is extended in one dimension, another in two, and another in three. For it is not for that reason that we must deny the participation in the common genus, not even in the case of numbers, because the dyad is prior to the triad, and the triad to the tetrad, and so on. For the dyad does not create the triad as something after it by being prior, but the prior and the posterior are reckoned in their case in one way, while it is in another way that participation in the genus is inherent in them, according to
147,1 which it includes the others in it neither more nor less.'

In all this some things seem clear and well said; but I do not at all follow why he says that that which is divisible among the constituent parts is quantity. For that seems to me to be indicative of a whole

rather than of quantity. The conception of a whole is one thing, that of quantity another; for to have whole and parts belongs to substance, not in so far as it is a quantity but in so far as it is a species (*eidos*) or an individual. That is why Aristotle says:[198] 'We should not be worried by the fact that the parts of substances are present in the whole as in a subject.' Therefore if substance has parts, one according to the species (*eidos*) to complete the species, as the animal has the rational and the mortal, the other according to the individual to complete the individual, as it has head, hands and feet, it is clear that they are divided into their constituent parts; consequently it is not this that is a particular feature of quantity, but the one according to which it is possible to say that each thing, e.g. two, three or two cubits, is a quantity. For measure is the particular feature of quantity. For even if a quantity is indeterminate, it is said to be indeterminate in the sense that the measure is not yet known, and if something infinite is supposed, it is supposed to be infinite in the sense that it is measured with no finality. For as I said earlier[199] not even extension *per se* seems to me to be a quantity, but rather a quality. But the line, the surface and the body are quantities *per se* because they are extended in one, two and three dimensions. Perhaps the divine Iamblichus defined quantity in terms of the divisible, but not only in terms of divisibility into parts. For what is divisible into parts is divided not only as a whole but also as one into many – which belongs to quantity.

6a12-18 Contrariety seems to belong within Quantity especially concerning place. [For people make 'up' the contrary of 'down', saying that the region towards the centre is 'down' because the centre of the universe is at the greatest distance from its outer limits. They seem to derive their definition of the other contraries from these, since the members of the same genus which are at the greatest distance from each other] are defined as contraries.

He has said that there is no contrary to Quantity; he now very systematically presents for consideration things that appear to be quantities and contraries.[200] When these possibilities have been refuted the argument that shows in general that Quantity has no contrary will be finally secure. Earlier on,[201] having suggested great and small as contrary quantities, he showed that they are not quantities but relative to something, and that even if one agreed that they were quantities, they were not contraries.

Now he presents place for consideration,[202] saying that contrariety within Quantity seems to apply especially to place – but he is not satisfied with that, in my opinion.[203] For he himself clearly said that there is no contrary to determinate quantity. But the 'up' part of place is determinate quantity.[204] So he says that not even in this case is

there contrariety, although there appears to be. How is this so? Is not 'up' opposed to 'down'? The answer is that it is not opposed in so far as it is a quantity. For a thing is a quantity in so far as it is a surface or two-dimensional, and in this respect it contains no opposition (*antithesis*). But if anything, in so far as it is relative to something, or is somewhere, the opposition between 'up' and 'down' comes into effect; for some of things that are relative admit contrariety, just as they also admit 'Where'. It was stated on many occasions that many of the things that exist are referred to different categories in different respects. It would perhaps be better to say that in relation to the universe 'down' is where heavy things gravitate towards, and 'up' is where light things rise towards, and that 'down' is the centre and the middle, and 'up' is what is round the centre and the middle (for this is how 'down' and 'up' are considered in a sphere), while in relation to ourselves 'down' is what is below our feet and 'up' is what is above our heads.

This being the case, only things that are said to be 'up' or 'down' in relation to ourselves are relative to something; for on each occasion they change together with us and are not 'up' and 'down' by nature; but 'up' and 'down' in the cosmos are relative to something in so far as they depend on each other for their being, but in so far as by their own nature they are such as they are said to be, never change round or are receptive of contraries,[205] and are furthest apart – in those respects they are contraries; consequently neither in so far as they are contraries in relation to something – which is what he appeared to be saying earlier – nor even more in so far as they are quantities,[206] are they in these respects either relative to something or contraries – but both these, i.e. being both relative to something and a contrary, will concur in the same thing, quantity seen as place in terms of the stated differentiae – but not *qua* quantity.[207]

He himself shows this by saying not that contrariety belongs 'to quantity', but is 'within quantity'; and by saying not 'to place', but 'concerning place'; and by saying not simply 'belongs', but 'seems to belong'. For such finer distinctions make it plain that, just as the straight and curved are not contrary to each other in so far as they are quantities, but that they and anything else are accidental to existing quantities, just so these things[208] are accidental concerning place; and just as the animal in itself has no contrary but is marked off according to contrary differentiae, (just so) place too is divided according to contrary differentiae. Therefore (the) contrariety did not come to be in so far as it is a quantity, but in terms of other things accidental to place already existing as a quantity. Since contrariety also occurs in connection with other quantities, it is to place that he attributed that which is contrary in the highest degree, on account of the fact that the other contraries are characterized by spatial separation. Therefore they say that contraries are what are furthest apart

from each other; but in the case of quality the separation is formal, while in the case of quantity it is dimensional, which is more strictly called separation; it is from this that the others are derived.

But if that which is at the greatest distance is a contrary, and if in a sphere the greatest distance is that across the diameter, why does he not say that these extremes, rather than the centre and the circumference, are contraries? The answer is that in terms of distance the extremes of the diameter are contraries, but in a sphere and in the cosmos, in terms of the form itself, the extremes of the diameter, being on the circumference, are both of the same nature and differ in no way from each other, while the centre is distinct from the circumference in terms of the form itself. That is why Aristotle himself[209] said that 'it is at the centre that the distance to the limits is at its greatest', in order to take 'up' as a whole, as being of the same nature, in relation to 'down' as a whole. In order that no one should think that 'up' and 'down' in relation to ourselves is meant, he presented for consideration the centre and the circumference which have an immutable difference by nature. 149,1

But in what way will the body which is in circular motion be 'up'?[210] For this[211] is the place of fire and what is light (in weight). The answer is that by nature the upper place belongs to fire, but *per accidens* it will be the place also of the fifth substance;[212] for circular <movement> is particular to it, and this is the movement of what surrounds – but it is accidental to this to be higher up than fire, as Iamblichus says, when he says that this is some alien accident and not, as it were, something which arises as a consequence in the process of coming-to-be; but since it is beyond what is 'up' and contains it, for this reason it would be rightly called uppermost.

But 'up' and 'down', they say, when they are not said in relation to something, are obviously contraries, being parts of place, and not differentiae predicated of parts. For the centre is 'down', and the circumference is 'up'. These, being furthest apart from each other, define the natural local movement of light and heavy things.[213] But if, as they say, place were the cause of movement just so far and of the termination in the composition and motion of bodies, one would be unable to say that place *per se* defines moving things. But if the composition of bodies and their movement according to their essence define the limits of place, then place would not be *per se* nor would it have these as its parts.

There has been much difference of opinion even about place. For some say that it is defined in terms of its relation to something; for in so far as there is something that contains body, this has been thought of as place, and that which contains is spoken of, in reference to that which is contained, as being relative to something. Others, claiming that it is an extension, say that it is a quantity and not

relative to anything. Some isolate 'up' and 'down' in the universe and posit them as contraries, while others do not even agree that they are contraries and deny that they exist at all in the universe; for they say that they are among things relative to something, like 'right' and 'left'.

150,1 The Pythagoreans say that place is the limit of all things,[214] seeming by the form of words to be saying the same as Aristotle, but in fact differing very greatly. For he says that place is the limit of what contains,[215] in so far as it contains what is contained, which is why he denies that the outermost heaven is in place.[216] But they say that 5 place is the limit of each thing that exists, calling place the limit of the form of each thing, in which it is fixed and by which it is sustained. When place is defined more generally and intellectively in this way, then 'up' must be considered in terms of its excess of being since it surpasses in purity, power and all such things, while the opposite applies to 'down'. It is clear that it is possible to consider these things 10 and to comprehend them according to the individual nature of each generally and unconditionally in this way in all cases. That is why the power that sustains and holds everything together is fixed in the heavens according to the superiority of the limit of all things.

> **6a19-25** Quantity does not appear to admit more and less [such as two cubits; for one thing is not more two cubits than another. Similarly with number; three is not said to be more three than five, nor any three more three than any other three. No period of time any more a period of time than any other. More and less cannot be applied at all to any of the items we mentioned], so 15 that Quantity does not admit more and less.

Quantity has this resemblance to Substance as well – I mean not admitting more and less. For it, just like Substance, does not partake of indeterminacy in terms of more and less, because it is held fast in 20 a determinate form. By means of this it is shown that there is no contrariety in Quantity. For whatever does not admit more or less could not even be said to have contrariety. For the slackening and diminution of the pre-existing form constitute the beginning of a change to the contrary, since enfeeblement occurs by the admixture of the contrary. That is why more and less belong to things that have 25 a contrary, and vice versa. Aristotle establishes his proof that it does not admit more and less from induction, by going on to discuss both determinate quantities – when he mentions two cubits and the number three – and indeterminate quantities – when he says that 'no time is any more time than any other'.[217]

I think that the reason why quantity does not admit more and less is the fact that other things are defined and measured in terms of 30 quantity. If then quantity becomes that which defines other things,

how could it partake of indeterminacy in terms of more and less? But if we say that one magnitude is greater than another, or one number larger than another, and if we consider that in this case more and less are important (for the Caucasus is greater than Hymettus – more so than Mount Athos is – and seven is larger than three more so than 151,1
five is), then we shall say that more and less belongs in terms of relation. But even if the Caucasus is more great, and Athos less great and Hymettus even less great, one might agree that because of the indeterminacy even quantity admits more and less as if it were a contrariety; for what is said to be great not in relation to something 5
but *per se* is opposed to what is said to be small *per se*. That is Andronicus' position.[218] But Plotinus denies that great is in relation to anything at all, but says that we often say 'great' instead of 'greater' improperly.[219]

> **6a26-35** An especially particular feature of Quantity is that it is said to be equal or unequal. [For each of the quantities we have mentioned can be said to be equal or unequal; for example a body can be said to be equal or unequal, as can a number; so too with time. Similarly each of the items mentioned can be said to be equal or unequal. Anything else which is not a quantity could certainly not be said to be equal or unequal; for example a disposition certainly cannot be said to be equal or unequal; rather it is said to be similar, as is the case with white, which certainly cannot be equal or unequal but can be similar.] So to be called equal or unequal would be an especially particular 10
> feature of Quantity.

Having given those concomitant features that Quantity has in common with the other categories he now presents its particular feature, which belongs to all Quantity but only to Quantity,[220] i.e. that a quantity can be said to be equal or unequal. He again shows this by induction, going on to discuss both continuous and discrete quantities 15
one by one.

That this is a particular feature of Quantity you could show as follows: quantity, in so far as it is quantity, is measurable; it is the nature of the measurable on some occasions to be measured by the same measures <as something else>, on others by greater or lesser ones; that which is measured by the same measures <as something else> is equal to it, and what is measured by greater or lesser ones is unequal; therefore a quantity in so far as it is a quantity can be said to be equal or unequal. For in so far as it is a quantity, it is 20
measurable; in so far as it is measurable, these features belong to it; for being measurable belongs to other things because of quantity; for wood is not measured *qua* wood, but *qua* magnitude and quantity;

therefore equal and unequal are strictly said of quantity, and not strictly of other things. For white is not strictly equal to white, but is said to be so by a misuse of language (*katakhrêstikôs*); strictly white is like white, as all things defined in terms of quality.[221] In this way too, then, a disposition (*diathesis*) would not strictly be said to be equal to a disposition, but like it. If then this feature belongs to all quantities, as he showed by induction, and to them alone, as he now shows – for the equal is not strictly spoken of in the case of quality, but the like is, nor in the case of substance in so far as it is a substance but in so far as it partakes of magnitude and quantity – it would be quite reasonably (be) said to be a particular feature of quantity.

Archytas (himself) too says that the equal and the unequal are a particular feature of quantity, and says that it is seen in amount, magnitude and downward thrust (*rhopê*),[222] and that none of these is a species of Substance or Quality. So he himself says that the equal and the unequal are defined according to the three differentiae of quantity. But Alexander follows Aristotle in positing downward thrust not within quantity, but in quality,[223] and says that equal and unequal are not strictly spoken of in the case of heavy things, but by a misuse of language. For like and unlike will be more suitable terms in their case too, just as it is in the case of other qualified things. He says also that being exactly measured[224] is quite commonly spoken of in their case: 'For when, in the case of whiteness, one thing is said to be ten times whiter than another, it is not exactly measured by the tenth part of the whiteness, but by that of the surface in which the whiteness inheres. But if the whiteness is exactly measured in this way *per accidens*, so too will the heaviness. For it is the body in which the weight is that is exactly measured; for the heavy object was heavy because of quality, not magnitude, since everything that was heavier than the light was *ipso facto* larger, at least if it was also of greater dimensions. But if it is not exactly measured, then the equal and the unequal would not be spoken of in the case of what is heavy and what is light.'

That is what Alexander, for the most part in his own words, says; the more recent commentators who follow Archytas in positing three types of quantity say that weight is not to be measured by means of body; for in that case the measure of body and of weight would be the same. In fact the measure of body is on many occasions of a contrary nature to that of downward thrust, as in the case of lead and wool the measure of the body can be unequal but the downward thrust equal; or conversely the mass can be equal but the downward thrust unequal. In the case of almost all bodies, in fact, the downward thrust is unequal to the mass; for one species of quantity is in the magnitude, but another is in the downward thrust;[225] for the mina and the talent differ in species from the foot and the cubit, so that, in that they are

quantified by some other quantity, they are neither qualities nor are they included in any of the other types of quantity. But Alexander, for some reason I cannot guess, assuming that in principle a thing is measurable only in terms of its magnitude and not its downward thrust, concluded that downward thrust was not a quantity but a quality. Yet if one heavy thing differs from another in terms of quality, the variation would have occurred in some of the differentiae of characteristics, just as this is seen in the case of other things that vary in their qualities. But in fact downward thrust, in so far as it is downward thrust, has the same particular feature; but because it tips the scales this much or that much it varies according to the calculation of its convergence to the centre.[226] These, then, are the three species of quantity, and the equal and the unequal are spoken of in three ways in reference to them.

Some people find difficulty with what Aristotle says; if the like and unlike are not a particular feature of quantity but of quality, how can magnitudes be said to be alike? For we can have like triangles and like quadrilaterals drawn by geometricians, and it is clear that they can also be unlike. So perhaps just as the equal belongs to qualities 153,1 in terms of the quantity which is co-inherent in them, so too the like belongs to quantities in terms of the quality in them. For the triangle is a quantity in terms of the mensurability of its extension, but it is also a quality in terms of its shape[227] and particular character according to which it also possesses likeness – just as it possesses equality in terms of quantity. That is why like things are often unequal, since likeness belongs to them in one respect, but equality in another.

Others find a difficulty understanding why he removed contrariety from Quantity but then postulated the contrariety of the equal and the unequal as part of its particular character.[228] They resolve the difficulty by saying that the opposition of the equal and the unequal is not of them as contraries, but relative to something considered in terms of quantity, just as like and unlike are relative to something in terms of quality. In general, whatever the nature of the equal and the unequal, they are not the same as quantity in such a way as to allow quantity to have contrariety within itself, but they supervene on quantity. But if anyone positing the equal and the unequal in the case of substances were to say that one tower is equal to another, either from the aspect of disposition or of function, equality belongs to the towers not in so far as they are substances or qualities, but in so far as they partake of quantity.[229] In the case of potentialities and actualities it would be worth asking what sort of measure there is – is it a number or the quantity of the downward thrust?

A third difficulty is how the equal and the unequal can be said to be a particular feature of quantity if they do not belong to the whole of quantity. For neither the unit nor the point can be said to be equal

or unequal. For if things measured equal by the same measure are equal, and things measured unequal are unequal, and if neither of these two things can be measured equal or unequal by the same measure (for they would no longer be without parts), then it is clear that neither is equal or unequal. Some resolve this difficulty by positing these things as quantities and showing that they are both equal and unequal. I think a proof would be like this: the unit is the measure both of itself and of other units an equal number of times – just once; therefore the units are equal; likewise the point; for if every point matches every other point, it is the measure of itself and of the others just once.[230] Others resolve the difficulty by not accepting that the unit and the point are quantities; for if they are neither continuous nor discrete quantities, but if all quantities consist in these, they would not be quantities, nor therefore would they be measurable, so that it would not be compatible to apply the terms equal and unequal to them. For the unit is the principle of number, but not a number, and the point is the principle of magnitude, but not a magnitude, so that both are principles of quantities but not quantities. So they are also principles of the equal and the unequal and are therefore neither quantities nor equal nor unequal. They are in no way derived from them, since they are their principles.

Since Porphyry tries, on this question, to follow Andronicus in articulating the concept of the one, the unit and the point not when spoken of in terms of Ideal Forms but when evident in terms of perception or reasoning (which the present undertaking is concerned with), let us too try to follow what he says. He writes: 'When we say that a length or a breadth or a depth is one, we must consider in what way we mean "one". Now it is clear that when someone looks at a body which is a continuous whole in itself containing all its parts, but is circumscribed individually and separated from all other bodies, we call such a continuous body "one" and the continuity of its parts with each other "a unity". In this way we conceive of what is numerically one, but we recognize what is one in species and of the same species <as other things> by separating off what is accidental to the individuals according to the differentiae in them. But when it is not only one, but also exists in the absence of anything else of the same genus or species or in general akin, then we call it "unique", the term "unique" now indicating something compounded out of the one and the condition which depends on its being isolated from other things and on its own. For uniqueness, when coming together with the one, is called unique. It makes no difference whether we say uniqueness or unit; for these are both said of the one underlying thing. But nothing analogous to uniqueness is said in the case of two and three etc., because each number consists in an amount. Therefore the one has a condition in terms of its contrast with all the others when it is set

apart from them. But when some say that the point is a unit with position and that the unit is a point without position, we should in this case not understand them as meaning that the unit becomes a point by the addition of position. For the unit, while still remaining a unit, does not take on position, nor does the point, while still remaining a point, lose its position. It appears, then, to reveal only an analogy of sameness; the real being of the point is different from that of the unit, and the point is the beginning and limit of sizes no less than the unit is of numbers. One might get a clear concept of the point from reduction; but the beginning of the reduction comes from a natural concept universally applicable: body has length, breadth and height, and the part of anything is taken as a one in one way, and the limit is so taken in another. The part has the same dimensions as the whole – the part consisting in the body being extended in three dimensions, that consisting in the surface in two, and that consisting in the line in one. But the limit is always one dimension less than what is limited; for if the line exists in one dimension, its limit will not have even that, so that it will be without dimensions or parts.'

The negations and verbal inflections within Quantity are like those in the case of Substance, but in the case of amounts there is a difference.[231] For it is not possible to make plural expressions about what is singular, nor singular expressions about what is plural; but things are said to be two cubits long, many and great in just the way that something is said to be two cubits long, great and much. Things are said also in a privative sense in the case of quantity; for the limitless is spoken of in terms of the privation of having limit; similarly the partless,[232] because although they are in the class of things that possess, they do not possess, the one in the case of number, the other in the case of line. Just as modal adverbs like 'justly' and 'finely' are derivatives from qualitative adjectives, so some numerical adverbial expressions like 'in how many ways?' e.g. 'in three ways', and others like 'how often?' e.g. 'twice', 'thrice', 'often' and 'seldom' are derived from quantitative expressions. Each thing is said to be one and whole, but the point and the unit are not said to be wholes. For a whole is that which is brought to completion in all its parts, but these are partless.

On these points Iamblichus explains in outline how it is possible to find the particular feature of Quantity and of the other categories one by one. He writes: 'It is necessary to take the innate accidents of each category of existents and to consider these as commonly inhering in the case of all the species of each category; for example excess and deficiency are together inherent as something innate in all Quantity, and are commonly inherent in every species of Quantity, and it is in these in particular that we must seek the particular feature of Quantity.[233] Since we posit that which is excessive and that which is

defective as one conjoint unequal feature, and since we oppose the equal to this, for this reason it will quite reasonably be possible to say that the equal and the unequal are the particular feature of Quantity. In the case of Substance the same special character is considered
25 innate and common in all substances which are in a state of coming-to-be, i.e. a potentiality suitably equipped for the reception of contraries; in the case of quality the feature of similarity and dissimilarity is inherent in the same way; and in the case of the other categories it is equally possible to discover the particular feature of each.' But let us proceed with Aristotle to the next category.

Notes

Abbreviations

DK = H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th edition revised by W. Krantz, Berlin 1952
KRS = G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven and M. Schofield (eds), *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2nd edition, Cambridge 1983
LS = A.A. Long and D. Sedley (eds), *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, (2 vols) Cambridge 1987
LSJ = H.G. Liddell, R. Scott and H.S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th edition, Oxford 1940

Works of Aristotle

DA = *De Anima* (*On the Soul*)
EN = *Ethica Nicomachea* (*Nichomachean Ethics*)
GC = *De Generatione et Corruptione* (*On Coming-to-be and Passing Away*)
Metaphys. = *Metaphysica* (*Metaphysics*)
Phys. = *Physica* (*Physics*)

All references to Porphyry, Dexippus and Ammonius refer to volumes in this series.

1. Aristotle has discussed Substance (*ousia*) in chapter 5. For Simplicius' commentary see Chapter 5 above.

2. The word used by Aristotle throughout this part of the *Categories* to denote quantity is *posón*, the neuter form of the indefinite adjective *posós*, whose literal meaning is 'of a certain size/quantity' (accented on the second syllable, unlike the interrogative adjective *pósos*, 'how much/great?', accented on the first syllable). Greek regularly uses the neuter form of an adjective as a noun; for example *kalon* can mean 'something beautiful', and (with the addition of the definite article) *to kalon* can mean 'the beautiful thing'. However it was not uncommon to use this latter form as an abstract noun, so that *to kalon* can equally mean 'Beauty'. Hence *poson* in Aristotle's text usually means 'a quantity' and *to poson* either 'the quantity', 'the quantified thing' or 'quantity'; Ackrill is scrupulous in translating *poson* as '*a* quantity' (see the notes in Ackrill (1963) 77-8 and 91). Later writers tend to use the specifically abstract noun *hê posotês* to refer to quantity, and Aristotle himself uses the term once (in the plural) at *Metaph*. 1028a19. Both Plato and Aristotle use the parallel abstract noun *poiotês*, and Aristotle distinguishes between qualified things (*poia*) and qualities (*poiotêtes*) at *Cat*. 10a27. Simplicius seems to use *poson* to denote 'something quantified' or 'a quantity', and *to poson* and *hê posotês* as the abstract noun 'quantity'.

3. The order of presentation of the categories was a topic much debated by, among others, commentators such as Dexippus (64,15ff.) and Porphyry (100,8ff.). The main points at issue were whether Quantity or Quality should have pride of place after Substance, and where the Relative should fit in. Simplicius reviews the various arguments down as far as 122,30. See n. 227 in Porphyry.

4. Simplicius frequently attributes arguments or viewpoints rather vaguely, as here, where he is referring to those who support the claim of Quantity over that of Quality.

5. The Greek verb is *sunuphistasthai*, cognate with the noun *hupostasis*, which became a standard technical term among the Neoplatonists, with the meaning 'substantial existence/real being' (see Fleet (1995) n. 215 on 12.10).

6. The Greek phrase is *tôi onti*, which I have translated as 'Being', since the sentence is reminiscent of Plato's *Parmenides*, e.g. 142Bff., and has a strongly metaphysical ring to it. But it is equally possible to translate *tôi onti* (which consists of the definite article and the present participle of the verb *einai* ('to be')) as 'that which exists', i.e. any sensible substance. In Neoplatonic terms the two primary characteristics of Mind, the Second Hypostasis, are being and, in so far as it is the first remove from the One, plurality; in Aristotelian terms a substance, in so far as it is a 'this something' (*tode ti*), has as its primary characteristics being and countability; cf. n. 9.

7. That Quantity has no contrary is discussed by Aristotle at 5b11-6a19; that it does not admit the more and the less, at 6a19-26; that Substance has no contrary, at 3b24-33; that it does not admit the more and the less, at 3b33-4a10; that Quality does admit contrariety, at 10b12-26; and that it does admit the more and the less, at 10b26-11a15.

8. cf. *Metaph*. 1028b36, where Aristotle envisages a layer of properties of bodies such as length, breadth and height which are more fundamental than all other properties such as 'active or passive processes or capabilities': 'if we strip away length, breadth and height we are left with nothing except what is made definite by these'. At *Phys*. 209b6 Aristotle examines briefly a definition of place which conflicts with his own and which he attributes to Plato. The implication of the whole passage is that at the most fundamental level of analysis matter is pure sizeless extension. The Neoplatonists sought to identify this sizeless extension with the Receptacle of Plato's *Timaeus*, which they saw as prime matter. Richard Sorabji (1988) n. 9 says: 'In Philoponus … the first subject is prime matter conventionally conceived (i.e. not as extension) and the second subject is prime matter endowed with three-dimensional extension.' Cf. Ammonius 54,5: 'Prime matter, which is formless and incorporeal, first receives the three dimensions and becomes a three-dimensional object called the second subject, and next receives its qualities.' Hence Quantity is more fundamental to Substance than any other property.

9. In this and the next line I have translated the Greek word *ousia*, which derives from the participle of the verb *einai* ('to be'), as 'substance', in conformity with its translation in the few lines above (cf. n. 6), but perhaps 'being' would be more appropriate here, a meaning which it can bear.

10. The Greek word which I have translated here as 'change' is *kinêsis*, which is often used to denote a particular type of change, movement. Other words in common use for 'change' are *metabolê* ('change' of any sort; 121,8: *tês posotêtos* ('of quantity')), and *alloiôsis* ('qualitative change'; 121,6: *kata poiotêta* ('in terms of quality')). See *Cat*. ch. 14 for the distinctions mentioned here by Simplicius.

11. The form here is clearly the immanent Aristotelian form, not the transcendent Platonic form. See Charlton (1970) 70-81. The growth or 'getting bigger' of the

child is a part of its change from potentiality to actuality, which is described by Aristotle at *On the Soul* 417b6 as 'a development into its real self or fulfilment … a different type of alteration'.

12. This seems to be a reference to the same work used by Ammonius, of whom Professor Sorabji says: 'And he is taken in by a pseudo-Pythagorean treatise on categories, probably from the first century BC, which purports to come from Archytas. Since the real Archytas preceded Aristotle, this gives Ammonius the impression that Aristotle did not invent the scheme of ten categories, but merely gave it its particular order'. (Introduction to *Ammonius: On Aristotle's Categories*, trans. S.M. Cohen and G.B. Matthews (1991) 4, in this series.) For a commentary on the text of pseudo-Archytas *On the Structure of Discourse* (*peri tou katholou logou*) see Szlezák (1972), where the text of pseudo-Archytas is interfaced with the passages of the Commentators, who appear to be drawing from this work, according to a compilation of Pythagorean sources in Thesleff (1961).

13. The Greek word *pôs* ('something like') suggests that Archytas is not being reported *verbatim*, although here and on other occasions in Simplicius' commentary Archytas' purported words are given in their original Doric Greek, whereas the text of *On the Structure of Discourse* is preserved in Attic Greek, which had become the common Greek language (*koinê*) of the post-classical world.

14. The Greek word *hupokeisthai* and its cognate *hupokeimenon* can be rendered in English either by '(to act as) substrate', a term familiar to readers of Aristotle's *Physics*, or more generally by '(to act as) subject'. I have in most cases chosen the former.

15. Simplicius uses the neuter (*tois allois*) rather than the feminine, which would agree with the feminine noun *katêgoriais* understood; substance acts as substrate to all other things, whether viewed within a categorical framework or not.

16. Secondary substance (i.e. genus and species) is predicated of a substance, while members of the other categories are said to be in it, as Aristotle explains at *Cat*. 1a16ff.

17. Ammonius (*in Cat*. 29,5ff.) lists eleven ways in which one thing can be said to be 'in' another.

18. The 'something' is the substance, the 'such-and-such' the quality; this argument shows that Quality must come after Substance, not that it must come before Quantity.

19. i.e. *ousia* ('being' or 'substance' – see n. 9). The language of 'being' and 'participation' is strongly Platonic. For knowability as the hallmark of being cf. Plato *Timaeus* 51Eff.

20. Simplicius is making a distinction between sensible and intelligible substance; in either role intelligible is prior to sensible.

21. It is according to forms that intelligible substances are known; the 'particular features' (i.e. qualities) of sensible substances are derived from intelligible forms. Therefore, using knowability as the criterion, quality is second to substance 'according to its kinship with it'.

22. 'The composite' (*to suntheton*) is Aristotle's regular way of denoting the sensible entity, the compound of form and matter.

23. In the compound of form and matter it is the form which plays the more significant role (cf. Aristotle *Metaph*. 7, 1029a5). Quality is to do with the form, while Quantity is to do with the matter, so that Quality is prior to Quantity.

24. The language is again Platonist. Quantity is seen as the principle of division and pluralization in the procession outwards and downwards from the One towards the indeterminacy of matter, while quality retains its integrity

through its kinship with the forms. 'The unembodied principles' are the Forms. For a fuller discussion of this argument see Dexippus 64,23-66,13, where he takes sides with Aristotle: 'All this I have advanced by way of argument, since it was necessary to counter on an intellectual level men of intellect, whose attention is fixed on the intelligible realm, and who are taking account of that realm as well as the sensible; but if we must pose Aristotle's intentions more truly, we should rather take our start from this point: the nature of Quantity is more akin to the body and its extension than is that of Quality, so that since there are more features in common between Quantity and Substance than between Quality and Substance, it is reasonable that Quantity should be ranked second after Substance' (65,27-66,5 tr. John Dillon).

25. Or: '… so also the quantified thing would come after the qualified, because it has its very character and individuality from the quality'. A thing owes its substantial existence more to form than to matter. In the language of Aristotle *Metaph*. 7, a substance owes more to its formal identity, to its being a 'this something' (*tode ti*) than to its material identity, to its being 'separable' (*khôriston*).

26. Simplicius' meaning seems to be that a substance owes its uniqueness – 'being called one' – to the qualities that define it, not to any quantitative aspect.

27. cf. Porphyry 100,11-28 and Dexippus 64,15-24 (where John Dillon says that Dexippus wrongly attributes an argument of Iamblichus to Plotinus).

28. Iamblichus (*c.* 250-325 AD) was a Neoplatonist whose commentary on the *Categories*, quoted extensively by Simplicius in this commentary, is lost. It was itself based on Porphyry's lost commentary entitled *To Gedalius* (*ad Gedalium*). Porphyry's version of this argument is at 100,20ff. Simplicius on several occasions refers to Iamblichus' interpretation of the categories as 'intellective' (*theôrêtikos*). Professor Sorabji (*The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD*, vol. 3, sect. 3, iv) says: 'As explained by Iamblichus' pupil, Dexippus, his idea was that sensible substances do indeed depend on intelligible substances which are primary, but since the intelligible ones cannot be directly described, they are called "substance" metaphorically and by analogy with sensible ones.' See Dillon (1997) esp. p. 77: 'It will be seen that it is Iamblichus' purpose to salvage Aristotle, reconciling him both with his perceived doctrine elsewhere (as, for example, in the *Metaphysics* and the *Physics*), and with that of Plato and the Pythagoreans. The aim is to establish a metaphysical framework for the interpretation of the *Categories*, revealing the hidden levels of truth inherent in it.'

29. Simplicius often prefaces his own contribution to the discussion with the word 'perhaps' (*mêpote* or *isôs*).

30. The indivisible unit in a number (for example, one of the units making up the number seven) is like the unit prior to number in that it is a unity, but unlike it in that it is not unique.

31. Matter is similar to the primary cause, the One, in that both are beyond determination, but dissimilar in that the One is prior to all determination, while matter is posterior.

32. cf. Simplicius *in Cat*. 206,9ff.

33. cf. *Metaph*. 7, 1028a36-b12.

34. Simplicius does not seem to be observing a distinction in expressing non-essential predication, which is signified by Aristotle by the use of the simple genitive case and which Simplicius uses here, and essential predication, which is signified by the use of the preposition *kata* followed by the genitive.

35. Aristotle says at *Cat*. 6a27 that 'It is a particular feature of quantity to be called equal and unequal', although he does not include the double and the half, the discussion of which is in the following chapter on Relatives.

36. For the distinction between differentia and species see Dexippus 27,2ff. and 48,20ff. and Frans de Haas (1997) 180-250.

37. Aristotle's word is *logos*, which I have rendered as 'speech'; others translate 'language', 'statement' etc.

38. Ackrill (1963) 93 says: 'Aristotle's inclusion of spoken language as a primary quantity seems odd. The length or shortness of a syllable – what we still call its *quantity* – is a matter of the length or shortness of time taken by its utterance; so speech is not a primary, non-derivative owner of quantitative properties.' But Aristotle does explain that speech is discrete in that it is made up of individual quantitative components, syllables (which *qua* quantities can be measured); so Simplicius' distinction between the individual men in a crowd and the individual syllables in speech seems unnecessary. The confusion hinges around the Greek word *polus*, which in the singular is usually translated as 'much' and can be applied to both continuous and discrete quantity; Aristotle's example of the former is time, of the latter speech (where I have translated *polus* at 123,9 as 'manifold').

39. Sophocles *Ajax* 646.

40. Simplicius is abbreviating or misquoting Aristotle here (unless he has a variant text in front of him): the OCT at 4b21 reads *to men ek thesin ekhontôn pros allêla tôn en autois moriôn* (the one consists of internal parts which have position relative to each other), whereas Simplicius quotes Aristotle as saying *to men ek thesin ekhontôn tôn en autôi*.

41. cf. Porphyry 101,4-13.

42. *Phys.* 227a10ff.; cf. 231a21-233b33.

43. *Cat.* 4b26.

44. Porphyry has an interesting discussion of the various senses of *logos* ('speech') at 64,28ff. He distinguishes between *logos prophorikos* (external speech) and *logos endiathetos* (internal speech). See Atkinson (1985) 50-4 for a full discussion of these (Stoic) terms.

45. *Blituri* is a nonsense word as early as the second century BC (see *SVF* 3.210) and becomes a standard example in philosophical writing (DL 7.57).

46. cf. Porphyry 101,26.

47. Probably in the lost *ad Gedalium*.

48. *Cat.* 5a5.

49. Herminus was a Peripatetic commentator, one of the teachers of Alexander of Aphrodisias. See Moraux (1984) 361-3.

50. The parts of a solid body when notionally divided are connected by what Porphyry (at 103,1) calls 'a quasi-surface' (*hoion epiphaneia*).

51. Solid angles are those produced by three or more lines, e.g. the corner of a cube.

52. See Ross (1924) vol. ii 344-5 for a discussion of Aristotle's terminology of continuity and contiguity.

53. Lucius was a forerunner of Nicostratus, who was a second-century AD Platonist. See Simplicius *in Cat.* 1,19ff., and J. Dillon (1977) 233-6 (also at 127,30 with Nicostratus, and at 156,17 *hoi peri ton Loukion*). See also Sorabji (1980) 98 and (1990) 71, 76 & 80-1.

54. *Cat.* 4b24-5. Cf. Porphyry 103,18ff.

55. For Aristotle's discussion of place (*topos*) see *Phys.* 4.1-5, and of time (*khronos*) *Phys.* 4.10-14.

56. Aristotle does not appear to say this in so many words in this part of the *Categories*.

57. For time as the extension (of movement) cf. Zeno in *SVF* 1.26 and LS 1.304-13.

58. For the statement that 'time is the number of movement' see *Phys.* 4, 219b1 and Hussey (1983) 150ff. At *Metaph.* 5, 1020a26ff. he says that both time and movement are quantities *per accidens*. See Ross (1924) vol. i 323-5.

59. The 'certain people' are represented by Plotinus, who discusses a similar problem at *Ennead* 6.3.13.12-15, and Dexippus, who deals more precisely with this problem at *in Cat.* 67,7ff., where he shows how the discrete can be considered prior to the continuous. For Porphyry this does not seem to be a problem, since he considers that the continuous and the discrete are differentiae, not species, of quantity (*in Cat.* 100,29ff.).

60. The implication is that, since the discrete is by nature prior to the continuous (according to the argument of 'certain people'), it must also be greater in that genus embraces species. Frans de Haas comments: 'The rule that a series consisting of things prior and posterior has no common genus was usually based on the notion that in those cases (e.g. the number series, or the dimensional figures) the higher is part of the lower, not on the notion that the higher embraces it. Cf. *Metaph.* 3, 999a6-14, *DA* 1.1. Hence Iamblichus can be seen to argue explicitly against this limited notion of genus at 146,28-147,1, adding an order in terms of participation in a (different kind of) genus.'

61. The Greek word is *hekaston*, which is usually translated as 'each'. Here it must mean 'each singly without the others', i.e. 'any one <of the species>'; the removal of the continuous, which according to them is posterior to the discrete, does not cause the removal of the discrete.

62. The implication here is that the continuous and the discrete are the sole (and opposite) species of the genus, and do not stand in a relationship of posterior and prior; their removal would therefore cause the removal of the genus.

63. The removal of the prior causes the removal of the posterior (cf. Dexippus 67,15), so with the removal of the prior and the consequent removal of the posterior, the genus too is removed. But Dexippus shows how things can be prior and posterior in one sense and yet still be equal species within a genus, as does Simplicius below at 126,30ff.

64. Three, as a number, is discrete, whereas the triangle is a continuous shape in that it is not divided into discrete parts.

65. The Greek verb *sunepipheretai* (literally 'is carried along with', as I have translated it) can also bear the meaning 'is implied by'; the discrete (the <number> three) is implied by the triangle, as he says in the next sentence, although he varies the verb and says *suneispheretai* (literally 'is carried together into'), with no real difference of meaning. He switches back to *sunepipherei* ('introduces') in the next part of the sentence.

66. Aristotle gives as his examples of the discrete number and speech (*logos*), which can be said to be and be thought of *per se* (Plotinus offers these as candidates for the title 'essence of the soul' at *Ennead* 3.6.1.28), while his examples of the continuous, line, surface, body, time and place, are all parasitic on substance and are therefore *per accidens*. This problem is not raised by Plotinus or Dexippus.

67. The grammar is puzzling here. The subject of the three verbs 'have' at 126,31, 'are' and 'communicate' at 126,32 would appear to be the same, i.e. 'the discrete and the continuous'. Both are neuter nouns, and according to the grammatical convention whereby neuter plural subjects are followed by singular verbs, we should expect the singular *ekhei* at 126,31, not the plural *ekhousin* of the manuscripts (we have the expected singulars *estin* and *koinônei* at 126,32). Possi-

bly the former verb has been attracted into the plural by the feminine nominative plural *hai atomoi* in the previous line.

68. There is no intervening species between them and quantity.

69. Dexippus 67,25-30 explains: 'In the same way, after all, although assertion is by nature prior to negation, when we focus on them in the process of expressing opinions and true and false statements, we conceive of them as falling under the same genus, recognizing that in one way they possess priority and posteriority, but also that, in so far as they share in the same genus, they admit of being divided off as coordinate species' (tr. John Dillon).

70. *Cat*. 4b20.

71. *Cat*. 4b24.

72. The discrete and the continuous.

73. *Ennead* 6.1.4.5.; Plotinus actually writes: 'If they say that the continuous *qua* continuous is quantity, the discrete would not be quantity. But if the continuous <is quantity> *per accidens*, what common feature will each have to make them quantities?' Simplicius regularly paraphrases his sources.

74. The reference seems to be to *Ennead* 6.3.13.1-3, but Simplicius is again giving a rather loose summary. Kalbfleisch suggests 6.3.13.14. Cf. Dexippus 66,18-20.

75. Platonic language; the sensible instantiations of the forms are often called their images, e.g. by Plato at *Timaeus* 37D & 92C.

76. For Lucius and Nicostratus see n. 53.

77. The Greeks did not have an understanding of gravity in the modern sense; the Greek word *rhopê* I have rendered as 'downward inclination'.

78. Athenodorus of Tarsus, a first-century BC Stoic who wrote a work criticizing Aristotle's *Categories*.

79. Ptolemaeus of Alexandria, a second-century AD polymath best known as an astronomer, one of whose works 'On Inclinations' (*Peri Rhopôn*) is mentioned by Simplicius at *in De Caelo* 710,14.

80. Or possibly: '… which are <to be placed in the category of> Quality, not quantity'.

81. The mina and the talent were used by the Greeks both as units of currency and as weights. As the latter the mina = 431 gr., the talent 25.9 kg.

82. The white of a surface is only a quantity as an accident of the surface.

83. *Cat*. 6a26ff.

84. Fragment 35 (Harteust) = Fragment 1 (DK).

85. For Iamblichus' triadic metaphysics see A.C. Lloyd in Armstrong (ed.) (1967) 297-301. Dillon (1997) 71-2 discusses this passage.

86. Motion in the sublunary world.

87. The motion of the heavens.

88. Again the language is Platonic. At *Ennead* 3.6.5.25 Plotinus talks of the excessive downward movement (*neusis* – Iamblichus uses the verbal form *neuei* here) of the soul, and at 4.8.4.26 of its self-willed gravity (*autexousios rhopê*) – although the language is figurative.

89. Cornutus was a freed slave from North Africa who came to Rome in the first century AD as a teacher of rhetoric and Stoic philosophy.

90. The question is raised by Plotinus at *Ennead* 6.1.4.13ff. and discussed by Dexippus at 68,12ff.; Dexippus appears to be following Plotinus more closely than Simplicius. Perhaps Simplicius is using some intermediate (lost) source (hence the 'they') which modifies what Plotinus says, and with which he is here (129,13ff.) taking issue. It is also worth noting that Simplicius does not name Plotinus as the author of this problem, whereas he does mention Plotinus specifically at 129,28

and 130,7. Plotinus' point is that Aristotle's failure to distinguish between numbers *per se* and numbers instantiated in sensible substances leads to paradoxical conclusions and ultimately to the denial of the possibility of a category of quantity. Dexippus dismisses Plotinus' argument as being irrelevant on the grounds that such a distinction is entirely foreign to Aristotle's whole conception.

91. The Greek word *pósos* is interrogative, meaning 'How much?'; here it seems to be used as if to prompt an answer such as 'just so much', i.e. a definite quantity. When written *posós* it is indefinite, and is the form used by Aristotle to denote indeterminate quantity, although of course accents were unknown to him; cf. n. 2.

92. cf. Dexippus 68,17-69,4: 'For it (Number) has one essence when considered on its own which is ignored by Aristotle (as Plotinus maintains), while it is the other that manifested when we call Number a quantity' (68,17-19 tr. J. Dillon).

93. Simplicius here states that the distinction between (indefinite) number *per se* and (definite) number instantiated in sensible objects (which he denotes by the Greek words *pósos* and *tosósde* – rather than *posós* – respectively) is a false one, adducing two arguments, (a) at 129,15ff. and (b) at 129,19ff. For the definite (*hôrismenos*) character of the contents of the Intelligible World see Fleet (1995) 152.

94. There is a lacuna in the Greek text at this point; I have adopted Kalbfleisch's suggestion. The argument thus seems to be: one of the first species of quantity is amount (*plêthos*) – the other is magnitude (*megethos*) – with the differentia being the discrete; a second species is number, with the differentia being the definite. Thus number is discrete and definite quantity, which is a refinement of Aristotle's position, where number is merely discrete quantity – but a necessary refinement to meet the Plotinian objection that Aristotle ignores indefinite number.

95. *Metaph*. 6. 1031a28ff.

96. Aristotle mentions formal number (*eidêtikos arithmos*) at *Metaph*. 13, 1086a5ff., where he contrasts it with mathematical number (*mathêmatikos arithmos*); see Ross (1924) vol. 2 459 and Annas (1976) 187 for differing interpretations of the passage.

97. *Ennead* 6.1.4.27-8.

98. Enmattered forms, the 'copies of realities always leaving and entering he Receptacle' of Plato's *Timaeus* 50C4. Cf. *Timaeus* 52C6.

99. Unitary (*monadikos*) number is contrasted with number in sensible objects by Plotinus at *Ennead* 6.3.13.6. Cf. *Ennead* 3.7.9 for a discussion of number as measure.

100. *Ennead* 6.1.4.28-33. Again Simplicius paraphrases. The same problem is discussed by Dexippus at 69,5ff.

101. This sentence is given a full discussion by Dexippus at 69,25ff. See Dillon's note *ad loc*.

102. *Ennead* 6.1.4.34-6. Here Simplicius gives part quotation, part paraphrase.

103. The meaning seems to be: since anything which participates in a property clearly does not have that property before it participates, then the property must be in something else, i.e. the form.

104. i.e. as form or as existing in a particular.

105. The second of the two problems is raised by Plotinus at *Ennead* 6.1.5.1ff., but the origin of the first is unclear; it is again ascribed to a vague 'they'. See the discussion in Dexippus 69,37-70,13.

106. Aristotle discusses combination (*sumplokê*) briefly at *Cat*. 1a16ff. It is the

subject of *De Interpretatione*. That only uncombined things are to be put under categories is stated at *Cat*. 1b25 and 2a4ff.

107. Aristotle does not offer a category of Motion, but says (at *Phys*. 3, 200b33ff. that it is common to certain categories. It is one of Plotinus' five categories. Cf. Plotinus *Ennead* 6.1.5, where he discusses speech as the impact on air and reviews the implications *vis-à-vis* the category of Quantity.

108. The term 'co-signification' (*sussêmantikon*) is the one used by Plotinus at *Ennead* 6.1.5.14, where he says (if we accept Igal's conjecture) that signification belongs to the category of Action, cosignification to that of Affection.

109. Dexippus quotes this passage of Iamblichus in his discussion of the problem at 69,37ff.

110. *Cat*. 4b35.

111. Kalbfleisch recommends the insertion of the verb 'measures <it>' (*metrei*), following the suggestion of Brandis. Cf. the conclusion of the argument at 131,26-7.

112. This argument, in slightly different terms, is given by Dexippus at 70,17ff. Dillon *ad loc*. suggests that Dexippus is following Iamblichus, who is adapting Porphyry. He says (n. 30 *ad loc*.): 'There is a mystery here. What seems to be referred to is Plotinus' next *aporia* in 6.1.5 (ll. 14-26), which is no longer about *logos*, but about time itself. Either Iamblichus (and Porphyry before him) has misunderstood the text of Plotinus, or we have here evidence of another text than ours.'

113. The distinction between metric and rhythmic time is made by Aristoxenus at *Harmonica* 32.

114. I follow Kalbfleisch's suggestion that the phrase 'and brevity' has fallen out of the text.

115. *Cat*. 4b33.

116. Simplicius uses both the simple verb *metrein* and the compound form *katametrein* in this paragraph; if there is a distinction it is that the former means 'to measure' and the latter 'to measure exactly'. It is not always easy to decide whether prefixes on verbs indicate a shade of meaning, or are just a sort of linguistic inflation of the period. It is worth remembering that the metres of classical Greek (and Latin) poetry are determined by strict rules of syllable length.

117. Porphyry says at 101,30-7: 'All speech is composed of nouns and verbs and the other so-called parts of speech. All these are composed of syllables. Syllables are either long or short: long syllables have a ratio to short syllables of two to one. Two and one are numbers, and number is discrete quantity, so syllables are discrete quantity as well. But speech is composed of syllables, and a compound thing is of the same kind as the things that constitute it. So speech is quantity, and a discrete quantity.'

118. First presented at 130,33.

119. e.g. the nonsense-word *blituri*.

120. *Cat*. 4b28.

121. Plotinus. The problem is raised at *Ennead* 6.1.4.11ff. – again Simplicius' version is a paraphrase.

122. *Ennead* 6.3.12.13ff.: 'there is a quantity when the unit, i.e. the point, progresses'. Simplicius completes the argument in the following sentence.

123. This last point is made by Plotinus at *Ennead* 6.3.13.1-2. For 'distinct' (*diêirêmenon*) we might substitute 'discrete' (*diôrismenon*).

124. cf. n. 8. Simplicius is making a threefold distinction: (i) *poson*, a definite quantity; (ii) *megethos* (magnitude), which invites numerical quantification even if only in terms of the number of dimensions; (iii) *diastasis*/*diastêma*, extension ignoring numerical quantification. See further Sorabji (1988) 7-10 for Simplicius'

distinction between magnitude and extension; the latter is viewed separately from any particular size. Plotinus *Ennead* 6.1.4.11 distinguishes similarly between *megethos* (magnitude) and *poson*.

125. i.e. if it is nothing more than pure extension.

126. i.e. its definition as a line, plane or body.

127. 'What is one and without parts' is the Platonic intelligible world; 'that which is apart from what is one and without parts' is the sensible world. Simplicius' dynamic language here suggests that the contents of the sensible world are saved from being 'carried into the infinite and indeterminate' i.e. matter, only by the imposition of measure or determinacy. The language is reminiscent of Plato's distinction between Determinacy and the Indeterminate at *Philebus* 16Cff. and 23Cff.

128. Andronicus of Rhodes was a Peripatetic philosopher responsible for reawakening interest in the works of Aristotle in the first century BC. He came to Rome where he eventually became head of the School, arranging Aristotle's writings in the order that has come down to us. Others take Where and When to be *at* a place, *at* a time, whereas place and time themselves are separate categories but instances of Quantity.

129. Simplicius is suggesting that When is the relationship of something to time.

130. cf. Plotinus *Ennead* 6.1.14.20ff.; why not have a multitude of categories formed on the analogy of *at* a time, e.g. *under* a substance.

131. 'Concomitants from outside' are non-essential characteristics, while those 'that complete the substance' are essential. The Greek verb *sumplêroun* (to complete) is used as a technical term. Cf. Porphyry 95,22-5: 'Essential qualities are those that are complements of substances. Complements (*sumplêrôtika*) are properties the loss of which destroys their subjects. Properties that can be gained and lost without the subject being destroyed would not be essential' (tr. Steven Strange). Form and matter are the basic Aristotelian components of a substance; in addition a natural substance has within itself the principle of change (as discussed in *Phys.* 2.1-2). But cf. de Haas (1997) 201-9.

132. For time as the measure of movement see Aristotle *Phys.* 4.12 220b15ff.

133. A problem raised by Plotinus at *Enneads* 6.3.11.6ff.

134. cf. Plotinus *Ennead* 6.3.11.5-10.

135. cf. n. 28.

136. The Peripatetic fallacy concerns the Unmoved Mover of *Metaph.* 1071b3ff; the Stoic fallacy is to do with the Active Principle (see LS §44). For a discussion of this passage see Dillon (1997) 72; he concludes: '[Simplicius] thus satisfactorily puts both of the chief rivals of Platonism in their place, criticizing on the one hand the Peripatetic Unmoved Mover, and on the other the dynamic Active Principle of the Stoics.'

137. i.e. no discrete entity (such as number and speech) has parts that have position relative to each other. Footnote (a) in the Loeb Classical Library edition of *Categories* says: 'These divisions are not co-extensive. Line, plane and solid and space are all called continuous quantities: all, too, consist of such parts as have interrelated positions. Time is a continuous quantity; its parts have, however, no positions in reference the one to the other.' Cf. Porphyry 105,6-11: 'So according to the first division there are five sorts of continuous quantity: line, surface, body, time and place; and there are two sorts of discrete quantity: number and speech. According to the second division there are four kinds of quantity the parts of which have position: line, surface, body and place: and three kinds that do not exhibit position: number, speech and time' (tr. Steven Strange).

138. See Porphyry 104,12ff.: 'Three things must be conceived in the case of things whose parts have relative position: the place where the parts are located, the parts themselves, which do not disappear, and the continuity of the parts with one another' (tr. Steven Strange). John Dillon considers that the case for these three requirements originates with Porphyry.

139. Simplicius is attempting to come to Aristotle's aid against those (Porphyry included) who think that 'position needs the following three things …' (136,12ff.); see n. 135. Simplicius is suggesting that Aristotle's own words do not make these three demands. He admits that requirement (ii) holds, ruling out 'those things that have their being in respect of coming-to-be, whose parts never persist' (such as speech, number and time; cf. 138,6-7); but he shows that requirement (i) need not be applied in an unqualified (*haplôs* 136,20) or a strict (*kuriôs* 136,26) sense, so that 'these things' (136,25) such as point and line can be included. Requirement (iii) is discussed at 138,20.

140. The main discussion of this is to be found at *Topics* 6.2. Cf also *Cat*. 5a17-20. The Greek verb *keisthai* ('to be positioned') is cognate with the noun *thesis* ('position').

141. A reference of unknown provenance, possibly *GC* 323a1-3 or *Phys*. 208b22-5.

142. Iamblichus seems to be attempting to explain Aristotle's words at 5a24, 'so too … with the parts of place'. He offers three possibilities, (a), (b) and (c), of which Simplicius rejects (b) and (c).

143. cf. Porphyry 104,14-16: 'When some of these conditions hold but others do not, the thing in question can possess an order (*taxis*), but it cannot have the sort of position that quantities have' (tr. Steven Strange).

144. So that a series or collection can remain something over and above its parts. Cf. Iamblichus' statement at 136,22-3. Simplicius' dynamic language here (n.b. the past tenses) has Neoplatonic overtones; he is making a parallel between quantification in its two forms and the procession from the One and the accompanying pluralization.

145. Professor Richard Sorabji (1988) ch. 12, 'Is space inert or dynamic?' explains how Iamblichus (according to Simplicius) sees place and time as having the function of saving things from collapsing into total co-incidence.

146. A good example of Simplicius' spurious etymology.

147. *Cat*. 5a28.

148. cf. 136,25.

149. The text appears to be a little corrupt here. The verb 'count' is in the third person singular, in either the middle or passive voice, and the noun phrase 'my five fingers' is in the accusative case; thus there is no apparent subject for the verb. Kalbfleisch's suggestion *arithmei tis* ('if someone counts …') seems sensible. The argument is that even if no one actually counts out my five fingers, they still remain a countable quantity in the way that an unarticulated thought does not.

150. *Cat*. 5a32-3.

151. Simplicius is explaining Aristotle's statement at *Cat*. 5a30-3: 'So with number; one is counted before two, and two before three. In this way <number> would have some sort of order – but you would not exactly get position'. See Ackrill (1963) 94.

152. Iamblichus' reservation is that in certain cases, i.e. when one considers merely the mechanics of speech production and when the word or phrase under consideration is meaningless, then no order is revealed. So the claim that speech reveals order is not always correct. It is not clear whether 139,8-10 is Simplicius' reply or a continuation of Iamblichus' argument.

153. There appears to be a corruption in the text here; I adopt Kalbfleisch's suggestion of adding *tois sunthetois hoion en*.

154. Frans de Haas comments: 'I would suggest that the superior and primary quantities are the intelligible principles of the enmattered, secondary, quantities. Simplicius lists two kinds of simplicity: like surface in body as more elementary (within the same realm), and of unitary intelligible principles in relation to their products for which they "provide a seat within themselves" as all principles embrace in their own way everything to be derived from them. This, I would suggest, is the second kind of simplicity. It is an interesting thought that the notion of position (in this second context) is needed to be able to conceive how the two realms themselves are continuous in a sense.'

155. At *Phys* 3.1 Aristotle defines movement (*kinêsis*) in terms of the actualization of a potentiality.

156. *Phys*. 3, 201b8.

157. *Ennead* 6.1.15.12-16, 6.3.21.1ff.

158. i.e. intervals of time.

159. See Sorabji (1988) 198. Simplicius, in various passages (see footnote *ad loc*.) cites Theophrastus in support of his criticism of Aristotle on this point. Sorabji summarizes: 'Theophrastus is like Aristotle in defining change as the actualization of potentiality, but unlike him in adding explicitly that this occurs in *every* category. Simplicius rightly or wrongly takes Theophrastus to mean more than the four categories allowed in Aristotle's earlier statement.'

160. The Greek verb *hupobainein* is a common Neoplatonic term for the descent from unity to plurality.

161. Possibly Lucius and Nicostratus.

162. For second substrate see Simplicius *in Cat*. 48,11-16. Examples of second substrates are bronze, Socrates. As opposed to quality-less prime matter these are qualified subjects of properties. See Sorabji (1988) ch. 2. Cf. Simplicius *in Cat*. 48,13-16 and Philoponus *in Phys*. 579,3-5 and *contra Proclum* 426,22-3.

163. i.e. unique and lifelong: a Stoic term – *to idiôs poion*, described at LS vol. 1 174 as 'qualitatively unique individuals, as designated by proper names like "Socrates" '. These are to be contrasted with 'the commonly qualified', and the two together make up the second of the four Stoic *genera*.

164. These last three are alternative descriptions for the same thing. It is form which Aristotle particularly backs as persisting through growth at *GC* 1.5. Cf. also Philoponus' comment on this at *in GC* 102,31-111,13. For further discussion see Sorabji, 'Soul and Self in Ancient Philosophy', n. 119, in James Crabbe (ed.) *From Soul to Self* (London 1999).

165. 123,1ff.

166. e.g. much and few, big and small – which do not give exact magnitude.

167. Line, surface, body, place, time, number and speech.

168. The three examples that follow – line, surface and body – are one-, two- and three-dimensional respectively. Cf. the parallel discussion in Porphyry 106,11ff.; he shows that properties such as straight and curved 'are not properties of line as such or insofar as it is a quantity, but are accidents of it, insofar as it it is a line that is qualified in a certain way' (tr. Steven Strange).

169. Simplicius examines the possibility that body and the bodiless are within the same genus, since contraries must be within the same genus as equal species, offering them as species of Substance. He then dismisses the three following possibilities (which he must presumably consider exhaustive): (a) body as affirmation and the bodiless as denial, since these are not contraries; (b) the bodiless as better (and cause) and body as worse (and caused), i.e. as intelligible and sensible

substance, since these stand in a relation of prior to posterior; (c) the bodiless as accidental property and body as (sensible) substance, since again the relation is one of prior to posterior, but reversed in this case. In both (b) and (c) body and the bodiless are 'not of equal power'.

170. As form.

171. As matter – both this and form in a Neoplatonic sense.

172. This passage (142,5-10) is parallel to Porphyry 106,30-4.

173. Even is continuous in that it is identified with the unlimited, and odd discrete in that it is identifed with limit: cf. Aristotle *Metaph*. 986a15ff, *Phys*. 203a10ff., and KRS p. 329.

174. Opposites are not the same as contraries, as discussed by Aristotle in *Cat*. 10, 11b35ff.

175. i.e. in so far as it is a quantity; this passage (142,22-4) is parallel to Porphyry 106,35-8.

176. cf. Porphyry's discussion of 'up' and 'down' at 107,1ff.

177. For the objection to be upheld, up and down would need to be (i) contraries, and (ii) species or parts of place. Simplicius first shows that if we consider up and down to be purely relative to us, then they cannot be contraries 'since contraries do not belong to the same thing at the same time', while according to the relativist view the same thing, e.g. the staircase, could be above you (standing in the hall) and below me (on the landing) at the same time. Hence condition (i) is not observed. Ammonius argues against and absolute up and down at 65,2ff.: 'there is no absolute 'up' or 'down', but only 'surrounding' and 'centre', which are not contraries, but relatives. For 'surrounding' is called the surrounding of something in the centre'. Cf. Simplicius 143,32 and Aristotle *Cat*. 5b30-1. Porphyry is less sure; he is prepared to admit that, since the outer limits and the centre of the universe are at the greatest possible distance from each other (cf. *Cat*. 6a18) they are contraries. But he modifies this by saying that any place other than the outer limits and the centre will be 'up' relative to some places, and 'down' relative to others (107,10-24). This dualistic approach is also evident in Simplicius' account at 148,8ff. Simplicius and Andronicus (and/or Herminus; cf. Porphyry 107,25-31) reply that if up and down are viewed absolutely, then they do not signify place (i.e. they do not meet condition (ii)), but rather belong to the category of Where. It should be noted that Aristotle's use of 'seems' at *Cat*. 6a12 appears not to commit him to the view that quantity admits contrariety.

178. i.e. it has them not *per se* but *per accidens*.

179. *Cat*. 5b14. The subsequent passage (143,13-16) is a loose paraphrase of Aristotle's argument at *Cat*. 5b17ff.

180. Simplicius is fond of reducing Aristotle's arguments to syllogistic form.

181. i.e. 'If small things are called great etc.'

182. i.e. 'when compared with things of like kind'.

183. Kalbfleisch includes these last four words in the quotation from Aristotle. But they are not to be found in the manuscripts, and should stand as Simplicius' judgement.

184. *Ennead* 6.3.11.11-19.

185. *Cat*. 5b31-2.

186. Great and small taken absolutely are indeterminate quantities, and as such are more properly to be considered as relatives, and hence are opposites rather than contraries. Cf. Porphyry 108,5-8.

187. cf. Porphyry 108,15ff., and Dexippus chapter headings 25 & 26.

188. cf. Plotinus *Ennead* 6.3.12.17-19

189. i.e. we have a *reductio ad absurdum*; cf. 144,6: 'But contraries cannot

co-exist, since they conflict with each other.' Simplicius seeks to establish an absolute sense of 'large' by appeal to participation in the Form of Magnitude. A mountain is by any standards large. But the same mountain viewed relationally is small compared with, say, Mt Olympus; so it is both large (absolutely) and small (relatively); hence the absurd conclusion. Porphyry admits that Aristotle does not mention any absolute sense of large, small etc., and he himself is hard put to it to show how any absolute sense can be established.

190. cf. Proclus *In Euclid*. 127: 'But if the objects of geometry are outside matter, its ideas pure (*katharoi logoi*) and separate from sense objects, then none of them will have any parts or body or magnitude. For *logoi* can have magnitude, bulk and extension in general only through the matter which is their receptacle.'

191. *Ennead* 6.3.11.12-14.

192. cf. Plato *Phaedo* 99Dff.

193. This is a paraphrase of *Ennead* 6.3.12.7-8. Simplicius ascribes it to a plural subject, 'they say', but I suggest reading the singular *phêsin* for the plural *phasin* of the manuscripts.

194. For the ten proportional relationships see Iamblichus *in Nicom*. 35,24-37,14 where he divides unequal number into ten relationships or categories, five for larger, five for lesser.

195. cf. Plotinus *Ennead* 6.3.12.9-15.

196. This question is put as if by an interlocutor, echoing Plotinus *Ennead* 6.3.12.16. Cf. *Ennead* 2.4.8 and Aristotle *Phys*. 187b13-21.

197. Latitude (*platos*) was a term used by the commentators to explain an apparent paradox: how can anything acquire different degrees of a quality which itself does not admit of degrees? Their answer was that the mixture of elements in a thing, through intension and remission (*epitasis* and *anesis*) in the mixture, allows a range or 'latitude' in the participation in the quality. See R.B. Todd 'Some concepts in physical theory in John Philoponus' Aristotelian commentaries', *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 24 (1980) 151-70.

198. *Cat*. 3a29.

199. 133,21ff.

200. This problem is raised by Plotinus at *Ennead* 6.3.12.1ff. and discussed by Porphyry at 107,1-30, and given as Dexippus' 27th Heading.

201. *Cat*. 5b34. The verb I have translated as 'suggested' is *paragein*, which more usually means 'introduce', but can bear the meaning of 'sidetrack'.

202. The following section is a reprise of the argument of 142,25-143,9.

203. The text reads *hôs oietai* ('as he thinks'), which makes poor sense. I therefore accept Kalbfleisch's suggestion *hôs oimai* ('as I think').

204. *Cat*. 5b12.

205. This is a puzzling phrase; the Greek reads *kai tôn enantiôn esti dektikon*, which should mean 'and are receptive of the[ir] contraries', – a strange thing to say about contraries. If the text is sound we should either allow the negative of the previous phrase to carry over into this one, or see a reference to *Cat*. 6a15: 'they seem to derive their definition of the other contraries from these', and translate 'and embrace all other contraries' – but this is to stretch the meaning of *dektikon*. I have chosen the former alternative.

206. The text has the singular *poson*.

207. The argument is compressed, but Simplicius seems to be saying that up and down *can* be viewed as both relatives and as quantities, but the latter only *per accidens*, not *per se*.

208. i.e. 'up' and 'down'; cf. 148,13ff.

209. *Cat*. 6a14.

210. i.e. the heavens.

211. i.e. up.

212. The fifth substance (or element) is aether, and is 'what surrounds' in the next line. It is accidental to aether to be higher up than fire in that up and down as characterised by the termini of rectilinear motion are confined to the four elements in the sublunary world, while in the heavens the only motion is circular, which is lacking in a terminus, so that up and down cannot be applied to it *per se*, but only *per accidens* in that the heavens are 'above' the sublunary world. See Lloyd (1968) 134-9.

213. This objection seeks to re-establish up and down as (i) *per se* contraries, and (ii) parts of place, for up and down are the places to which light and heavy things – fire and earth *par excellence* – respectively move by nature and not *per accidens*. Simplicius replies that the reverse is the case; cf. Dexippus Question 32.

214. See Thesleff (1965) 29,9-11 under pseudo-Archytas: 'Place is to entities as limit is to what is limited; for the place of the whole cosmos is the limit of all things'; also Sorabji (1988) ch. 11 for Iamblichus' use, inspired by pseudo-Archytas, of the idea of place as limit in the sense of the cohesive holder which preserves form.

215. *Phys*. 212a5

216. *Phys*. 212b8.

217. *Cat*. 6a22-3; Ackrill (1963) 98 notes that Aristotle 'is careless when he says: "Nor yet is one time called more a time than another": he should say that one period of time is not, for example, more *a year long* than another.' But this would destroy the contrast between determinate and indeterminate quantities.

218. Simplicius seems to be pointing a contrast in the way that we express degrees of comparison. If (i) we use the word 'than' we are presenting the three mountains or numbers in a relational context, and so more and less belong to them not quantitatively but relationally. If (ii) we present the three mountains or numbers simply as a descending series and do not relate them by using the word 'than', then because of this indeterminacy quantity *might* appear to admit more and less, as if it were a contrariety – but in fact it is only an opposition.

219. *Ennead* 6.3.11.11ff.

220. A species is marked off from other species within the same genus, and at the same level of analysis, by the possession of just such a differentia – one that is particular to all members of the species and to them alone. For genus, species and sub-species having the same differentiae in common cf. *Cat*. 1b20ff., Porphyry *Isag*. 12,13ff. and Simplicius *in Cat*. ch. 5 *passim*.

221. cf. Porphyry 110,30-111,5 and the Dexippus Questions 34-40.

222. Downward thrust is a dynamic quality to be characterized in terms of like and unlike, and is not therefore the same as weight, which (in our perception at least) can be measured quantitatively in terms of equal and unequal. So in this passage the terms heavy and light should be seen qualitatively in relation to downward thrust. Cf. 128,18.

223. Aristotle does not exactly say that *rhopê* is a quality, but at the start of *De Caelo* he discusses the 'affections, functions and capacities' (*pathê*, *erga* and *dunameis*) of the elements, and says: 'We designate a thing heavy or light by its capacity for natural movement; there is no term for the actualizations (*energeiai*) of these capacities except, perhaps, *rhopê';* at *Cat*. 9a14ff. natural capacities are included in the Category of Quality. Professor Richard Sorabji draws attention to a new discovery by Emma Gannagé, who has recovered part of Alexander's lost commentary *in GC* in *Documente e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* (Spoleto 1998); in her Paris dissertation (Sorbonne 1998) she argues that Alexander disagrees – while believing that he agrees with Aristotle, by transferring

dynamic force from natural place to heaviness and lightness. This might be seen as an aspect of treating heaviness and lightness as qualities. At *GC* 329b18-21 Aristotle lists heavy and light alongside hot and cold, dry and moist etc. as 'contrarieties according to touch'.

224. The point is that we can arrive at an exact measurement (the Greek verb used is *katametrein* as opposed to the milder *metrein*, and exact measurement is the *proprium* of quantity as stated at 151,16-17) of the *amount* of whiteness of any two white objects only *per accidens* when we compare their surface areas; a white surface of 10 square metres has exactly ten times as much whiteness as a white surface of 1 square metre. But we cannot measure exactly the *degree* of whiteness *per se* so as to be able to talk about a tenth part of the whiteness; whiteness *per se* is a quality and as such not amenable to quantification, but only to qualification; we quantify it *katakhrêstikôs*. Colour stands to surface as downward thrust does to body. The conclusion is that if we cannot give exact measurements of colour and downward thrust, then we cannot judge equality and inequality in either case; therefore neither are quantities.

225. The third species of quantity, amount (*plêthos*), is left out of the reckoning here.

226. This third group rightly observes that downward thrust and body are to be measured by different measures – the mina/talent and the foot/cubit respectively. But mina and talent are exact measures of quantity, so Alexander is wrong on that point. But we need to say what the differentia of downward thrust *qua* quantity is; the answer is: its convergence to the centre, which is calculable (i.e. measurable), although Simplicius does not say how.

227. Shape is given as a quality at *Cat*. 10a11. There is nothing to stop something from being placed in more than one Category.

228. cf. Dexippus 38th' Heading, and Dillon's note: 'The answer is that they are not being regarded here as contraries, but simply as complementary relatives.'

229. This is effectively the same argument as that about the white in a surface. Simplicius' point is that we can only measure the disposition or function of a tower as being equal or unequal to that of another *per accidens*. It is not clear what he means by disposition (*diathesis*) or function (*energeia*), but we are clearly meant to take them as qualities (or at least as non-quantities, which is what Aristotle says of dispositions at *Cat*. 6a32f.). In the next sentence he talks of potentialities (*dunameis*) and actualities (*energeiai*), and it would be surprising if the two pairs were not in some way parallel. His suggested solution – number or the quantity of downward thrust – is perhaps ironic.

230. cf. Dexippus' Heading 39, and Dillon's note *ad loc*.

231. cf. Dexippus' 40th Heading and Dillon's note *ad loc*. By 'negations' (*apophaseis*) Simplicius means terms like 'limitless'; the passage in the chapter on Substance is 4a22-4b20 where Aristotle is talking about statements and beliefs. Simplicius' discussion of 'verbal inflections' (*ptôseis*) here seems much broader than Aristotle's concerns with the genitive case in the chapter on Substance; he includes (i) singular and plural, where the point is that although you can use 'size' terms like 'two cubits long' in the singular and in the plural, you cannot use 'amount' terms in the same way; you cannot talk about 'ones' or 'a many'; (ii) words modified by -less (prefixed with *a-* in Greek); (iii) adverbs, modal and numerical. His final sentence 155,12-14 does not appear to relate to this.

232. The unit and the point.

233. When we compare two things in terms of size or amount, we say that they are equal if neither exceeds or falls short of the other, and unequal if that is not the case. Therefore equal and unequal are hallmarks of Quantity.

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* Denotes volumes in this series.

English-Greek Glossary

accented on the first syllable: *barutonos*
accented on the second syllable: *oxutonos*
accompany: *sunakolouthein*
accurate: *akribês*
acted on, be: *paskhein*
action: *poiêsis*
active, be: *energein*
actuality: *energeia*
actualization: *energeia*
add: *prostithenai*
addition: *sunthesis*
additional division: *epidiairesis*
adjacent, be: *parakeisthai*, *sunkeisthai*
admit: *epidekhesthai*
admixture: *mixis*
affection: *pathos*, *peponthêsis*
affirmation: *kataphasis*
aggregate: *khuma*
agree: *sunkhôrein*
akin: *oikeios*, *sungenês*
alter: *metaballein*
alteration: *alloiôsis*, *metabolê*
ambiguity: *amphibolia*
amount: *plêthos*
analogous: *analogoun*
analogy: *analogia*
angle: *gônia*
angles, with: *gôniakos*
animal: *zôon*
antecedent: *hêgoumenon*
apply: *harmozein*
appropriately: *oikeiôs*
argue: *philoneikein*
arithmetic: *arithmetikê*
arrange: *suntattein*, *tattein*
arrive: *paragignesthai*
articulate: *diarthrein*
articulation: *diastasis*
ask: *zêtein*
assimilate: *sumphuein*
assume: *prolambanein*
assumption: *lêmma*, *proslêpsis*
atom: *atomos*
attribute (v.): *nemein*
audible: *akoustos*

bare: *psilos*
be: *huparkhein*
beginning: *arkhê*
being: *hupostasis*, *on*
belong to: *huparkhein*
bind together: *sundein*
bodily: *sômatikos*
body: *sôma*
border on: *sunaptein*
boundary: *horos*
brevity: *brakhutês*
brightness: *epiphaneia*
bring about: *paragein*
bring under: *hupagein*
bringing completion: *sumplêrôtikos*

calculate: *sullogizesthai*
call by name: *onomazein*
carry along with: *suneispherein*, *sunepipherein*
category of the relative: *pros ti*
cause: *aitia*, *aition*
centre: *meson*
challenge (v.): *enistasthai*
change round: *metapiptein*
change (n.): *kinêsis*, *metabolê*
change (v.): *metaballein*
character: *idiôma*, *kharaktêr*
characterize: *kharaktêrizein*
circle: *kuklos*
circular motion, in: *kuklophorêtikos*
circumference: *perix*
circumscribe: *perigraphein*
clarification: *saphêneia*
classification: *anagôgê*
classify: *anagein*, *tattein*
clear: *enargês*, *prodêlos*

co-exist: *sunuparkhein*, *sunuphistasthai*
coherence: *allêloukhia*
combination: *sumplokê*
coming-to-be: *genesis*
commensurate, be: *sunapartizein*
commentator: *exêgêtês*
common speech: *sunêtheia*
common: *koinos*
communicate: *epidekhesthai*
compare: *paraballein*, *sunkrinein*
comparison: *sunkrisis*
complete (the composition): *sumplêroun*
completion: *sumplêrôsis*
composed of, be: *sunkeisthai*
composite: *sunthetos*
composition: *sustasis*
compound: *sunamphoteros*, *sunamphoteroun*, *sunthetos*
comprehend: *perilambanein*
conceive: *hupolambanein*; *noein*
concept: *ennoia*
conception: *ennoia*
concern oneself with: *pragmateuesthai*
conclusion: *sumperasma*
concomitant, be a: *parakolouthein*, *epakolouthein*
concurrence: *epakolouthêsis*
conflict: *makhesthai*
confound: *sunkhein*
confuse: *sumphurein*
congruity: *epiprepeia*
consequence: *enuparkhein*
consider: *theôrein*
consonant: *enarmonios*
consequent: *lêgon*
consequent upon, be: *parepesthai*
constituent, be: *enuparkhein*
construct: *kataskeuazein*
contain: *periekhein*
containing: *periektikos*
continuity: *sunekheia*
continuous: *sunekhês*
contraction: *sustolê*
contrariety: *enantiôsis*, *enantiotês*
contrary: *enantion*
contrary, be: *enantioun*
contrast (v.): *antidiastellein*
contrast (n.): *antithesis*
contrasted: *antithetos*
convergence: *sunneusis*
convex: *kurtos*
corporeal: *sômatikos*
co-significant: *sussêmantikos*
cosmos: *kosmos*
count: *arithmein*, *diarithmein*, *katarithmein*
countless: *anarithmêtos*
criticize: *enkalein*
curved: *kurtos*

deal with: *prokheirizein*
decrease: *meiôsis*
deficiency: *elleipsis*
deficient, be: *elleipein*
define: *aphorizein*, *horizein*
definite: *hôrismenos*
delimit: *peratoun*
demonstrate: *endeiknusthai*
denial: *apophasis*
density: *puknotês*
deny: *apogignôskein*
derive: *parenklinein*
descend: *hupobainein*
destroy: *anairein*
destructive: *anairetikos*
determinate: *hôrismenos*
determine: *aphorizein*, *horizein*
determined: *aphorismenos*
diction: *lexis*
differ: *diistasthai*
difference: *diaphora*
differentia: *diaphora*
differentiation: *diaphorotês*
dimension: *diastêma*
dimensional: *diastêmatikos*
diminution: *elattôsis*
discrete: *diôrismenos*
discrete, being: *diorismos*
discussion: *exergasia*
disorderly: *ataktos*
disposition: *diathesis*
dispute (v.): *philoneikein*
dissimilar: *anomoios*
distinction: *diairesis*
distribute: *diairein*
divide: *diairein*, *diakrinein*
divided: *meristos*
divisible: *diairetos*
division: *diairesis*, *diorismos*
do with speech: *lektikos*
doctrine: *dedogmenon*
double: *diplasios*

downward inclination: *rhopê*
draw along with: *sunupagein*
dwarf: *nanos*
dyad: *duas*

element: *stoikheion*
employ: *khrasthai*
empty: *kenos*
end: *teleutê*
endow with form: *eidopoiein*
endure: *hupomenein*
enfeeblement: *amudrôsis*
enmattered: *enulos*
enquire: *zêtein*
enumerate: *diarithmein*, *katarithmein*
enumeration: *diarithmêsis*
enunciation: *ekphônêsis*
equal: *isos*
equal power, of: *isosthenês*
equality: *isotês*
equalize: *sunexisoun*
equipollent: *isosthenês*
equivocally: *homônumôs*
essence: *ousia*
establish: *kataskeuazein*
evident: *enargês*, *prodêlos*
exceed: *huperekhein*, *parallassein*
excess: *huperbolê*, *huperokhê*
excessive, be: *huperballein*
exchange: *enallattein*
exist alongside: *sunuphistasthai*
exist: *huphistasthai*
expansion: *epektasis*
explain before hand: *prodidaskein*
explain: *didaskein*, *paradidonai*
exposition, detailed: *diexodos*
expound: *paradidonai*
extend together: *sunekteinein*
extend: *diateinein*, *ekteinein*
extended: *diastatos*
extended, be: *diistasthai*
extension: *diastasis*, *ektasis*
extension, in: *diastatos*

fallacy: *parakrousma*
fashion: *dêmiourgein*
figure: *skhêma*
finer distinction: *prosdiorismos*
first: *prôtos*
fit: *epharmozein*, *harmozein*
fix: *hidruein*
flavour: *khumos*
flux, be in: *rhein*
follow: *katakolouthoun*
form: *eidos*, *idea*
formal: *eidêtikos*
function: *energeia*

general: *katholikos*
generate: *apogennan*
geometry: *geômetria*
give existence: *huphistanai*
give shape: *morphoun*
give the sense: *sêmainein*
good proportion: *eutaxia*
grasp: *lambanein*

habit: *sunêtheia*
half: *hêmisus*
have in mind: *ennoein*
having feet: *hupopous*
having no beginning: *anarkhos*
having no end: *ateleutêtos*
heavens, the: *ouranos*
hold together: *sphingein*
homonymously: *homônumôs*
hypothesis: *hupothesis*
hypothetical premiss: *sunêmmenon*

identity: *tautotês*
image: *eikôn*
imagination: *phantasia*
immaterial: *aülos*
immediate: *amesos*
immortal: *athanatos*
immutable: *ametablêtos*
impact (n.): *plêgê*
impact (v.): *plêttein*
imprint: *tupôsis*
impulse: *hormê*
inclination, without (adj.): *arrepês*
incline: *neuein*
include: *perilambanein*
incomposite: *asunthetos*
incongruous, be: *apemphainein*
incontrovertible: *biaios*
incorporation: *periokhê*
increase: *auxêsis*
indefinite: *aoristos*
independent: *apolelumenos*
indeterminacy: *aoristia*, *apeiria*
indeterminate: *aoristos*
indicative: *parastatikos*
individual: *atomos*

indivisible: *adiairetos*, *atomos*
induction: *epagôgê*
infinite: *apeiros*
inherent, be: *enuparkhein*, *sunuparkhein*
innate: *sumphuês*, *sumphutos*
intellective: *theôrêtikos*
intellectually curious: *philomathês*
intelligible: *noêtos*
interchange: *hupallattein*
interpret: *theôrein*
interval: *diastêma*
introduce: *paragein*
invest with being: *ousioun*
irrational: *alogos*

join together: *sunaptein*
juxtaposition: *parathesis*

keep: *phulattein*
kind, of like: *homogenês*
kinship: *sungeneia*
know: *gnôrizein*
knowable: *gnôrimos*
knowledge: *epistêmê*

lack of parts: *amereia*
lacking in quality: *apoios*
latitude: *platos*
leave behind: *kataleipein*
length: *mêkos*
less, being: *elleipsis*
lightness: *kouphotes*
like: *homoios*
liken: *homoioun*
likeness: *homoiotês*
limit: *peras*
line: *grammê*
local: *topikos*
long: *makros*

magnitude: *megethos*, *pêlikos*
made up of, be: *sunistasthai*
make an assertion: *apophainesthai*
make plain: *emphanizein*
mark off as opposite members of a genus: *antidiairein*
mark off at intervals: *dialambanein*, *temnein*
mass: *onkos*
match: *epharmozein*, *paraballein*
mathematical: *mathêmatikos*
mathematician: *mathêmatikos*
measurable: *metrêtos*
measure exactly: *katametrein*
measure: *metron*
measured: *metrêtos*
measurement: *metrêsis*
mental conception: *dianoia*
metric: *metrikos*
mind: *nous*
misuse of language, by a (adv.): *katakhrêstikôs*
modification: *ptôsis*
monad: *monas*
more, being: *huperokhê*
mortal: *thnêtos*
motion: *phora*
movement: *kinêsis*
movement away: *ekstasis*

name: *onoma*
natural: *phusikos*
nature: *phusis*
nature, be by: *phuesthai*
nature, of the same: *homophuês*
need in addition: *prosdeisthai*
negation: *apophasis*
note: *ephistasthai*
noun: *onoma*
number: *arithmos*

object (v.): *enistasthai*, *enkalein*
occupy: *katekhein*
odd: *perissos*
omit: *paraleipein*
one dimension, in: *hapax*
opposite: *antikeimenon*
opposition: *antithesis*
order: *taxis*
orderly arrangement: *diakosmêsis*
organization: *suntaxis*
outline: *tupos*
own: *oikeios*

partake: *metalambanein*
participate: *metekhein*
participation: *koinônia*, *methexis*, *metousia*
particular: *idios*
particular character: *idiotês*
particular feature: *idiôma*
parts, without (adj.): *amerês*, *ameristos*
pass over: *paraleipein*, *parienai*

passing away: *phthora*
per accidens: *kata sumbebêkos*
perfect realization: *entelekheia*
per se: *kath' hauto*
perceptible: *aisthêtos*
perfect: *teleios*
perpetual motion, in (adj.): *aeikinêtos*
persist: *hupomenein*
pervade: *diêkein*
place: *topos*
plane: *epipedon*
plural, in the (adv.): *plêthuntikôs*
point: *sêmeion*, *stigmê*
point of view: *epibolê*
posit: *hupotithenai*, *tithenai*
position: *thesis*
position, without (adj.): *athetos*
positioned, be: *keisthai*
possession: *lêpsis*
postulate: *hupotithenai*
potentiality: *dunamis*
power: *dunamis*
power, of equal: *isosthenês*
predicate: *katêgorein*
predication: *katêgorêma*
pre-exist: *proüparkhein*
present (v.): *paradidonai*
present for consideration: *paratithenai*
preserve: *phulattein*
primary: *prôtos*
principle: *arkhê*
prior: *presbuteros*
prior to, be: *proüparkhein*, *proêgeisthai*
privation: *sterêsis*
privative sense, in a: *sterêtikôs*
proceed with: *summetabainein*
procession: *proödos*
progression: *proödos*
pronounce: *propherein*
proof: *apodeixis*, *epideixis*, *epikheirêma*
propose: *protithenai*
prove: *apodeiknusthai*, *endeiknusthai*
put first: *protattein*
put in order: *tattein*

quality: *poion*, *poiotês*
Quantity, the form of: *autoposotês*
question: *skepsis*, *zêtêsis*

rational: *logikos*
realities: *pragmata*
reality: *hupostasis*
reason: *aitia*
reasonable: *eulogos*
reasoning: *dianoia*
receive: *epidekhesthai*
reception: *hupodokhê*
receptive: *dektikos*
recognize: *epigignôskein*, *gnôrizein*
reduction: *analusis*
reference: *anaphora*
refute: *dielenkhein*
relate: *anapherein*
relation: *skhesis*
remove: *anairein*
remove together with: *sunanairein*
resemble: *proseoikenai*
resolve a problem: *dialuein*, *luein*
rest (n.): *stasis*
reveal: *dêloun*, *prophainein*
rhythm: *rhuthmos*
rhythmic: *rhuthmikos*
roughness: *trakhutês*
ruler: *kanôn*

sameness: *tautotês*
science: *epistêmê*, *skepsis*, *theôria*
sense: *tropos*
separable: *hôristos*
separate (v.): *exairein*, *khôrizein*
separate (adj.): *hôristos*
separated: *diairetos*
separated, be: *diistasthai*
sequential arrangement: *suntaxis*
set alongside: *suntattein*
set apart: *exairein*
set aside: *sunairein*
set up in opposition: *antitithenai*
shake: *saleuein*
shape: *morphê*, *skhêma*
share: *epikoinônein*
short: *brakhus*
shortness: *brakhutês*
significant: *sêmantikos*
signification: *sêmasia*
signification, without (adj.): *asêmos*
signify: *sêmainein*
similar: *homoios*
similarity: *homoiotês*
simple: *haplous*
slackening: *huphesis*
smell: *osphrêsis*
smellable: *osphrantos*
smoothness: *leiotês*

solid: *stereos*
sound: *phônê*
species: *eidos*
speech: *logos*
state: *diathesis*, *hexis*
status: *taxis*
strict: *kurios*
stripped: *psilos*
study: *theôria*
subdivision: *tmêma*
subordinate: *hupotattein*
subsist together with: *paruphistasthai*
substance: *ousia*
substantial form, of: *ousiôdês*
substrate, be: *hupokeisthai*
subsume: *hupotithenai*
such a kind, of: *toioutos*
such-and-such a kind, of: *toiosde*
suffer: *paskhein*
suitable: *epitêdeios*
summation: *soreia*
superior, be: *huperekhein*
supervene: *epigi[g]nesthai*, *episumbainein*
supervenient: *epeisodiôdês*
supposition: *hupothesis*
surface: *epiphaneia*
surprising: *thaumastos*
surround: *periekhein*
surrounding: *periektikos*
sustain: *anekhein*
syllable: *sullabê*
syllogism: *sullogismos*
systematically: *epistêmonikôs*

take: *lambanein*
take into account: *prospoieisthai*
tastable: *geustos*
taste: *geusis*
tear apart: *diaspan*
tell a lie: *pseudesthai*
tentative, be: *endoiazein*
termination: *apoperatôsis*
thickness: *pakhutês*
think: *noein*
thought: *dianoia*
time: *khronos*
tip the scales: *helkein*
touch: *haptesthai*
triad: *trias*
triangle: *trigônon*
twofold: *dittos*

unclear: *aphanês*
unconditional: *apolutos*
undergo: *paskhein*
underlie: *hupokeisthai*
undertaking: *prothesis*
undivided: *ameristos*
unembodied: *asômatos*
unequal: *anisos*
unextended: *adiastatos*
unique: *monos*
unique in form: *moneidês*
uniqueness: *monôsis*
unit: *monas*
unitary: *monadikos*
unite: *henoun*
unity: *henôsis*
universe, the: *to pan*
unlike: *anomoios*
unmoving: *akinêtos*
unqualified sense, in an (adv.): *haplôs*
use: *khrasthai*
utter: *propherein*
utterance: *diexodos*

variation: *parallagê*
verb: *rhêma*
view: *theôrein*
vocal expression: *phônê*
voice: *phônê*

weight: *baros*, *barutês*
word: *lexis*
work out: *sullogizesthai*
written character: *gramma*

Greek-English Index

References are to the page and line numbers of the Greek text (C. Kalbfleisch (ed.) *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, vol. 8, Berlin 1907), which appear in the margin of the translation. I have generally cited only two or three instances of each word. Verbs are given in the infinitive, nouns in the nominative case and adjectives in the nominative case (masculine), in the positive form even where the occurrence in the text is comparative or superlative.

adiairetos, indivisible, 122,22
adiastatos, unextended, 122,9
aeikinêtos, in perpetual motion, 128,3
aisthêtos, perceptible, 121,30; 122,2; 131,19
aitia, cause, reason, 120,28
aition, cause, 122,24; 142,2
akinêtos, unmoving, 135,27
akoustos, audible, 131,13
akribês, accurate, 123,6
allêloukhia, coherence, 127,20; 136,15
alloiôsis, alteration, 121,6; 140,2
alogos, irrational, 123,25; 136,6; 142,18
amereia, lack of parts, 140,20
amerês, without parts, 133,31; 137,24
ameristos, undivided, without parts, 121,22; 122,9
amesos, immediate, 126,35
ametablêtos, immutable, 149,10
amphibolia, ambiguity, 139,34
amudrôsis, enfeeblement, 150,22
anagein, to classify, 130,14
anagôgê, classification, 134,4
anairein, to destroy, remove, 121,1
anairetikos, destructive, 144,3
analogia, analogy, 137,11
analogoun, analogous, 129,17
analusis, reduction, 154,29
anapherein, to relate, 121,31; 143,32
anaphora, reference, 134,27; 143,16
anarithmêtos, countless, 123,15
anarkhos, having no beginning, 128,31
anekhein, to sustain, 150,6
anisos, unequal, 122,35; 128,15
anomoios, dissimilar, unlike, 122,22; 152,3; 153,1
antidiairein, to mark off as opposite members of a genus, 127,11
antidiastellein, to contrast, 136,25
antikeimenon, opposite, 126,10; 128,9; 142,17
antithesis, opposition, 144,23, contrast, 154,22
antithetos, contrasted, 141,2
antitithenai, to set up in opposition, 145,30
aoristia, indeterminacy, 150,31
aoristos, indeterminate, indefinite, 129,11; 132,19; 144,9
apeiria, indeterminacy, 145,18; 150,19
apeiros, infinite, 124,6; 129,4; 146,6
apemphainein, to be incongruous, 137,12
aphanês, unclear, 140,31
aphorismenos, determined, 130,5
aphorizein, to determine, to define, 130,19; 131,7; 142,10
apodeiknusthai, to prove, 143,19
apodeixis, proof, 143,26
apogennan, to generate, 135,11
apogignôskein, to deny, 146,30
apoios, lacking in quality, 120,33
apolelumenos, independent, 121,28
apolutos, unconditional, 146,18; 150,9
apoperatôsis, termination, 149,23
apophainesthai, to make an assertion, 127,3; 131,16
apophasis, negation, denial, 127,2; 141,31
arithmein, to count, 130,29

arithmêtikê, arithmetic, 126,22
arithmos, number, 122,23; 123,4; 142,10
arkhê, principle, 122,11; 134,28; 153,33; beginning, 128,30
arrepês, without inclination, 128,28
asêmos, without signification, 124,18; 132,34; 139,8
asômatos, unembodied, 122,11; 128,32; 141,27
asunthetos, incomposite, 129,22
ataktos, disorderly, 137,23
ateleutêtos, having no end, 128,31
athanatos, immortal, 123,26; 136,8
athetos, without position, 138,10
atomos, atom, 126,30; indivisible, 140,28; individual, 147,6
aülos, immaterial, 127,28; 129,21; 130,5; 146,21
autoposotês, the form of Quantity, 130,12
auxêsis, increase, 121,4; 140,1

baros, weight, 128,6
barutês, weight, 128,8; 129,2
barutonos, accented on the first syllable, 129,10
biaios, incontrovertible, 126,30
brakhus, short, 124,12; 131,23
brakhutês, shortness, brevity, 131,29; 132,10

dedogmenon, doctrine, 126,4
dektikos, receptive, 125,15
dêloun, to reveal, 129,12
dêmiourgein, to fashion, 135,24
diairein, to divide, distribute, 122,10.31; 147,11
diairesis, distinction, division, 122,35; 141,12; 142,17
diairetos, separated, divisible, 122,10; 124,8; 146,24
diakosmêsis, orderly arrangement, 127,24
diakrinein, to divide, 135,22
dialambanein, to mark off at intervals, 128,30
dialuein, to resolve a problem, 129,7
dianoia, thought, mental conception, reasoning, 124,8.20; 154,5
diaphora, differentia, difference, 123,1; 128,33; 141,13
diaphorotês, differentiation, 145,36
diarithmein, to count, to enumerate, 130,16; 138,12
diarithmêsis, enumeration, 127,8
diarthrein, to articulate, 154,3
diaspan, to tear apart, 137,23
diastasis, extension, 122,28; 134,24; 140,16; 142,32; articulation, 142,24
diastatos, extended, in extension, 120,33; 122,10
diastêma, dimension, 125,21; 134,8; 149,30; interval, 128,36; 140,9
diastêmatikos, dimensional, 148,35
diateinein, to extend, 135,11; 145,25; 146,25
diathesis, disposition, state, 121,12; 151,26
didaskein, to explain, 120,27
diêkein, to pervade, 135,12
dielenkhein, to refute, 147,26
diexodos, utterance, 139,7; detailed exposition, 140,10
diistasthai, to differ, 122,21; to be extended, 140,16; to be separated, 148,34
diôrismenos, discrete, 122,31; 123,2
diorismos, being discrete, 133,30; division, 135,14; 139,1
diplasios, double, 122,35
dittos, twofold, 133,33
duas, dyad, 139,3
dunamis, potentiality, 125,7; 153,17; power, 129,6; 150,8

eidêtikos, formal, 129,25; 140,20; 148,34
eidopoiein, to endow with form, 146,18
eidos, form, species, 121,9
eikôn, image, 127,26
ekphônêsis, enunciation, 132,9
ekstasis, movement away, 137,22
ektasis, extension, 137,28
ekteinein, to extend, 138,20
elattôsis, diminution, 150,22
elleipein, to be deficient, 131,14
elleipsis, deficiency, 128,16; being less, 142,12; 144,30
emphanizein, to make plain, 148,25
enallattein, to exchange, 132,1
enantion, contrary, 120,32; 125,15; 141,10

enantiôsis, contrariety, 141,21; 142,20; 148,2
enantiotês, contrariety, 147,30
enantioun, to be contrary, 148,26
enargês, clear, evident, 122,22; 128,32
enarmonios, consonant, 145,34
endeiknusthai, to prove, to demonstrate, 138,1
endoiazein, to be tentative, 133,6
energeia, actualization, actuality, 124,20; 125,10; 130,5; function, 153,15
energein, to be active, 131,9
enistasthai, to object, to challenge, 129,13; 144,16
enkalein, to object, to criticize, 127,30
ennoein, to have in mind, 127,6
ennoia, concept, conception, 134,3; 145,26
entelekheia, (perfect) realization, 140,4
enulos, enmattered, 129,19; 130,15; 145,13
enuparkhein, to be inherent, to be constituent, 130,9; 134,16; 146,23; 147,11
epagôgê, induction, 150,25; 151,15
epakolouthein, to be concomitant, 125,19
epakolouthêsis, concurrence, consequence, 130,17
epeisodiôdês, supervenient, 132,34
epektasis, expansion, 145,32
epharmozein, to match, to fit, 123,27
ephistasthai, to note, 124,28; 130,24
epibolê, point of view, 123,24
epideixis, proof, 125,28
epidekhesthai, to receive, to admit, 120,32; 122,35; 128,15; 135,35
epidiairesis, additional division, 123,15; 136,6
epigi[g]nesthai, to supervene, 130,17
epigignôskein, to recognize, 121,32
epikheirêma, proof, 143,23
epikoinônein, to share, communicate, 126,32
epipedon, plane, 124,35; 133,16
epiphaneia, surface, 123,5; 141,23, brightness, 152,7
epiprepeia, congruity, 137,26
epistêmê, science, 126,21; knowledge, 135,8
epistêmonikos, systematically, 147,25
episumbainein, to supervene, 153,13
epitêdeios, suitable, 155,25
eulogos, reasonable, 122,11
eutaxia, good proportion, 129,6
exairein, to separate, to set apart, 139,16
exêgêtês, commentator, 138,27
exergasia, discussion, 141,17

genesis, coming-to-be, 121,5; 140,17
geômetria, geometry, 126,22
geusis, taste, 131,18
geustos, tastable, 131,21
gnôrimos, knowable, 126,27
gnôrizein, to know, to recognize, 121,30
gônia, angle, 124,36
gôniakos, with angles, 125,1
gramma, written character, 132,7
grammê, line, 123,5; 136,18; 148,20

hapax, in one dimension, 153,27
haplôs, in an unqualified sense, 128,12; 144,32
haplous, simple, 126,20
haptesthai, to touch, 123,31; 125,11
harmozein, to apply, 134,10; to fit, 145,6
hêgoumenon, antecedent, 143,16
helkein, to tip the scales, 152,29
hêmisus, half, 122,35
henôsis, unity, 127,20; 135,21; 154,11
henoun, to unite, 125,18; 127,18
hexis, state, 129,31
hidruein, to fix, 150,5
homogenês, of like kind, 143,14.20; 144,33; 145,1.23
homoios, like, similar, 122,23; 152,3.32; 153,3
homoioun, to liken, 122,24
homoiotês, likeness, similarity, 122,22; 153,7; 155,27
homônumôs (adv.), homonymously, equivocally, 127,32
homophuês, of the same nature, 149,8
hôrismenos, determinate, definite, 129,10.18; 133,22; 144,27
horizein, to define, to determine, 133,20
hormê, impulse, 131,5
horos, boundary, 123,32; 124,24

hupagein, to bring under, 134,26; 141,20
hupallattein, to interchange, 127,35; 128,4
huparkhein, to belong to, to be, 122,19; 125,14; 141,14
huperballein, to be excessive, 131,14
huperbolê, excess, 128,16
huperekhein, to be superior, 139,16, to exceed, 145,34
huperokhê, excess, being more, 142,12; 144,30; 145,12
huphesis, slackening, 150,22
huphistanai, to give existence, 135,13
huphistasthai, to exist, 122,18; 149,33
hupobainein, to descend, 140,21
hupodokhê, reception, 155,26
hupokeisthai, to be substrate, to underlie, 121,15; 125,14; 147,7
hupolambanein, to conceive, 145,20
hupomenein, to endure, to persist, 136,26; 138,1
hupopous, having feet, 123,27
hupostasis, reality, being, 129,21; 130,16
hupotattein, to subordinate, 134,6
hupothesis, hypothesis, supposition, 122,30
hupotithenai, to posit, to postulate, 121,22; 122,26; to subsume, 123,33

idea, form, 130,22
idiôma, particular feature, character, 121,31; 143,4; 155,25
idios, particular, 127,17
idiotês, particular character, 122,1.14; 129,24; 134,23; 153,4
isos, equal, 122,34
isosthenês, equipollent, of equal power, 142,4
isotês, equality, 130,25; 153,7

kanôn, ruler, 130,9
kata sumbebêkos, *per accidens*, 122,33
katakhrêstikôs, by a misuse of language, 151,25
katakolouthoun, to follow, 154,4
kataleipein, to leave behind, 121,2
katametrein, to measure exactly, 124,12; 142,24; 147,15
katarithmein, to count, to enumerate, 134,24
kataskeuazein, to establish, to construct, 126,24; 143,29
kataphasis, affirmation, 127,2; 142,1
katêgorein, to predicate, 121,17; 149,19
katêgorêma, predication, 141,4
katekhein, to occupy, 125,24.30
kath' hauto, *per se*, 121,15.25; 125,30
katholikos, general, 150,6
keisthai, to be positioned, 136,13.28
kenos, empty, 137,17
kharaktêr, character, 121,32; 122,2.14.17
kharaktêrizein, to characterize, 123,11; 148,33
khôristos, separable, separate, 130,22
khôrizein, to separate, 127,26; 154,10
khrasthai, to use, to employ, 125,27
kinêsis, movement, change, 121,4; 128,23; 142,6
khronos, time, 123,6; 142,5
khuma, aggregate, 139,3
khumos, flavour, 131,20
koinônia, participation, 146,28.34
koinos, common, 120,31; 123,32
kosmos, cosmos, 127,19; 149,4
kouphotes, lightness, 128,23; 129,2
kuklophorêtikos, in circular motion, 149,11
kuklos, circle, 128,31
kurios, strict, 122,7; 125,35; 135,17; 148,35
kurtos, curved, convex, 141,22

lambanein, to take, to grasp, 124,15.35
lêgon, consquent, 143,16
leiotês, smoothness, 141,24
lektikos, to do with speech, 122,27
lêmma, assumption, 143,27
lêpsis, possession, 136,23
lexis, word, diction, 131,17; 132,4; 150,1
logikos, rational, 123,25; 136,8; 142,18
logos, speech, 123,5; 124,9; ratio 124,13
luein, to resolve a problem, 130,13

makhesthai, to conflict, 144,6
makros, long, 123,14; 124,12
mathêmatikos, mathematical, 124,34; 137,6; a mathematician, 128,7
megethos, magnitude, 123,2.13; 145,3.27
meiôsis, decrease, 121,5; 140,1
mêkos, length, 132,1
meristos, divided, 122,10; 130,4
meson, centre, 142,33
metaballein, to change, to alter, 121,9
metabolê, change, alteration, 121,8; 145,19
metalambanein, to partake, 145,16
metapiptein, to change round, 148,17
metekhein, to participate, 121,22; 122,34; 145,3
methexis, participation, 126,35; 130,1
metousia, participation, 146,30
metrêsis, measurement, 152,17
metrêtos, measured, measurable, 140,12; 151,17
metrikos, metric, 131,34
metron, measure, 126,26; 127,15; 128,21
mixis, admixture, 150,23
monadikos, unitary, 130,7
monas, monad, unit, 122,23; 123,34; 130,8; 153,20.26
moneidês, unique in form, 130,5
monos, unique, 154,15
monôsis, uniqueness, 154,17
morphê, shape, 153,4
morphoun, to give shape, 131,3

nanos, dwarf, 146,14
nemein, to attribute, 135,27
neuein, to incline, 128,34
noein, to think, to conceive, 121,16
noêtos, intelligible, 121,29; 122,2
nous, mind, 128,35
oikeios, akin, 122,11.28; own, 125,5
oikeiôs, appropriately, 141,6
on, being, 120,29
onkos, mass, 152,18
onoma, name, noun, 124,11
onomazein, to call by name, 154,10
osphrantos, smellable, 131,21
osphrêsis, smell, 131,19
ouranos, the heavens, 128,28; 150,4
ousia, substance, essence, 120,27; 122,21
ousiôdês, of substantial form, 129,28; 134,34
ousioun, to invest with being, 129,23
oxutonos, accented on the second syllable, 129,11

pakhutês, thickness, 128,9
to pan, the universe, 128,27; 142,32; 149,31
paraballein, to compare, to match, 143,14.20
paradidonai, to expound, to present, to explain, 127,9; 134,1; 141,15; 155,15
paragein, to bring about, to introduce, 135,16; 147,28
paragignesthai, to arrive, 130,18; 146,10
parakeisthai, to be adjacent, 125,11
parakolouthein, to be a concomitant, 122,20; 134,20; 141,13; 151,12
parakrousma, fallacy, 135,28
paraleipein, to pass over, to omit, 129,13
parallagê, variation, 146,4; 152,27
parallassein, to exceed, 146,12
parastatikos, indicative, 147,4
parathesis, juxtaposition, 127,21
paratithenai, to present for consideration, 147,25; 149,10
parenklinein, to derive, 155,11
parienai, to pass over, 143,17
parepesthai, to be consequent upon, 151,34
paruphistasthai, to subsist together with, 149,16
paskhein, to undergo, to suffer, to be acted on, 138,7
pathos, affection, 121,11; 124,20
pêlikos, magnitude, 127,31; 128,1
peponthêsis, affection, 130,1
peras, limit, 123,30; 142,33; 149,34
peratoun, to delimit, 125,11
periekhein, to contain, to surround, 125,21.26; 149,29; 150,3
periektikos, surrounding, containing, 132,23; 134,33; 149,16
perigraphein, to circumscribe, 125,5; 144,28; 154,9

perilambanein, to include, 128,10; 136,4; to comprehend, 150,11
periokhê, incorporation, 136,10
perissos, odd, 142,14
perix, circumference, 149,3
phantasia, imagination, 131,4
philomathês, intellectually curious, 121,19
philoneikein, to argue, to dispute, 126,28
phônê, voice, vocal expression, sound, 124,10; 131,6
phora, motion, 149,23
phthora, passing away, 121,6
phuesthai, to be by nature, 125,13
phulattein, to keep, to preserve, 140,20
phusikos, natural, 124,37; 125,28
phusis, nature, 126,7; 127,19
platos, latitude, 146,10
plêgê, impact, 131,2
plêthos, amount, 123,2; 127,21; 145,7
plêthuntikôs, in the plural, 155,5
plêttein, to impact, 131,8
poiêsis, action, 131,4
poion, quality, 120,32; 141,25
poiotês, quality, 120,32; 131,20; 151,34
pragmata, realities, 128,21; 136,17
pragmateuesthai, to concern oneself with, 134,2
presbuteros, prior, 126,22
prodêlos, clear, evident, 125,27
prodidaskein, to explain beforehand, 133,35
proêgeisthai, to be prior to, 120,33; 126,27; 128,11
prokheirizein, to deal with, 141,18
prolambanein, to assume, 152,23
prodos, progression, procession, 133,15; 145,33; 146,5
prophainein, to reveal, 122,22
propherein, to pronounce, to, utter, 131,33; 142,24
pros ti, (category of the) relative, 125,22
prosdeisthai, to need in addition, 139,16
prosdiorismos, finer distinction, 148,25
proseoikenai, to resemble, 150,17
proslêpsis, assumption, 143,19
prospoieisthai, to take into account, 122,5
prostithenai, to add, 122,12; 136,6
protattein, to put first, 121,20
prothesis, undertaking, 154,5
protithenai, to propose, 120,2
prôtos, first, primary, 122,24; 130,21
proüparkhein, to pre-exist, to be be prior to, 121,22; 122,12
pseudesthai, to tell a lie, 127,4
psilos, bare, stripped, 124,34
ptôsis, modification, 155,4
puknotês, density, 128,8

rhein, to be in flux, 140,24
rhêma, verb, 124,11
rhopê, (downward) inclination, 128,6.14.18.22; 151,33
rhuthmikos, rhythmic, 131,34
rhuthmos, rhythm, 132,2

saleuein, to shake, 144,25
saphêneia, clarification, 126,4
sêmainein, to signify, to give the sense, 124,17; 142,1.35
sêmantikos, significant, 131,2.9; 132,23; 142,23
sêmasia, signification, 143,26
sêmeion, point, 124,3; 145,36; 146,4; 153,27
skepsis, question, 125,29; science, 134,2
skhêma, shape, figure, 146,9
skhesis, relation, 121,28; 122,6; 134,8; 135,1
sôma, body, 123,6.13; 141,26
sômatikos, bodily, corporeal, 121,3; 122,26
soreia, summation, 127,21
sphingein, to hold together, 150,12
stasis, rest, 128,30
stereos, solid, 124,32
sterêsis, privation, 141,36
sterêtikôs, in a privative sense, 155,7
stigmê, point, 133,15; 154,26.29
stoikheion, element, 124,11
sullabê, syllable, 124,11; 131,22; 142,24
sullogismos, syllogism, 143,17.27
sullogizesthai, to calculate, to work out, 122,21

summetabainein, to proceed with, 155,29
sumperasma, conclusion, 143,37
sumphuein, to assimilate, 127,23
sumphuês, innate, 155,19
sumphurein, to confuse, 137,26
sumphutos, innate, 155,17
sumplêrôsis, completion, 121,21
sumplêrôtikos, bringing completion, 134,34; 147,9
sumplêroun, to complete (the composition), 134,21; 155,14
sumplokê, combination, 130,33
sunairein, to set aside, 134,17
sunakolouthein, to accompany, 138,6; 141,4
sunamphoteros, compound, 155,22
sunamphoteroun, compound, 124,21
sunanairein, to remove together with, 121,2
sunapartizein, to be commensurate, 132,20
sunaptein, to join together, 123,32; 124,2; to border on, 138,22
sundein, to bind together, 125,35
suneispherein, to carry along with, 126,18
sunekheia, continuity, 124,33; 135,15
sunekhês, continuous, 122,31; 123,2
sunekteinein, to extend together, 140,17
sunêmmenon, hypothetical premiss, 143,17.36
sunepipherein, to carry along with, 126,18
sunêtheia, habit, 122,27; common speech, 145,21
sunexisoun, to equalize, 131,13
sungeneia, kinship, 121,23; 122,4
sungenês, akin, 122,7
sunistasthai, to be made up of, 124,11
sunkeisthai, to be composed of, 124,4; to be adjacent, 138,23
sunkhein, to confound, 137,24
sunkhôrein, to agree, 147,29; 149,32
sunkrinein, to compare, 145,4
sunkrisis, comparison, 145,4.13
sunneusis, convergence, 152,30
suntattein, to set alongside, 122,28; 139,14; to arrange, 130,19
suntaxis, sequential arrangement, organization, 127,24
sunthesis, addition, 130,7
sunthetos, compound, composite, 122,3.26; 129,19
sunupagein, to draw along with, 146,7
sunuparkhein, to co-exist, 122,29; 129,26; 130,15; to be inherent, 153,2
sunuphistasthai, to co-exist, to exist alongside, 120,29; 122,15
sussêmantikos, co-significant, 131,9
sustasis, composition, 149,23
sustolê, contraction, 145,33

tattein, to arrange, to classify, to put in order, 128,6; 153,14
tautotês, identity, sameness, 135,18; 154,26
taxis, order, 120,28; 122,6.22; status, 130,17
teleios, perfect, 128,21
teleutê, end, 128,30
temnein, to mark off, 148,29
thaumastos, surprising, 122,29
theôrein, to consider, to view, to interpret, 121,33; 125,7; 127,16
theôrêtikos, intellective, 135,8; 146,22
theôria, science, study, 125,28
thesis, position, 123,16; 126,3; 135,33; 143,3
thnêtos, mortal, 123,26; 136,7; 147,9
tithenai, to posit, 131,16
tmêma, subdivision, 123,27
toiosde, of such-and-such a kind, 141,24
toioutos, of such a kind, 142,9
topikos, local, 143,4
topos, place, 123,6; 133,35; 142,25
trakhutês, roughness, 141,23
trias, triad, 128,21
trigônon, triangle, 126,17
tropos, sense, 130,6
tupos, outline, 155,15
tupôsis, imprint, 131,6

zêtein, to ask, to enquire, 127,12
zêtêsis, question, 127,14
zôon, animal, 142,17

Subject Index

actual and potential, 125,7; 140,3.14; 153,6; 157,7.15
action, 131,6
affection, 131,6
affirmation and denial, 127,2
Alexander, 151,35; 152,24
amount, 123,2
Andronicus, 134,5; 143,1; 151,7; 154,3
animal, 136,7
Archytas, 121,13; 122,14; 128,7.16; 151,32; 153,14
Athenodorus, 128,7
atoms, 126,31

being, 120,29; 122,16; 127,12; 129,20; 136,23
blituri, 124,18
body, 123,6; 133,10; 136,32; 139,20; no contrary, 141,26; parts of, 124,28; not in place, 125,39; as substance, 125,13
boundaries, 125,3

change: qualitative, 121,6; quantitative, 121,4; substantial, 121,5
combination, 130,33; 132,30
contiguous, 123,31
continuous, 122,31; 123,29; 126,6; 127,12; 133,10; 135,35; 145,35
contrariety, 148,2
contrary, 141,16; 147,25
Cornutus, 129,1
cosmos, 127,19; 148,15; 149,4; see also universe

day and night, 142,6
density, 128,9
determinate quantity, 144,26
discrete, 122,31; 123,29; 129,15; 136,1; acc. to Plotinus, 127,12; prior to continuous, 126,6
division, 123,16; 126,25.30; 136,7
downward thrust (*rhopê*), 128,6; 129,1; 151,33

elements, 128,28
equal and unequal, 128,16; 142,12; 151,12; 153,7
even and odd, 142,13
excess and deficiency, 146,15
extension, 121,2; 122,28; 133,25; 135,2; 146,10; 147,16

fifth substance, 149,13
fire, 149,11
flux, 140,24
form, 145,10; 146,7; 150,22; 154,4; enmattered, 130,15; 145,13; immaterial, 129,21; persisting through change, 121,8; separable, 130,22; substantial, 134,34

great and small, 143,10; 145,10

heavens, 128,28
Herminus, 124,33

Iamblichus, 122,19; 123,7; 124,21; 128,20; 130,6.14; 131,10; 135,8; 136,22; 137,7; 138,10; 139,6.21; 140,8; 141,28; 144,7.17; 145,10; 146,23; 147,19; 155,15
indeterminate, 144,26
intellect, 128,35; 130,1
intervals, 128,35; 140,7

justice, 129,31

latitude, 146,10
like and unlike, 152,32
limit, 123,30; 154,33
line, 123,5; 124,3.30; 125,3; 133,11.21; 136,18; 139,20; 141,20
logoi, 130,2; 146,16
Lucius, 125,16; 127,30

magnitude, 123,1.11; 127,16.19.22; 127,31
matter, 122,23; 145,15

measure, 126,26; 132,13; 134,25; 147,13; 151,17; 153,21
more and less, 150,18
motion, movement, 128,29; 149,11
much and few, 143,9

Nicostratus, 127,30
night and day, 142,6
number, 122,23; 123,4.34; 124,21; 127,10; 133,13.30; 142,10; 145,29; acc. to Lucius and Nicostratus, 127,32; formal, 129,25; intelligible and sensible, 129,28; no contrary, 142,10; not having position, 138,9; 139,20; problems with, 129,10; unitary, 130,7

odd and even, 142,13
the One, 135,10
opposition, 144,22
order, 137,20; 138,32; of Categories, 121,14; 122,19; 125,28

participation, 130,26; 133,22; 134,12
parts: of body, 124,28; 125,29; with and without position, 123,16; 128,26; 135,30
place, 123,26; 125,18; 134,5.18; 137,7; 139,20; 142,25; 147,30; 149,21
Plotinus, 127,12.14; 129,28; 130,7; 133,11.15; 140,6; 144,13; 145,21.24; 151,7
point, 124,3; 133,15; 136,29; 145,35; 154,4
Porphyry, 124,21.31; 129,1; 131,27; 154,3
position, 136,12; 140,21
privation, 142,1; 155,8
procession, progression, 133,15; 135,10; 140,19; 145,35
proportional relations, ten, 145,30
pure *logoi*, 145,12
Pythagoreans, 149,34

Quality, 121,3.29; 122,8; 144,26
Quantity, ch. 6 *passim*; acc. to Iamblichus, 146,22; continuous and discrete, 122,31; as differentia, 123,1; determinate and indeterminate, 133,27; 146,26; 147,14; 150,18; extended, separated, divided, 122,10; magnitude and amount as species, 123,1; number and speech as species, 123,3; place and time as species, 123,5; parts with and without position as species, 123,16

relative: movement as, 139,35; time as, 134,25

shape, 153,5
smell, 131,119
soul, 128,33; 129,31; 131,5
speech, 123,5.34; 124,9.21; 127,10; 130,32; 133,5; 137,30; 138,12.30; 139,4.21; 142,22
sphere, 149,1
substance, 120,27; 121,13; acc. to Archytas, 121,21; and accidents, 134,15; compound and corporeal, 122,26; fifth substance, 149,13; acc. to form, 140,28; indivisible, 140,28; intelligible, 121,29; 122,6; knowable *per se*, 121,21; perceptible, 121,30; 122,6
substrate, second, 140,27
surface, 123,5; 124,24.30; 128,15; 133,11; 135,4; 136,31; 139,20; 140,16; 141,8; 152,6
syllable, 124,11; 131,22; 132,13
syllogism, 143,16

taste, 131,19
thickness, 128,9
time, 123,6; 125,17.31; 128,1; 132,1; 134,5.18; 137,33; 138,30; 139,21; 141,8; 142,5; 143,2
triad, 128,21; 138,24; 139,2; 146,32

unequal, see equal
unique, 154,15
unit, 123,34; 136,29; 138,10; 139,2; 145,36; 153,20; 154,4
unity, 137,21
universe, see also cosmos, 128,27; 135,11; 148,8.15; 149,32
'up' and 'down', 142,26; 148,1

water, 127,35
weight, 128,6; 152,9.14.15
When, 134,7.21; 142,36
Where, 134,6.22; 142,35

Index of Passages

References are to the page and line numbers of the *CAG* text and to the notes.

AMMONIUS
in *Cat.* **29,5**: n.17; **54,5**: n.8
ARISTOTLE
DA **417b6**: n.11
GC **329b18**: n.223
Metaph. **986a15**: n.173; **999a6**: n.60; **1020a26**: n.58; **1028a36**: n.33; **1028b36**: n.8; **11029a5**: n.23; **1031a28**: 129,22; n.95; **1071b3**: n.136; **1086a5**: n.96
Phys. **187b13**: n.196; **200b33**: n.107; **201a10**: 140,5; **201b8**: 140,5; n.156; **202a7**: 140,5; **203a10**: n.173; **209b6**: n.8; **212a5**: 150,2; n.215; **212b8**: 150,3; n.216; **219b1**: n.58; **220b15**: n.132; **226b23**: 123,30; **227a10**: 123,30; n.42; **231a21**: n.42
ARISTOXENUS
Harmonica **32**: n.113
DEXIPPUS
in Cat. **27,2**: n.36; **48,20**: n.36; **64,15**: nn.3 & 27; **64,23**: n.24; **66,18**: n.74; **67,7**: n.59; **67,15**: n.63; **67,25**: n.69; **68,12**: n.90; **68,17**: n.92; **69,5**: n.100; **69,25**: n.101; **69,37**: nn.105 & 109; **70,17**: n.112
IAMBLICHUS
in Nicom. **35,24**: n.194
PHILOPONUS
in Phys. **579,3**: n.162
contra Proclum **426,22**: n.162
PLATO
Laws **625C**: 173,34; **653A**: 193,24
Parmenides **142B**: n.6
Phaedo **37D**: n.75; **51E**: n.19; **52C**: n.98; **92C**: n.75; **99D**: n.192
Philebus **16C & 23C**: n.127
PLOTINUS
Enneads **3.4.3**: 191,10; **3.6.1.28**: n.66; **3.6.5.25**: n.88; **4.8.4.26**: n.88; **6.1.4**: 127,12; 129,28; 130,7; 133,10; **6.1.4.5**: n.73; **6.1.4.11**: nn.121 & 124; **6.1.4.13**: n.90; **6.1.4.28**: n.100; **6.1.4.34**: n.102; **6.1.5.1**: n.105; **6.1.5.14**: n.108; **6.1.14.20**: n.130; **6.1.15.3**: 140,6; **6.1.15.12**: n.157; **6.3.11**: 144,14; 145,21; 151,7; **6.3.11.6**: nn.133 & 134; **6.3.11.11**: nn.184 & 219; **6.3.11.12**: n.191; **6.3.12.1**: n.200; **6.3.12.7**: n.193; **6.3.12.9**: n.195; **6.3.12.13**: 133,15 & n.122; **6.3.12.16**: n.196; **6.3.12.17**: n.188; **6.3.13.1**: nn.74 & 123; **6.3.13.4**: 127,14; **6.3.13.6**: n.99; **6.3.13.12**: n.59; **6.3.13.14**: n.74; **6.3.21.1**: n.157
PORPHYRY
in Cat. **64,28**: n.44; **95,22**: n.131; **100,8**: n.3; **100,11**: n.27; **100,20**: n.28; **100,29**: n.59; **101,4**: n.41; **101,26**: n.46; **101,30**: n.117; **103,18**: n.54; **104,12**: n.138; **104,14**: n.143; **105,6**: n.137; **106,11**: n.168; **106,30**: n.172; **106,35**: n.175; **1107,1**: n.200; **107,25**: n.177; **108,5**: n.156; **108,15**: n.187
Isagoge **12,13**: n.220
PROCLUS
in Euclid. **127**: n.190
SIMPLICIUS
in De Caelo **710,14**: n.79
SOPHOCLES
Ajax **646**: 123,14
SVF
1.26: n.57; **3.210**: n.45